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This study seeks to examine whether CEO duality further exacerbates CEOs' motivation of self‐interest to engage in mergers and acquisitions to increase their compensation.

Regression tests using CEO compensation as the dependent variable, and CEO duality, firm size and firm performance as independent test and control variables. The regression tests are used for various sub‐samples of the firms, those that merge and those that have CEO duality.

The results indicate that for merging firms CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size. However, this association is unaffected by CEO duality. For non‐merging firms, the results indicate that CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size and firm performance. CEO duality moderates the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance.

This study is limited to the extent that it does not observe the deliberations of compensation committees in their setting of CEO compensation, but only examines the outcomes of those deliberations. A future area of research is to examine compensation schemes of merger/acquisition CEOs in the context of other government structures, such as board independence and composition.

Shareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels positively associated with firm performance may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board.

This study contributes to the literature by concluding that governance structure influences CEO compensation schemes and CEOs of merging firms command higher compensation in spite of governance structure and firm performance.

CEO duality occurs when the same individual holds both the CEO and board Chair positions. In some countries (such as Britain) CEO duality is considered to impair good corporate governance. In the United States, however, CEO duality is still a common practice. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) included many corporate governance reforms, but the Act did not address the issue of CEO duality. However, we suggest that the corporate governance environment surrounding the passage of SOX may have influenced corporate board decisions regarding CEO duality when appointing new CEOs. In this study, we seek to determine whether CEO duality changed in the post-Sox environment by investigating the likelihood of CEO duality when CEO changes took place before and after SOX. Using a sample of 182 CEO succession events before and after the passage of SOX, we find that the likelihood of combining the CEO and Chair positions for newly appointed CEOs significantly decreased in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period. Our results suggest the SOX environment fostered a greater focus on governance issues even beyond the specific provisions of SOX.

This study investigates whether and how chief executive officers (CEOs) with personal risk-taking preference (expressed in owning a pilot license) will act differently when they are vested with additional power serving as board chairs.

Regressions analyses are performed using a sample of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 firms with available data during 1996–2009. CEO's risk-taking outcomes are measured using firms' total risk, idiosyncratic risk and research and development expenditures (R&D) investment.

Firms led by pilot CEOs have greater firm risks, yet CEO duality attenuates the relationship. Further channel tests show that CEO duality suppresses CEO's risk-taking tendencies through managers' reputation concerns.

The findings highlight the importance of incorporating human factors into consideration of appropriate governance structures for a firm. Future studies can expand the existing data and further explore the relationship between human factors and governance structures on other firm strategies.

Regulators may focus mainly on regulatory setting based on the “best practice” of governance yet overlook human influence in corporate dynamics. For shareholders, hiring managers with distinct styles will change corporate outcomes but different governance mechanisms could be devised to adapt to CEOs with various personalities.

Prior studies show that both CEO personal preferences and firms' governance structure affect corporate policies, and this paper complements prior studies by exploring how the two may interact to shape corporate policy and its outcomes. This paper also adds to the literature showing that CEO duality could serve a disciplinary role.

This paper aims to concentrate on the prevailing agency theory along with its complementary theory of stewardship as foundations for the authors' research. Recent economic turmoil within the USA has resulted in stakeholders demanding change within governance policies of corporations. One such adjustment has been the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions within organizations. The authors' study seeks to uncover the extent to which duality CEO relationships exist in large corporations within the USA. In light of the push towards splitting the dual roles, the authors further investigated new CEOs recently appointed into the CEO position.

Companies selected for this study were the top 500 revenue‐producing companies in the USA as published by Fortune magazine in 2008. For comparison purposes, the authors' database included newly appointed CEOs coming on board with the original 2008 companies that had remained on the listing for both years as published by Fortune in 2010. The authors' 2008 database included 500 companies and their 2010 database included 86 companies. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) was the product classification used in order to establish the principal industry sector for companies under analysis.

The authors' 2008 analysis reveals that 303 CEOs hold a combination title of CEO and Chairman. The most frequent title combination is CEO and Chairman, with 156 executives holding this combined title. The authors' 2010 analysis reveals that 33 new CEOs hold a combination title of CEO and Chairman. The most frequent title combination is CEO and President with 43 executives holding the title. The authors' analysis of retired CEOs reveals that 15 retired CEOs continue serving in the capacity of Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Using the top 500 companies in the USA, based upon sales revenue, did limit the study to large corporations within the USA.

The agency theory does provide an explanation of the duality movement witnessed in corporations. The practice of splitting duality roles of CEO and Chairman within public corporations appears to be becoming a reality within the USA, whether on a voluntary or a mandatory basis in order to enhance corporate independence and transparency.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the moderating role of CEO duality on the geographic diversification–firm performance relationship in the US lodging industry.

