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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of financial restatements (FRs) on the likelihood of the top management team (TMT) dismissal. It investigates the effects of types of FRs [corrective note and reissuance of financial statement (RFS)], of FR severity and of FR related to international financial reporting standards (IFRSs) easy or difficult-to-estimate.

The authors hand-collect: data about 96 FRs from the Italian public oversight board documents; chief executive officer (CEO) name, chairman name, year of the financial statement under investigation, total assets and operating income, from their financial statement. The authors use multivariate regression to test the effects of FRs on the probability of TMT dismissal.

The authors find that the RFS leads to a higher likelihood of chairman dismissal. A greater magnitude of misrepresentation on income statements, and FRs, which decrease net income, increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Difficult-to-estimate IFRSs increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.

FRs are significant determinants of the CEO/chairman dismissal. The authors show that FRs directly involving shareholders (RFS) have negative consequences on the chairman of the board of directors, while the CEO is more affected by FRs that involve technical factors (FR severity or financial statement associated with difficult-to-estimate IFRSs).

This paper aims to examine how regulatory legitimacy and moral legitimacy influence biased performance evaluations on female chief executive officers’ (CEOs) dismissal.

The final sample contains 10,780 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013.

This paper finds that the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal is weakened when the firm has a female CEO. In addition, the regulatory legitimacy pressure and moral legitimacy pressure can disrupt the biased performance evaluations in the board.

This study enriches female leadership literature regarding gender stereotype issues by incorporating institutional approach and organizational legitimacy literature. By focusing on regulatory legitimacy and moral legitimacy, this work also helps to further understand gender-related organizational behaviors and outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the turnover‐performance relation depends on the proportion of outside directors and institutional ownership concentration and to explore the relative roles of accounting‐ and stock‐based performance measures in the process of CEO dismissals.

Probit analysis using an unbalanced panel of the top 460 UK listed companies from 1990 to 1998 was employed.

No evidence of effective board monitoring was found. On the other hand, evidence of institutional shareholder activism was found. In particular, when institutional concentration is high, the turnover‐performance link is more negative in relation to stock returns but less negative in relation to accounting performance. This is consistent with institutional investors using a richer set of information than that contained in reported accounting earnings.

Further research may examine the effect of board monitoring on the turnover‐performance relation after considering the endogeneity of board structure and membership. Moreover, further research may examine the complementarity of the two governance mechanisms considered, i.e. the board of directors and institutional investors.

In the aftermath of Enron and other corporate frauds world‐wide, the paper exploits a unique dataset of institutional ownership and provides additional evidence on the controversial role of boards and institutional investors in replacing inefficient CEOs, as well as on the role of accounting information in the effectiveness of governance processes.

This paper focuses on the dismissal of two Australian managing directors/CEOs after a relatively short tenure in office. Despite the fact that one was an insider and the other was an outsider, they were both selected to lead two of the largest corporations in Australia. Power and political influence played a vital role in their dismissal. Both CEOs attempted to take charge of their organizations, but failed to take the power and influence of the board into account. Implications and recommendations for executives are outcomes of the paper.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of the splintered chief executive officer (CEO) succession literature and provide a unifying future research agenda.

This review content analyzes 227 relevant articles published after 1994. These articles examine the causes, process, replacement, and consequences of CEO succession.

The review develops a comprehensive typology, identifies gaps in the literature, and proposes opportunities for future research. For instance, the CEO succession literature can be classified along four primary dimensions: when, how, who, and consequences. These four primary dimensions are further explained by ten secondary factors and 30 tertiary components. Research opportunities include: enlarging the data pool to expand the repertoire of firms studied, incorporating the CEO’s perspective, and integrating CEO succession research with literatures in selection, turnover, and human capital theory.

Through integrating research across research domains, future research will be able to better predict when CEO succession will occur, how to avoid unwanted CEO succession, how to better implement CEO succession, and how to minimize negative aspects and maximize positive aspects of CEO succession for the firm and the CEO, as well as understand the consequences of CEO selection, and help move toward and understanding of how to prevent poor performance, and retain high performing CEOs.

This is the first comprehensive review since 1994. It creates a typology to guide and categorize future research, and shows ways to incorporate relevant, but often ignored literatures (e.g. human resources, psychology, decision making, and human capital).

