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The purpose of this paper is to determine if self-serving bias affects audit client satisfaction level with their audit firm.

A 2×2 between-subjects design is used, where the authors experimentally manipulate the level of client involvement in the audit and the extent of value-added services the client received.

Using a sample of 115 financial managers (audit clients), the authors find no evidence that self-serving bias exists among clients in the experimental setting. Rather, they find that clients appear to be more satisfied with their auditor when they (clients) participate more in the service exchange.

The research is limited to a specific context within the privately held company audit setting.

Audit firms may consider encouraging their privately held clients to participate more in the audit process by clearly communicating expectations and providing clients with audit preparedness materials, including templates and training where necessary.

Although the self-serving bias has been shown to exist in the marketing literature, the authors present a setting where the relationship between service provider (auditor) and customer (client) is such that the self-serving bias may not hold.

The enormous financial losses during the economic crash in Iceland led to widespread anxieties, coupled with a deep sense of shared national disaster and moral collapse (Bernburg, 2015; Ólafsson, 2014). The strong sense of betrayal indicates how economic processes are not only about economic prosperity, but are embedded also in wider societal discourses and a sense of national identity (Schwegler, 2009). We use perspectives from anthropology and cultural economics to ask how the lack of trust by the Icelandic population after the crash signals both a different way of visualising Iceland’s role within an increasingly global world and a changing sense of Icelanders as national subjects standing unified against foreigners. Iceland’s neo-liberalisation inserted the country into global institutions and processes with the faith that these processes would automatically be beneficial to Iceland. Furthermore, the sense of some kind of a unified Icelandic subject was manifested in the image of the ‘Business Viking’, which was seen as embodying the interest of the Icelandic nation as a whole. Following the economic crash, the betrayal of trust involved disrupting the idea of the ‘oneness’ of Iceland and thus, the sharp distinction between ‘us’ Icelanders and ‘those’ foreigners. In our discussion, we trace different ways of conceptualising this sense of Icelanders as a unified entity, asking what this notion means in terms of trust. Our research shows how the sense of ‘unified Icelanders’ was instrumental in creating the feeling of trust, and how it is possible to manipulate and appropriate that trust.

This paper aims to underscore how the digitization of content and the convergence in the telecommunications sector has prompted a wave of consolidation between telecom and content players.

Using interdisciplinary insights from competition policy and business strategy, the paper draws attention to the interplay between business model innovation and merger control in the converged telecoms sector.

Technological innovation and business model innovation led to the emergence of over-the-top (OTT) services. This innovation in turn led to two key effects, first, successful commercialization of content and the emergence of the “smart pipes” that in turn has led to the second effect, which is increased mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the converged telecommunications sector. Emergence of OTT with big data as a key advantage challenged the strategy and business models of the more established players, such as the AT&T, Time Warner, Liberty Global and Fox, which in turn led to the current trend of M&As in the sector.

This paper makes the following key contributions to the literature on M&As between the fixed/mobile and content players. First, it elucidates how the existing market players can benefit from competition policy, such as merger remedies to enter new and related markets. Second, it advocates that the US and the European competition authorities while assessing these M&As, take due account of innovation in business models, as business model innovation not only promotes innovation in the market but also enhances consumer welfare, considering that it offers the merged firm economies of scale and scope to offer better-quality goods and services at subsidized prices.

This chapter maps the political economy characteristics of Icelandic society in the post-war period. It shows how the period of statism from the early part of the 20th century, with a strong legacy of protectionism and clientelism, changed up to the present. A major turning point came with a shift towards more liberal mixed economy in 1960, which progressed through the 1980s. That was a period of very high growth rates in an egalitarian society. During the 1990s the political economy became significantly more influenced by neoliberal policies, which can be associated with the buildup of an excessive bubble economy in the 2000s. A new policy emphasis in a new environment of globalized finance, of which Iceland became an active part from 1995, in conjunction with a generally lax attitude of laissez faire in public administration, seems to have made possible rather unusual excesses in speculation and debt accumulation. That eventually led to the dramatic collapse of Iceland's financial system in October 2008. In the wake followed a deep recession. The chapter sets this long-term development into a broad societal context, taking account of political power constellations and changes in politics, the labour market and living conditions.

Through the use of a case study of a high growth start up programme in Tyneside, examines 36 entrepreneurs as they start their own business. Cites previous relevant literature and considers the link between motivation and ideas and creativity. Suggests some implications and consider further research needed.

This chapter examines the formal governance mechanisms put in place by various authorities within Iceland after the crash. In contrast to one of our earlier papers (Bryant, Sigurjónsson, & Mixa, 2014), we find that, no matter how well the mechanisms work, formal mechanisms are insufficient to restore trust. To that end, we examine the trust literature from political science that suggests that trust is a lubricant of the social system that consequently causes individuals to open themselves up to vulnerability. When trust is broken in a society with a high-existing degree of trust, such as Iceland, the loss of trust is significant and leads even apparently minor incidents to be perceived as betrayals. We examine the various processes put in place by both the government and other institutions and show how they mostly worked in concert. Nonetheless, we find that the processes by themselves have been insufficient to restore society’s trust in the affected institutions.

This article examines the effectiveness of an award‐winning program of self‐pace customer‐service training, which replaced the classroom‐based “sheep‐dip” approach at Office Depot.

Presents the comments of the Office Depot head of learning and development, and the customer‐service director, as well as the views of some of the people who have undertaken the training.

Shows that people's feelings about how they were being trained made them fearful, reluctant to learn and take up customer service. The result was high attrition and dropout rates. The self‐pace customer‐service program has provided a solution centering on how people learn to achieve tangible business benefits, supporting Office Depot's mission to be a great place to work.

Argues that the company has achieved increased business through high‐quality customer service delivered by motivated, happy, skilled staff.

Highlights the ways in which some people's reservations about the new system of training were overcome.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.