Search results

How do top bureaucrats define, in their own words, their professional identity and the norms they work by? Do they define them in line with a Weberian ideal type of the bureaucrat and bureaucratic norms? Or rather by a modernised entrepreneurial ideal type, often associated with New Public Management reforms? Further, what can such self-presentations tell us about professional norms operating in top bureaucrats’ daily work, and about institutional or wider societal logics guiding the non-elected, administrative side of contemporary government? The top officials, the senior civil servants in central ministries, who take part in policy-making and serve the political leadership, have a specific role distinct from that of the politicians and are guided by professional norms. Scholars focusing on this level of top bureaucrats have described their professional norms as being about serving the elected politicians loyally, but also contributing technical and thematic expertise independent of political considerations and ensuring that policy is developed according to legal standards. This chapter investigates how top bureaucrats themselves define those norms and that role – is it in line with an ideal close to Weberian ideal type characteristics, or not?

The objective of this study is to investigate how country risk, different political actions from the government and bureaucratic behavior influence the activities in industry supply chains (SCs) in emerging markets. The main objective of this study is to investigate the influence of these external stakeholders’ elements to the demand-side and supply-side drivers and barriers for improving competitiveness of Ready-Made Garment (RMG) industry in the way of analyzing supply chain. Considering the phenomenon of recent change in the RMG business environment and the competitiveness issues this study uses the principles of stakeholder and resource dependence theory and aims to find out some factors which influence to make an efficient supply chain for improving competitiveness. The RMG industry of Bangladesh is the case application of this study. Following a positivist paradigm, this study adopts a two phase sequential mixed-method research design consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches. A tentative research model is developed first based on extensive literature review. Qualitative field study is then carried out to fine tune the initial research model. Findings from the qualitative method are also used to develop measures and instruments for the next phase of quantitative method. A survey is carried out with sample of top and middle level executives of different garment companies of Dhaka city in Bangladesh and the collected quantitative data are analyzed by partial least square-based structural equation modeling. The findings support eight hypotheses. From the analysis the external stakeholders’ elements like bureaucratic behavior and country risk have significant influence to the barriers. From the internal stakeholders’ point of view the manufacturers’ and buyers’ drivers have significant influence on the competitiveness. Therefore, stakeholders need to take proper action to reduce the barriers and increase the drivers, as the drivers have positive influence to improve competitiveness.

This study has both theoretical and practical contributions. This study represents an important contribution to the theory by integrating two theoretical perceptions to identify factors of the RMG industry’s SC that affect the competitiveness of the RMG industry. This research study contributes to the understanding of both external and internal stakeholders of national and international perspectives in the RMG (textile and clothing) business. It combines the insights of stakeholder and resource dependence theories along with the concept of the SC in improving effectiveness. In a practical sense, this study certainly contributes to the Bangladeshi RMG industry. In accordance with the desire of the RMG manufacturers, the research has shown that some influential constructs of the RMG industry’s SC affect the competitiveness of the RMG industry. The outcome of the study is useful for various stakeholders of the Bangladeshi RMG industry sector ranging from the government to various private organizations. The applications of this study are extendable through further adaptation in other industries and various geographic contexts.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long partnered with universities and other nonprofit organizations to perform early-stage, military-related research using research centers established under long-term contracts known as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Over the last 25 years, there has been a shift in the type of arrangement used to University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) that this paper argues is the result of bureaucrats acting as evasive entrepreneurs in response to changing regulations.

Extending the theory of evasive entrepreneurship to bureaucrats, the author shows how regulations increase the cost of bureaucratic action and incentivize the creation of substitute actions to avoid those regulatory costs and capture benefits. Qualitative evidence from DOD documents is used to support the contention that UARCs serve the same function as FFRDCs. Quantitative evidence on the number of FFRDCs and UARCs and their funding illustrates how bureaucrats respond to political restrictions.

Bureaucrats have little to no recourse to respond to budgetary cuts or spending ceilings. In the case of FFRDCs, spending ceilings were introduced starting in the 1960s and led to a decline in the number of DOD FFRDCs. Bureaucrats can however strategically evade new regulations by reorganizing transactions justified by existing federal law that contradicts new regulations. Once FFRDCs were federally regulated in 1990 there were strong incentives to create substitute arrangements leading to the creation of UARCs in 1996 that have ultimately replaced FFRDCs as the research center of choice for the DOD.

The article makes three contributions. First, it applies the concept of evasive entrepreneurship to a political context and then use that framework to understand the creation and establishment of the DOD's UARCS. Second, the organizational features and purpose of UARCs are analyzed. Third, the evidence provided shows how regulations resulted in a shift in the DOD's R&D strategy toward working with universities.

This article assesses a rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour - the bureau-shaping model - as an explanation of budget-making in British local government. The bureau-shaping model is essentially a reconstructed rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour in liberal democratic states, which emerged from critiques of its rival budgetmaximising model. The explanatory power of the bureau-shaping model is significantly superior to the budget-maximising model. However, the explanatory power of the bureaushaping model is limited because, as a supply-side model, it cannot explain how budgets are demanded and controlled by political sponsors, who in turn are constrained politically. Budgetary decision-making takes place in a political arena where both supply and demand are mediated; a supply-side model, at best, can explain only half the budget-story.

The paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explain the exact process through which the scale effect works to create a possible wedge between a perception-based ranking like the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ” and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking of economies with low enforcement against corruption.

The paper takes into account corruption both at the “high” and “low” levels of bureaucracies, where the bribes are paid sequentially at the two levels. The bribes are endogenously determined at the equilibrium using a sequential game approach.

The paper finds that in the absence of coalition between the two levels of bureaucrats, both the absolute level of corruption and the welfare level of the economies are expected to vary inversely with the perceived corruption frequency. The paper also explores the possibility of a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats and shows that with the perception of a stable coalition being formed, the negative monotonic relation between the corruption frequency and the absolute size of corruption breaks down.

First, the paper argues that the ranking of the economies with low enforcement against corruption on the basis of perceived corruption frequency may not reflect the ranking of the economies according to their absolute size of corruption; it points out that the perceived higher corruption frequency in an economy as reflected in CPI can be an indicator of both the lower size of “high” level corruption and absolute size of corruption in the economy. Particularly, this happens in economies where coalition between the “high” and “low” level officials does not form. Second, it identifies the exact way in which the scale effect works to create a difference in the CPI ranking and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking and explains why similar difference would exist if “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking is derived from all the sources of hard data on corruption. Third, it explains why a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats in economies with low enforcement does not usually form.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the attitudes of street-level bureaucrats from different agencies and sectors of the Finnish welfare state, namely municipal social workers, diaconal workers of the Lutheran church, benefit officials of the Social Security Institution and officials of private unemployment funds.

The authors are interested in the following questions: What are the attitudes of street-level bureaucrats towards the labour market allowance? What is the impact of individual characteristics? The study utilised the unique national survey data of different groups of street-level bureaucrats from the year 2011 (total N=2,313). The dependent variables focus on legitimacy of the basic level of labour market allowance and sanction policies. Analyses are built around five independent variables which measure professional, personal interest and ideological factors.

There are differences both between and within groups of Finnish street-level bureaucrats with regard to their attitudes concerning the labour market allowance. Social and diaconal workers believe more often than officials that the level of labour market allowance is too low, and offer less support for the idea that an unemployed person should take any job that is offered or have their unemployment security reduced. The results show that the attitudes of bureaucrats are explained by length of work history, economic situation and ideological factors.

There have been very few analyses comparing attitudes among different groups of bureaucrats. The present study is intended to fill this gap in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development.

The analysis is based on a simple model of growth in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households.

Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with households in providing false information to the government. Costly concealment of this activity leads to a loss of resources available for productive investments. The incentive for a bureaucrat to accept a bribe depends on economy‐wide outcomes, which, in turn, depend on the number of other bureaucrats who accept bribes. The paper establishes the existence of multiple development regimes, together with the possibility of both history‐ and frequency‐dependent equilibria. The predictions of the analysis accord strongly with recent empirical evidence.

The paper provides insights into the issue, and in doing so, makes further inroads to the macroeconomics of misgovernance.

Many relationships between politicians and bureaucrats are based on an energy‐equilibrium model where the politicians provide energy and the bureaucrats, equilibrium. According to this model, conflicts occur when one partner does not adequately fulfill his or her expected role. This model may be fruitfully used to study the relationship between the politician, the career bureaucrat, and the political appointee. The division of roles among this “ménage à trois” is particularly difficult and often generates tension. The situation is most prone to conflict when the government is in a period of change. At such times, the newly elected politicians have a tendency to mistrust the established bureaucracy and to depend almost exclusively on their political appointees. The dysfunctions induced by this phenomenon, in regard to the capacity of the bureaucracy to adequately fulfill its equilibrium role, are very clearly illustrated by the Canadian political transition of 1984, when the federal government was handed over to the Progressive Conservative Party. A series of interviews with ministers, senior civil servants, and senior policy advisors, all of whom had ringside seats to this transition, shows how the extensive power granted to ministerial offices aggravated the difficulties usually associated with a period of transition. This particular transition illustrates how important it is for the newly elected to ensure that their partisan policy advisors play their roles without getting in the way of the indispensable cooperation which must be established between ministers and senior civil servants.

Niskanen (1971) established an influential and enduring model of bureaucrats as budget maximizers. Since this theory’s inception, most empirical tests have demonstrated the limited validity of Niskanen’s vision. Using state agency heads as an analytical unit, this paper further develops ways that the rational choice assumptions inadequately characterize bureaucratic budget aspirations: First, instead of being self-interested, many bureaucrats focus on the interests of collectives across governmental and societal actors, and second, an enhanced focus on transparency in presentation of budgetary and programmatic information reduces the information asymmetry that is central to Niskanen’s theory. The findings show that intentions based in a broad public interest and motivations of accountability and transparency tend to reduce, rather than enhance, growth aspirations in state-level bureaucrats.