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Studies which hate examined relations between the organizational orientations of professionals, who work in bureaucracies, and measures of professionalism hate produced inconsistent and inconclusive findings. The results remain equivocal partly because restricted statistical techniques have been used and because studies have failed to differentiate between the structural and attitudinal components of professionalism. In the present study regression surface analysis was used to investigate relations between the bureaucratic orientations of 230 secondary school teachers and their professional attitudes at different levels of autonomy. The Jackknife technique was used to adjust the significance levels in the analysis. Bureaucratic orientations and autonomy had significant linear and curvilinear relations with attitude measures of ideal of service and dedication to teaching. Although the regression surfaces differed between female and male teachers, they showed that at each level of bureaucratic orientation increases in professional attitudes were associated with increases in the amount of autonomy allowed teachers. That is, bureaucratic orientations and the professional attitudes of teachers need not be in conflict if schools increase the autonomy allowed teachers.

This chapter explores the question of the relationship between bureaucracy and politics in Latin America. The objective is exploring the role that politics plays in guaranteeing a professional and autonomous bureaucracy structure.

The chapter first examines an institutional explanation for bureaucratic performance. I will scrutinize the institutional arrangements that might preclude the existence of a professional bureaucracy. The chapter then “brings the state back in,” under the assumption that the explanation for performance of bureaucracy might have been related to long-lasting conditions of “Stateness.” The bureaucracy is analyzed in a more historical perspective and relates the former with specific societal and partisan coalitions at the time of state consolidation. These historical decisions seem to have determined a pattern of clientelistic utilization of the State apparatus in some countries but not in others. The partial evidence presented in this section suggests the importance of “state strength” to understand bureaucratic performance.

This chapter examines one of the specific manifestations of political–administrative relationships, namely the delegation of powers to managers. The first part of the chapter is a literature review of political–administrative relationships in both developed and developing countries. This is followed by a discussion of the framework for delegation in South Africa that was laid down in the late 1990s. Next is an analysis of the implementation of delegation in the 2000s, along with the National Planning Commission recommendations in 2012, which has led to a resurgence in delegation initiatives. There is a well-developed government monitoring system of delegation that has led to some improvement in compliance with delegation, but the overall delegation levels are on the low side. Delegation to officials is often thwarted by Ministers who wish to retain control and/or promote patronage. Further, in some cases, managers lack capacity or are unwilling to manage and take responsibility for delegated authority.

This review frames the state of agencification studies to explore the development and results achieved to date (Q1: what has been done?) and identify future directions (Q2: what could be done?) of the studies.

A systematic approach is carried out to summarize how agencification is adopted, variability of implementation, and its effects, from literature published in the past 48 years (1973–2020). Eligibility criteria include a combination of literature quality (number of citation) and source reputation (journal impact factor). From this, 84 articles and 9 books were included in the review.

The review finds various country-specific adoptions of agencification and some similarities and differences of agencification practice across various administrative settings. Studies on the effects of agencification is limited and offer mixed results. Meanwhile, little attempt was made to reveal how micro-processes are happening in the everyday practice of agencification. The paper outlines a set of research agenda and possible alternative approaches for future studies.

This review provides an avenue for scholars and practitioners to pay more attention to the “street level” of agencification. Future studies may challenge New Public Management's view of agencification by proposing new perspectives based on a direct observation.

This study contributes to the growing amount of agencification studies by synthesizing theoretical and empirical works across countries covering developed and developing economies in local, regional, and national levels of government.

This chapter examines one of the most contested issues in Public Administration, namely political–administrative relationships. The first part of the chapter begins with a brief overview of the features of an ideal-type bureaucracy. Next is a literature review of political–administrative relationships. This is followed by an analysis of typologies of political–administrative relationships, with particular reference to developing countries. The second part of the chapter analyses the evolution of political–administrative relationships since the dawn of South African democracy in 1994. It examines the growing politicisation of the public service, the weakening of the powers of public officials vis-a-vis Ministers and the emasculation of the PSC. Data indicate that the government is unable to fill posts at the Senior Management Service (SMS) level and that there are a high number of acting HoDs, an indicator of instability. Finally, it uses Dasandi and Esteve’s typology of political–administrative relationships in developing countries to interpret the South African case.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the practices of financial autonomy and control the emerging issue of agencification in the higher education sector.

