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Natural disasters and other crises present methodological challenges to organizational researchers. While these challenges are well canvassed in the literature, less attention has been paid to understanding how distinct crisis events may present, not only unique challenges, but also important opportunities for research. In this chapter, we draw on our collective experience of conducting post-earthquake research and compare this with the COVID-19 pandemic context in order to identify and discuss the inherent vulnerabilities associated with disaster studies and the subsequent methodological challenges and opportunities that researchers might encounter. Adopting a critical perspective, the chapter grapples with some of the more contentious issues associated with research in a disaster and crisis context including aspects of stakeholder engagement, ethics, reciprocity, inequality, and vulnerability.

In light of the many crises and catastrophes faced in the modern world, policymakers frequently make claims to be ‘following the science’ or being ‘governed by the data’. Yet, conflict based on inequalities continue to fuel dissatisfaction with the decisions and actions of authorities. Research into public security may require surveillance and covert observations, all of which are subject to major ethical challenges. Any neat distinction between covert and overt research is difficult to maintain given the variety of definitions used for all the terms addressed here. Covert research may be ethically justified and is not necessarily deceptive. In any case, deception may be ethical if engaged in for the ‘right’ reasons. Modern research sites and innovative research methods may enhance opportunities for covert work. In all surveillance and covert work, care must be taken about how consent is managed, how observed subjects are protected and harm to all involved minimised in all situations.

This chapter draws on experiences of research with children who work as street traders in Nigeria, with a focus on establishing trust and the related concepts of power and rights. The discussion stems from a study which used a rights-based approach to gather children’s accounts of their experiences of working as street traders within a large market in a Nigerian city. Seventeen children (aged 10–15 years) took part in semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Children talked about difficult situations as they undertook tiring work and received conflicting messages about the importance of making an economic contribution to the family, versus the need to attend school. Researching these accounts entailed a number of ethical challenges, which centred on access and recruitment; consent/assent and participation; sensitivity of research; and researcher positionality. First, recruitment was limited to children with parents/guardians who could give consent, with assent from the children. Second, a relationship of trust had to be negotiated between the researcher and the participating children. This involved acknowledging different elements of adult–child positionality, which had implications for the ways in which children participated in the study. Third, sensitivity was essential given that children could discuss attitudes or activities, which were not universally seen as acceptable. Fourth, researcher positionality influenced all aspects of the study, including access to children, how relationships were forged and the interpretation of data. All of these challenges relied heavily on building trust with children. However, the authors illustrate how trust must be employed cautiously in research with children, given adult–child power disparities.

In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue around community-based and systems-based approaches to security risk management through the introduction of top-down and bottom-up knowledge acquisition. In essence, this relates to knowledge elicited from academic experts, or security subject-matter experts, practitioner experts, or field workers themselves and how much these disparate sources of knowledge may converge or diverge. In many ways, this represents a classic tension between organisational and procedural perspectives of knowledge management (i.e. top-down) versus more pragmatic and experience focussed perspectives (i.e. bottom-up).

This chapter considers these approaches and argues that a more consistent approach needs to address the conflict between procedures and experience, help convert field experience into knowledge, and ultimately provide effective training that is relevant to those heading out into demanding work situations. Ultimately, ethics and method are intricately bound together in whichever approach is taken and the security of both staff and at-risk populations depends upon correctly managing the balance between systems and communities.

This short chapter is an introduction to my 2018 book: The Ethics of Surveillance: An Introduction (Macnish, 2018). It is provided at the start of this PRO-RES collection of essays because it anticipates and supplements the range of issues covered in this collection and lays out some of the fundamental considerations necessary to ensure if surveillance must be conducted, it will be done as ethically as possible.

When is surveillance justified? We can largely agree that there are cases in which surveillance seems, at least prima facie, to be morally correct: police tracking a suspected mass murderer, domestic state security tracking a spy network, or a spouse uncovering partner’s infidelity. At the same time, there are other cases in which surveillance seems clearly not to be justified: the mass surveillance practices of the East German Stasi, an employer watching over an employee to ensure that they do not spend too long in the toilet, or a voyeur watching the subject of his lust undress night after night.

As an introductory text, my book does not seek to provide a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for ethical surveillance. What it does provide is an overview of the current thinking in surveillance ethics, looking at a range of proposed arguments about these questions, and how those arguments might play out in a variety of applied settings. It hence provides a useful and accessible volume for policymakers wishing to rapidly get up to speed on developments in surveillance and the accompanying ethical discussions.

Covert research has a mixed reputation within the scientific community. Some are unsure of its moral worth, others would proscribe it entirely. This reputation stems largely from a lack of knowledge about the reasons for choosing the covert method. In this chapter, these reasons will be reconstructed in detail and all the elements that will allow one to judge the level of ethicality of covert research will be laid out for the reader. In particular, the chapter will answer the following questions: What harms can result from covert research to the subjects participating in the research? Is covert research necessarily deceptive? In which cases is it ethically permissible for a researcher to deceive? What is the scientific added value of the covert research, that is, what does covert research discover that overt research does not? What are the risks to researchers acting undercover? Finally, some suggestions will be offered to research ethics reviewers to help in their appraisal of covert research.

A policy of surveillance which interferes with the fundamental right to a private life requires credible justification and a supportive evidence base. The authority for such interference should be clearly detailed in law, overseen by a transparent process and not left to the vagaries of administrative discretion. If a state surveils those it governs and claims the interference to be in the public interest, then the evidence base on which that claim stands and the operative conception of public interest should be subject to critical examination. Unfortunately, there is an inconsistency in the regulatory burden associated with access to confidential patient information for non-health-related surveillance purposes and access for health-related surveillance or research purposes. This inconsistency represents a systemic weakness to inform or challenge an evidence-based policy of non-health-related surveillance. This inconsistency is unjustified and undermines the qualities recognised to be necessary to maintain a trustworthy confidential public health service. Taking the withdrawn Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between NHS Digital and the Home Office as a worked example, this chapter demonstrates how the capacity of the law to constrain the arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of power through judicial review is not sufficient to level the playing field. The authors recommend ‘levelling up’ in procedural oversight, and adopting independent mechanisms equivalent to those adopted for establishing the operative conceptions of public interest in the context of health research to non-health-related surveillance purposes.

In many security domains, the ‘human in the system’ is often a critical line of defence in identifying, preventing and responding to any threats (Saikayasit, Stedmon, & Lawson, 2015). Traditionally, such security domains are often focussed on mainstream public safety within crowded spaces and border controls, through to identifying suspicious behaviours, hostile reconnaissance and implementing counter-terrorism initiatives. More recently, with growing insecurity around the world, organisations have looked to improve their security risk management frameworks, developing concepts which originated in the health and safety field to deal with more pressing risks such as terrorist acts, abduction and piracy (Paul, 2018). In these instances, security is usually the specific responsibility of frontline personnel with defined roles and responsibilities operating in accordance with organisational protocols (Saikayasit, Stedmon, Lawson, & Fussey, 2012; Stedmon, Saikayasit, Lawson, & Fussey, 2013). However, understanding the knowledge that frontline security workers might possess and use requires sensitive investigation in equally sensitive security domains.

This chapter considers how to investigate knowledge elicitation in these sensitive security domains and underlying ethics in research design that supports and protects the nature of investigation and end-users alike. This chapter also discusses the criteria used for ensuring trustworthiness as well as assessing the relative merits of the range of methods adopted.