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This chapter investigates whether core competence of managers and their expansive (vs. specialized) managerial style affects firms' innovative ability, capacity, and efficiency. Using exogenous CEO departures as a natural experiment, it establishes a causal link between managerial capability and innovation. Importantly, it reveals that firms with talented managers receive significantly more nonself citations; make significantly lower self-citations and lesser citations to the others, indicating novel and explorative innovation achievements. Also, managers with higher general (specialized) ability are cited more (less) by patents from a wider range of fields. Lastly, career concern is identified as a mechanism linking higher ability and innovation.

This study aims to investigate how the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm performance, documented in prior research, is affected by the joint effects of managerial ability and attributes of the firm's governance structure.

Unbalanced panel contains the essence of cross-sectional time-series data. A significant F-test proves the inappropriateness of pooled OLS regression to the sample. Further, the rejection of the Hausman test null favors fixed-effects over random-effects. However, statistically significant results from Shapiro–Wilk test, Breusch–Pagan test and Wooldridge test reveal non-normal distribution of the dependent variable, the presence of heteroscedasticity and the existence of first-order autocorrelation, respectively. Thus, this study applies feasible generalized least squares with panel-specific autocorrelation structure (hence, a slightly smaller sample) controlling for heteroskedasticity to all models after lagging all the explanatory variables by a year.

This study finds that higher levels of managerial ability enable firms to benefit more/less from their CSR investments depending on the presence/absence of appropriate governance devices. While CEO ability may be seen as an indicator of how well the CEO might serve the firm in the market-domain strategies, the results suggest that this may not be the case in the non-market domain in the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms.

The arguments and analyses in this study support two important contributions to the growing literature on CSR. First, the current study is one of the few to identify CEO ability as an important factor that may influence the dynamics of the firm's CSR (see also Garcì-Sànchez et al., 2019 and Yuan et al., 2019). Second, this study examines whether governance robustness minimizes the potential for opportunistic behavior of more able CEOs or constraints the effectiveness of more able CEOs in decisions pertaining to CSR.

This paper aims to consider the effect of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) ability on the amount of cash stock at the firm level.

The empirical hypothesis is examined via fixed-effect regression models using data from US incorporated firms.

Consistent with the upper echelon theory and cash holding motives, the results reveal that able CEOs are associated with an increased level of cash stock, ceteris paribus. Further analysis shows that the association between CEO ability and firm cash holding is more profound for financially sound firms. The authors also demonstrate that firm size significantly affects the relationship between CEO ability and cash management. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses and additional tests.

This work is subject to limitations inherent in the use of relevant proxies. Thus, the study implements several model specifications to ensure the validity of findings in a more generic context. Future research should investigate the board structure’s role and the monitoring procedures on the CEOs’ cash holding behavior as a natural extension to this study.

The insights derived from the study are expected to advance the decision-making process of cash policies and CEO selection for shareholders, business executives and investment strategists.

Overall, the study provides new evidence that CEO ability is a contingent factor of corporate cash stock.

Most prior studies investigating determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals ignore how managerial ability affects compensation. This study aims to examine whether CEOs with greater ability to manage corporate resources efficiently receive more payment in nonprofit hospitals.

This study employs a sample of 764 observations from 85 Pennsylvania nonprofit hospitals for the period 2010–2020.

This study finds a positive and statistically significant association between managerial ability and CEO compensation. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability.

The measure of managerial ability proposed in this study could be used by boards of directors to quantify, evaluate and benchmark CEO ability. The results are also relevant to policymakers, stakeholders and the public interested in understanding the determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofits.

This study is among the first to use a more precise measure of managerial ability, which captures the unobserved manager-specific aspects of CEO ability. In addition, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that CEO's ability to manage hospital resources efficiently plays an essential role in designing executive compensation contracts.

Chief executive officer (CEO) ability may have an effect on various corporate reporting decisions, and consequently, the CEO ability is subject to scrutiny by regulatory reviewers. However, theoretical literature provides mixed evidence on how the CEO ability affects the regulatory review risk. Thus, this study aims to empirically examine the effect of CEO ability on regulatory review risk.

