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We examine explicitly priced financial distress risk in post-1990 equity markets. We add a financial distress risk factor to Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, based on Griffin and Lemmon's (2002) findings that financial distress is not fully captured by the book-to-market factor. We test three-factor and four-factor capital asset pricing models using both annual buy-and-hold analysis and monthly time series analysis across portfolios adjusted for common book-to-market, size, and financial distress factors. We find empirical support for an Ohlson (1980) O-score-based financial distress risk four-factor asset pricing model in the U.S. and Japanese markets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock return impact of “lucky” numbered days in markets dominated by Chinese participants. The existence of such patterns might present arbitrage opportunities for investors who do not share a belief in the Chinese system of “lucky” numbers.

In univariate and multivariate analyses, the author examines the statistical significance of return differences between “lucky” numbered days and other days. The author examines samples which only consider single digit days and months, and the author also considers samples based on the last digit of the day or month. Based on the findings in these tests, the author designs and tests a trading strategy on the Shenzhen Exchange that produces significant risk-adjusted returns in excess of the buy-and-hold return on the Shenzhen Composite Index.

The author shows that “lucky” numbered dates impact stock returns in Chinese markets and demonstrate a “lucky” number date trading strategy for the Shenzhen market that produces risk-adjusted returns in excess of the market return.

Prior research on home address numbers and stock trading codes shows that, in markets dominated by Chinese participants, assets with identifiers containing numbers defined by Feng Shui as “lucky” sell at a premium and assets with identifiers containing “unlucky” numbers sell at a discount. In such markets, prices are more likely to end in a “lucky” number than an “unlucky” number. Chinese firms also tend to price their shares at IPO using “lucky” numbers and avoiding “unlucky” numbers. The author extends this literature to examine whether dates containing “lucky” and “unlucky” numbers experience stock returns significantly different than other days on Chinese stock exchanges.

This paper looks at one relatively less‐visited issue in market timing: switching investments on common stocks between different stock markets, namely, “intermarket timing”. By employing the stock price data for the period of 1992‐2002 from a developed market, Hong Kong, and two emerging markets, Shanghai and Shenzhen, this paper examines potential gains and the required predictive accuracy for intermarket timing between Hong Kong and Shanghai, and between Hong Kong and Shenzhen from Hong Kong investors’ perspective. Potential gains could be obtained from such timing strategy, and the non‐high minimum forecasting ability required for successful timing is fairly attainable for Hong Kong investors, even after taking into account the assumed transaction costs.

The timeliness of portfolio holdings information disclosure has been of interest among regulators, academics and practitioners since the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Securities Exchange Commission has been trying to strike a balance between investors' interest in timely disclosure and the potential costs associated with revealing the strategies of investment managers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether current rules regarding the delay in disclosure adequately protect investors, and prevent the formation of copycat portfolios that can profit from the research of the original portfolio manager.

The paper examine the effectiveness of different delays (30, 60 or 90 days) in disclosure of holdings for a sample of large‐cap, actively‐managed mutual funds. Copycat portfolios are constructed based on the holdings of the original portfolios, and their returns compared against the returns (net of expenses) of the original portfolios over the corresponding time frames.

The results indicate that the current delay of 60 days is sufficient to prevent such free‐riding; however, shortening the delay to 30 days would adversely affect mutual fund investors.

The paper aims to provide an answer to those debates on the effective delays in portfolio disclosure among academics and practitioners based on quantitative evidence. It also contributes to leave a guideline for regulators since the patterns of over‐ or under‐performance of the original portfolio returns vis‐à‐vis the copycat portfolio returns over varying delays provide important insights about possible effects of changes in disclosure regulations.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing finance literature on capital structure by examining the long‐run equity performance of the firms that employ extremely conservative debt policy – zero leverage for three or five consecutive years.

This paper measures the long‐run equity performance of zero‐debt firms with two commonly used methods: the buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns following Barber and Lyon, and the Fama and French three‐factor models. The four‐factor models are also used to check the robustness of the result.

The authors find that zero‐debt firms perform better over the long run based on the calendar‐time portfolio regressions after adjusting for Fama‐French factors. The results indicate that the persistent lack of debt in the capital structure seems an important determinant of stock returns, and the impact of extreme conservatism in debt policy is not fully captured by the theoretical and empirical risk proxies, such as beta, size, book‐to‐market, and momentum.

The benefit of the present article for investors and portfolio managers is the identification of an additional important determinant of stock returns.

This paper is the first article that thoroughly investigates the long‐run stock returns of the firms that choose to stay debt free over an extended period of time.

This paper aims to examine the behavioral timing hypothesis in the context of UK rights issues by seeking to establish and investigate inter-relationships between directors’ trading around rights issues as a proxy for stock mis-valuation and post-issue stock price performance.