We develop theoretical arguments from the efficiency wage model (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984) to provide better understanding of Fama’s (1980) seminal notion that executive labor markets contribute to the alignment of executive and shareholder interests. We show how the efficiency wage model can be integrated with several other theories of executive turnover. Furthermore, the model allows for predictions that have received very little analysis to date, such as the effect of firm risk and executive salaries on turnover. We test predictions from the model on a sample of executives from 280 manufacturing firms observed annually from 1986 to 1992. Our sample includes data on over 12,000 observations and nearly 1,700 employment terminations. The results are consistent with the main predictions of the efficiency wage model. Holding performance constant, boards of directors are less patient with (more likely to dismiss) executives who have lower salaries and those in higher risk firms.

Drawing on the literature on CEO succession research and impression management, the present study examines how the selection of CEO successors affects their motivation to initiate postsuccession strategic change. Based on the perspective of reference-dependence in prospect theory, the study also explores the impact of boards' reference-point setting on the intensity of CEO successors' inclination to change corporate strategy after assuming office.

Two-stage Heckman model and a spline function analysis are used to analyze data of 4,373 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2016.

The empirical findings indicate that the intensity of CEO successors' willingness to change corporate strategy is diluted by the gap between the focal firm's performance on succession and its prior performance, while it is strengthened by the gap between the focal firm's performance on succession and the industry-average level of performance

By establishing a theoretical model, the present study analyzes the process of CEO selection to explore the role of boards of directors in this process and its effect on CEO successors' willingness to initiate postsuccession strategic change. Significantly, this study shows that the boards of directors would adopt internal and external reference setting when evaluating CEO successors in the postsuccession phase, which would impact the intensity of successors' motivation to manage impression by initiating postsuccession strategic change.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the association between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure, compensation, and firm's performance.

The paper compares the influence firms' performance on CEOs' cash and total compensation based on the length of tenure. It also examines pay–performance relationship for new CEOs vs those serving their last year in such positions.

The firm size appears to be a significant explanatory variable for CEOs' cash and total compensation regardless of CEOs tenure and measure of performance. Additionally, firms' performance is a significant determinant of cash compensation for CEOs during the first three years of their work as CEOs and not significant for those with 15 years or more as the company's CEO. Both market‐based and accounting‐based performance measures are negatively correlated with CEOs' total compensation regardless of length of experience.

This study did not differentiate routine CEO changes, i.e. normal retirement, from the non‐routine ones. Additionally, the results may be limited by the temporal nature of the sample. Future studies dealing with CEO turnover should cover a longer period of CEO' tenure and examine the nature of CEO's dismissal. Such a research design may provide additional insight to the CEO compensation and influence of performance measures in executive contracts.

This research offers some evidence in support of CEO incentives relative to the length of service as the firm's CEO. The findings indicate differences in pay–performance sensitivities on the basis of CEO's tenure. Comparing the pay–performance relationship for individuals serving their first year and those serving their last year as the firm's CEOs, the paper detects statistically significant differences in influence of performance on cash compensation.

Scholars working in the strategy area have long held that one of the primary ways in which organizations adapt to external changes is through strategic choice. Inasmuch as a new CEO can result in a new strategic direction for the firm, the CEO turnover event itself is an important way by which organizations can signal an alteration in the direction of the firm. In this chapter, we explore how and why CEO turnover has become one of the most powerful indicators of adaptation the firm can make and propose a research agenda to guide future work on CEO turnover.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of board characteristics on CEO turnover performance relationship (TPR) in Indian listed firms.

A subset of the Standard and Poor’s Bombay Stock Exchange 500 (S&P BSE 500) Index companies was analyzed over the period 2015–2019 using the logistic (fixed-effects) regression model.

It was found that a weak relationship exists between CEO turnover and firm performance. With respect to board characteristics, board size was found to have a significant role in strengthening the TPR. However, other characteristics, such as board independence, multiple directors, board meetings and board gender diversity, played no role in influencing the TPR.

First, the study period is limited to five years, during which several sample firms did not face any CEO turnover event leading to small sample size. Second, this study considers only the board’s gender diversity, whereas other types of diversity are omitted. Third, this study does not differentiate between insider and professional CEOs.

The findings suggest that regulators should focus on the effective enforcement of laws to strengthen the TPR and improve the monitoring role of boards, particularly in emerging economies like India, which face type II agency problems in addition to traditional principal–agent conflict. The results also offer implications for corporations, investors and academic researchers, highlighting areas that need considerable attention pertaining to corporate governance.

This study discerns the impact of several board-related characteristics on the TPR, particularly after the introduction of the new Companies Act 2013 in the emerging economy of India, where it has not been explored extensively.