To measure CEO ability, this study uses the CEO ability-score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Further, to measure regulatory review risk, the study uses the probability of receiving a comment letter from the Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran.

This study finds that the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk is generally negative and statistically significant but not economically significant, i.e. the relationship is very small. In this regard, the study shows that the relationship is negative and also statistically and economically significant for firms with low levels of agency conflicts and high levels of corporate governance quality; and is positive and also statistically and economically significant for firms with high levels of agency conflicts and low levels of corporate governance quality. In addition, while the study finds no evidence that the regulatory reviewers’ workload compression influences the general relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk, it documents that low (high) regulatory reviewers’ workload compression weakens (strengthens) both the relationships stated above.

Collectively, the results suggest that the agency conflicts/corporate governance quality and regulatory reviewers’ workload compression are important factors in the analysis of the relationship between the CEO ability and regulatory review risk. The results offer insights into the opposing theoretical viewpoints about the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk. Thus, the results will be of interest to boards of directors and other stakeholders involved in the regulatory review process.

This study aims to investigate the impact of top management team (TMT)'s gender diversity on corporate social performance (CSP). It sheds light on inconsistent results in literature by testing the moderator effects of chief executive officer (CEO) managerial ability and corporate governance (CG) on such impact.

A dynamic panel estimator is applied to an international sample of 8640 firm‐year observations from 2013 to 2017.

The author finds reliable evidence that the critical mass of at least three women leaders has a positive impact on the firm's CSP. Obtained results suggest, moreover, the deterrence effects of CEO managerial ability and CG tools (board independence, board gender diversity, the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee and family control) on the women leaders' contribution to the firm's CSP level. These results remain consistent with alternative measures for women leaders and CEO managerial ability. However, findings are lost when women achieve the CEO position, the chairperson position or both positions, which imply that men and women leadership styles are closely similar rather than different. Furthermore, women leaders' effect on CSP seems dependent (do not) on the country (industry) which a firm belongs to.

From a practical standpoint, the study highlights the importance of fostering the achievement of a critical mass of women leaders and the combination of CEO managerial ability – educational/professional backgrounds – and CG attributes to improve the firm's CSP. The study has important implications for investors and regulators. If investors wish to increase CSP, they should ask for more gender diversified TMTs. Furthermore, this study supports regulators in their efforts to increase senior women's quotas by providing empirical evidence of better social outcomes under leader gender diversity. The study’s evidence is also useful for companies in setting the criteria to identify CEOs who can support their strategic decisions.

By studying the impact female leaders have on CSP under CEO managerial ability and CG as moderators, this study is the first to display complementarities and substitutions between CEO's managerial ability and selected CG attributes in the promotion of CSP by female senior executives. Furthermore, it fills the void on how TMT's gender diversity impact CSP. In fact, while it is conventionally considered that women are more likely to engage in socially responsible activities, sensitive findings of this study shed light on the brighter side of female executives when they achieve the CEO, the chairperson position or both positions.

This research aims to examine the moderating role of green chief executive officer (CEO) in the effect of managerial ability (MA) on environmental performance (ENV).

This research’s sample consists of 197 manufacturing firm-years that are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the Program Penilaian Peringkat Kinerja Perusahaan Dalam Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup (PROPER) participants. Data analysis use industry- and year-effect regression analysis.

The result shows that MA improves ENV when led by a green CEO. It indicates that a green CEO with higher MA considers environmental responsibilities as a valuable investment to create business competitive advantages and sustainability.

First, this research only uses the PROPER participants as the research sample. Second, by nature, MA measurement errors might still exist because it is hard to determine the MA with qualitative factors. Third, this research does not split the environmental responsibilities into a wider spectrum, such as environmental–business, environmental–regulation or environmental–ethical spectrum.