To examine the individual effect of geographic diversification and the moderating effect of CEO duality, this study adopts random effects regression. Additionally, to appropriately address the endogeneity issue, this study uses random effects regression with the instrumental variable method. The sample period spans 1990-2015 and 258 firm-year observations are included.

This study finds that geographic diversification has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. Also, the result shows a positive and significant moderating role of CEO duality, which implies that the magnitude of the impact of geographic diversification on firm performance is significantly greater when CEO duality exists.

Although it has a limitation of applying the results of this study to privately held lodging firms in other countries, US public lodging firms are encouraged to consider a corporate governance structure incorporating CEO duality to maximize the effect of geographic diversification on firm performance.

This study contributes to the hospitality literature by providing a unique dimension that the influence of geographic diversification is contingent on the adoption of CEO duality. And, the results of this study provide practical guidelines for the lodging firms’ implementation of geographic diversification.

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance and the moderating effects of the family control factor on this relationship with respect to public companies in Hong Kong.

This study employs publicly available data from financial databases and the annual reports of a sample of 128 publicly‐listed companies in Hong Kong in 2003.

Neither agency theory nor stewardship theory alone can adequately explain the duality‐performance relationship. The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between CEO duality and accounting performance is contingent on the presence of the family control factor. CEO duality is good for non‐family firms, while non‐duality is good for family‐controlled firms.

The study is based on publicly available financial data, and actual board processes are not observed.

The design of board leadership structure is contingent on corporate ownership and control (family control or not).

The paper provides empirical evidence that CEO duality is not necessarily bad for public companies in Hong Kong and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, business practitioners, and academic researchers.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.

Purpose – This paper aims at re-examining the predictions of agency theory with regard to the negative association between CEO duality (i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, CEO, serves also as the board chairman) and corporate performance. It also examines the role of other corporate governance mechanisms (board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as moderating variables in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This paper uses the financial statements for the year 2006 of most actively traded Egyptian companies to examine these predictions of agency theory. Moderated Regression Analysis is used to analyse the empirical data.

Findings – The findings indicated that the hypothesized relationships between CEO duality, the moderating variables and corporate performance have changed. For companies characterized by large boards and low top management ownership, corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and positively impacted by institutional ownership.

Research limitations/implications – A limitation of this study is the use of accounting-based performance measures because of the expected earnings management behaviours by CEOs.

Practical implications – The Egyptian Capital Market Authority should adopt a reform programme to encourage Egyptian listed companies to modify their governance structures by increasing top management ownership and reducing board sizes before incorporating the new governance rules into the listing requirements.

Originality/value of paper – The paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance and corporate performance by introducing a framework for identifying and analysing moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

This study aims to examine whether CEO duality affects the association between board gender composition, dividend policy and cost of debt (COD).

The S&P 1500 firms’ data for this study were collected from the Bloomberg professional service terminal for the period 2010-2015.

The results show that board gender composition positively impacts both a firm’s propensity to pay dividends and the level of payouts. However, this positive association is only present in firms with CEO duality. The authors find no significant association between board gender composition and COD, but when the authors split the sample into firms with and without CEO duality, the authors find a negative association in firms without CEO duality.

The empirical results highlight important issues for policymakers, managers and investors. The study provides positive feedback on corporate governance rejuvenation efforts that seek to engender and advocate the appointments of female directors to corporate boards. Market participants, such as financial analysts and lenders, could recognize the empirical specifics related to the influence of board gender composition on firms’ dividend policy and COD in the context of CEO duality.

This study fills an important gap in the literature on the relationship between board gender composition and its relation with dividend policy and COD.

This study aims to draw on the resource dependence theory to synthesize the conflicting arguments as well as commonalities of the agency and stewardship perspectives on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.

Multiple regression analysis is used to analyze the data collected from a sample of 212 large-scale publicly listed companies representing 20 sectors in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.

The research results based on all of 212 publicly listed companies in Sri Lanka show, in support of the agency theory, that CEO duality exerts a negative effect on firm performance when the CEO is equipped with additional informal power. Conversely, CEO duality exhibits a positive effect on firm performance when board involvements are high, a finding that supports the commonalities of the agency and stewardship theoretical perspectives.

By examining the governance practices and concepts in an Asian developing economy, this study provides insight into the power dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors in managerial contexts that are largely different from those in western countries.

This study expands the theoretical underpinning of corporate governance research by identifying the performance implications of CEO duality within the broad context of the resource provision of the board of directors and the informal power of CEOs.