The cumulative average abnormal returns, the buy and hold abnormal returns, the standardized residual cross-sectional t-test and the generalized sign test techniques.

The directors do possess short-term timing ability as they can identify profitable trading situations by buying more often before stock outperformance and by selling more often before stock underperformance. In addition, directors trading prior to the rights offering is found to exert an influence on the long-run abnormal returns of the rights-issuing firm, which supports the story that mis-valuation and behavioral timing are empirical.

Other types of seasoned equity offerings rather than rights issues should be included.

The research provides a direct testing for the strong form of market efficiency hypothesis, which enables policymakers to take into account market reaction to directors’ trades and how it is affected by corporate events (e.g. rights issues) when addressing insider trading regulations.

This study extends available literature in the context of both developed and emerging equity markets to testing the behavioral timing hypothesis by testing the inter-relationships between directors’ trading around rights issues and post-issue short- and long-run performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that examines these inter-relationships in the UK context.

This paper examines the relationship between the extent and quality of the four dimensions of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) namely community, environment, workplace and marketplace with the long-run share price performance of Malaysian initial public offering (IPO) companies.

This study utilised secondary data by the content analysis of the annual reports and Datastream of 115 IPOs listed from 2007 to 2015 in Malaysia. The IPO’s performance was determined by calculating the return measures under the equally weighted and value-weighted schemes of the mean abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns covering the three years post-listing using the event-time approach.

The findings demonstrate that Malaysian IPOs experience substantial overperformance and underperformance when both the IPO performance measures are benchmarked against the matched companies and market. The results indicated that the extent and quality of the community and environment CSRD dimensions are positively and significantly correlated to the IPO’s performance. On the other hand, the extent and quality of the workplace and marketplace CSRD dimensions are negatively and significantly correlated to the IPO performance.

Malaysian regulators could benefit from these findings in their endeavour to carry out a reform process on CSRD to improve its quality. The results of this study are important to investors, regulators, non-government organisations, communities and policymakers. They also enhance the understanding of companies about the importance of disclosing greater CSR information to improve their performance and profitability.

To the researchers' best knowledge, this study provides new insights into the association between CSRD and the performance of Malaysian IPO companies, which is considered important.

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between intellectual capital disclosures in initial public offerings (IPOs) and post‐issue stock performance.

The analysis is based on a sample of 259 IPOs listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2005. Post‐issue stock performance is measured using market‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold returns across a 500 trading day observation window after listing. Intellectual capital disclosure is measured using an 81‐item index.

The study's major finding is a negative association between the level of intellectual capital disclosure in IPO prospectuses and post‐issue stock performance. The negative association persists regardless of industry type but is stronger for small IPOs relative to larger counterparts.

The study includes only Singapore IPOs within a specific timeframe concentrating on a single disclosure mechanism. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on an association rather than causal relationship.

The findings imply greater intellectual capital prospectus disclosure may contribute to investor over‐optimism leading to higher IPO mispricing. As information becomes available post‐issue, and over‐optimistic expectations are not immediately met, investors aggressively discount shares leading to greater negative post‐issue stock performance for high IC disclosing IPOs. Pre‐listing owners/management may exploit the speculative environment generating higher wealth transfers from investors. Policymakers may need to introduce (some) uniform intellectual capital disclosure requirements to reduce speculative market conditions.

This paper documents the first study to provide empirical evidence of the association between intellectual capital disclosures and post‐issue stock performance; thus, it offers a new path for future intellectual capital disclosure research and understanding.

This paper aims to study characteristics of specified purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and examine the performance of their securities over time.

Previous findings in literature on SPACs' performance around the announcement of merger date are scarce, not uniform, and mostly address the performance of SPACs' common shares. The authors believe that more insights on merger announcements can be obtained if the perf]ormance of all three types of securities that SPACs issue during the IPO, namely units, common stocks, and warrants are analyzed simultaneously. In order to examine the behavior of these securities we form three samples with daily returns for three distinguished SPAC securities. Results are obtained for abnormal returns based on the market model from Brown and Warner.

It is found that SPACs represent a fairly unique way to raise capital. The incentives of their founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and successful business combinations generally result in significant returns to founders. The analysis shows that SPACs have a complex corporate structure in which the incentives of the founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and where successful mergers result in significant returns to the founders. It also shows that different SPAC securities do not exhibit similar reactions in response to announcements regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three securities realize positive abnormal returns on the merger announcement day, the strongest reaction is observed among the investors holding warrants, while common stock holders react very mildly.

SPACs are recent phenomena in capital markets and very few papers in finance literature describe them. None of the existing papers evaluated performance of all three types of SPAC securities: units, common shares and warrants before this paper.