The practices are investigated using case studies from seven semi-autonomous state universities in Indonesia. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 17 respondents including university officials, policymakers, and experts. The interview results were analysed using an inductive-deductive approach.

This research highlights an unstable balance between financial autonomy and control practices in the universities. Autonomy supports agencification mainly by simplifying financial procedures and control is seen by university managers to be overemphasised compared to in the other state universities. Despite successes in introducing a business-like atmosphere within bureaucratic universities, questions about balancing financial autonomy and control remain.

The small number of cases implies limited generalisability. The two characteristics used, size and parent ministries do not represent all university variabilities.

Agencification has become a key reform practice for state universities. Rather than using a “one size fits all” approach, the government needs a repertoire of models for these institutions.

This study provides empirical evidence of agencification in the higher education sector with an emphasis on the financial dimension of autonomy and control in a developing country setting.

This paper aims to analyze antecedents of entrepreneurship propensity in two separate studies, at individual and organizational levels. The first study proposes that the effect of individual cultural values on entrepreneurial propensity is mediated by the locus of control. The second study focuses on the interaction effect between the individual's need for autonomy and a bureaucratic culture characterized by high centralization and high formalization.

The approach takes the form of surveys of business students and retail salespeople in Romania and regression analysis.

Internal locus of control predicts entrepreneurship propensity. Mediation effects were not supported. Centralization and formalization stimulate entrepreneurial propensity, especially in salespeople with a high need for autonomy. In general, the individual cultural values approach generated weak results, while the organizational culture approach showed strong support for the hypotheses.

A combination of push and pull effects determines an individual's entrepreneurial propensity. Personality traits, such as internal locus of control and need for autonomy predict entrepreneurial propensity. But individuals are pushed into entrepreneurship by negative factors, such as dissatisfaction with existing employment.

In transitional economies, entrepreneurial ventures are relied on to sustain a high growth rate, to serve the unmet needs of the population, and to create jobs. Multinationals operating in transition countries could improve recruiting decisions by hiring managers with a high internal locus of control and could then allow them decision‐making power to satisfy their need for autonomy.

The paper analyzes antecedents of entrepreneurship propensity in two separate studies, at micro (individual) and meso (organizational) levels, but set within the same transitional economy. This macro context is posited to shape both organizational culture and individual cultural values and personality traits.

While many studies have focused on the link between economics and democracy in exploring the strategies adopted by developing countries, they have tended to overlook the role of bureaucracy in democratization. This study seeks the missing link between bureaucracy and democratization. What are the conditions necessary for bureaucracy to facilitate the democratization process of a country? This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the bureaucracy literature from Max Weber and Karl Marx and then argues that despite its shortcomings, bureaucracy in its Weberian form can facilitate the political democratization of a developmental state. This study concludes that although bureaucracy is often regarded as dysfunctional, it can be instrumental in the democratization process in the context of the developmental state. This article concludes that there are six conditions for the function for democratization: big enough to protect themselves from the arbitrary use of political authority, qualification and competency, take administration out of politics and political neutrality, red tape, consensus about the good government, and having an eye on the long-term, broader interests of the country and the government.

This article provides a critical review of four constructs-organizational identification, organizational commitment, occupational identification, and occupational commitment-to advance our understanding about how public sector employees from different occupations may become psychologically attached to their organizations. This review is intended to clarify previous inconsistencies as well as spark new interest among public administration researchers to examine sources and consequences of public employees’ organizational identification and commitment. This article also elucidates about how public sector employees’ attachment to their occupations may influence their attachment to their organizations. In that effort, this article reviews interrelationships among the four constructs. Finally, based on the patterns of connections observed, a future research program including seven testable research propositions is proposed.