This research provides new evidence that higher MA by green CEO increases ENV in Indonesia. This research also gives a contribution to fill the inconsistent previous findings of MA and ENV.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of managerial ability on informative earnings management (hereafter IEM) and to examine the moderating role of the chief executive officer and board of commissioner relationship (hereafter CEO-commissioner relationship) and board independence between managerial ability and IEM.

Sample consists of 864 firm-years listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Informative earnings management is measured by the relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings growth. Managerial ability is measured by data envelopment analysis. This research uses firm-effect logistic regression to perform the data analysis.

Based on firm-effect logistic regression, managerial ability increases IEM. It confirms the managers’ stewardship behavior where managers tend to engage in IEM and provide higher quality information for shareholders. The result also shows that the absence of a CEO-commissioner relationship and higher board independence leads higher ability managers to engage more in IEM. It confirms the role of corporate governance to reduce managers-shareholders conflict (in the context of agency theory) or to facilitate higher ability managers to act as both controlling and minority shareholders’ stewards (in the context of stewardship theory) by engaging more in IEM and providing higher-quality information.

This research contributes to filling the previous studies gap that provides conflicting results on managerial ability and earnings management by considering earnings management motivations, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence. This research also contributes to providing new evidence of managerial ability, IEM, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence, especially in Indonesia.

This paper examines the role of managerial discretion in the relation between managerial ability on the level of corporate cash.

Conjoining the upper echelons theory's premises and the theoretical framework of cash holdings, we posit that the managerial ability's effect on cash policy varies with managerial discretion using firm-level data. To test the empirical prediction, we employ a linear regression model with fixed effects with a sample of US listed firms from 1980 to 2016.

The findings reveal that the positive association between the ability of chief executive officers and corporate cash savings is weakened by firm-level managerial discretion. The results are robust to various additional analyses, namely lagged independent variables regression, reduced form regression and granger causality test. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the cash holding motives yielding transaction and precautionary demand for money. However, our findings also shed light on whether managerial discretion moderates or exacerbates agency problems related to top executives' cash holding policies.

This work's distinct characteristic is the investigation of the joint effect of managerial talent and discretion on a firm's cash holding, which remains unexplored in the literature.

Prior research shows that managers with lower ability release less accurate management earnings forecasts and have more earnings restatements, lower earnings persistence and lower quality accruals estimations. Yet, whether the impact of managerial ability (MA) on financial reporting can be extended to the narrative section of firms' financial disclosures needs to be theoretically and empirically examined. The authors theorize in this paper that managers with low ability opportunistically inflate the tone to increase outsiders' perceptions of their ability. The authors also examine the relation between MA and the informativeness of tone to predict future firm performance and explain investors' reaction at earnings announcement.

The authors collect 24,000 earnings press releases of 1,149 distinct firms between 2004 and 2013. Content analysis is used to proxy the tone of the disclosures. The authors use the score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure MA. The authors then employ panel data regressions to examine the impact of MA on disclosure tone.

The authors find that low-ability managers inflate the disclosure tone to positively influence labor market's perceptions about their ability. This effect is magnified for younger and shorter-tenured managers, for firms with more intense monitoring and during bear markets. The authors also find that the tone of earnings press releases of low-ability managers results in a lower stock price reaction. Supplementary analyses show that the results do not only hold for the tone, but also can be extended to other linguistic features such as the numerical intensity and the readability of earnings press releases. The results are robust to alternative library specifications and other corporate disclosures such as CEO letters to shareholders or 10-K filings.

The paper shows that managers worry about how firm performance influences the labor market assessment of their ability. In particular, the authors find that managers of low ability are willing to opportunistically manipulate the content of corporate disclosures to improve this perception and build their reputation.

The authors contribute by providing theoretical and empirical evidence on how managers attempt to steer assessments of their ability by manipulating corporate disclosures. Consistent with prior business research suggesting that one's ability is a key feature that affects managers' propensity to engage in ethical practices, such as tax avoidance or manipulation of financial information, this study shows that less able managers tend to inflate the tone of the earnings announcements and that this ability-driven bias is likely to be magnified by career concerns.