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Light Rail Transit (LRT) systems have emerged as an attractive form of public transport both in industrialised as well as developing countries. This paper reviews the implementation mechanism of LRT projects proured by private finance, through Build Operate Transfer (BOT) type concession contracts. A case study approach is used to model an actual LRT project. The case study analysis shows that the uncertainty factor could be converted to monetary terms and the process would enhance ability of the decision makers to have a better understanding of the consequences of risks.

Technological advancement, innovative procurement patterns such as build‐operate‐transfer, build‐own‐operate‐transfer as well as intrusion of international contractors have immensely changed the construction market. Local contractors need to devise a strategy to raise not only its technological capability but also financial capability which becomes increasingly necessary to compete successfully in this new landscape. This study aimed to investigate strategic assets which have been driving financial capability of construction firms in Thailand. Four large construction firms in Thailand were investigated through case study method and the result was verified with twelve industry experts. Three strategic assets were found contributing to competitive advantage of Thai construction firms including access to capital, efficient cash management, and effective capital investment. It was also found that strong relationship was the needed ingredient in developing these particular assets in Thailand. The findings should assist managers of construction firms in realizing the impact of financial capability, envisaging its driving strategic assets, and comprehending the mechanism which provides competitive advantage.

The Build‐Operate‐Transfer (BOT) model of development of privatized infrastructure projects is implemented through the award of a concession to a private sector consortium which will finance, build and operate the facility. In a competitive BOT tender, the selection of the successful consortium does not depend on the lowest tolls offered by the tenderer. Rather, it is dependent on the ability of the promoter to provide the most competitive package of distinctive winning elements in its proposal during the final negotiations. The promoter must fully understand the government's needs and concerns and be able to address them through the right package of the winning elements. In this paper, these elements are developed from sub‐factors of the critical success factors of technical solution advantage, financial package differentiation and differentiation in guarantees.

Several major infrastructure projects in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have been delivered by the build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) model since the 1960s. Although the benefits of using BOT have been reported abundantly in the contemporary literature, some BOT projects were less successful than the others. This paper aims to find out why this is so and to explore whether BOT is the best financing model to procure major infrastructure projects.

The benefits of BOT will first be reviewed. Some completed BOT projects in Hong Kong will be examined to ascertain how far the perceived benefits of BOT have been materialized in these projects. A highly profiled project, the Hong Kong‐Zhuhai‐Macau Bridge, which has long been promoted by the governments of the People's Republic of China, Macau Special Administrative Region and the HKSAR that BOT is the preferred financing model, but suddenly reverted back to the traditional financing model to be funded primarily by the three governments with public money instead, will be studied to explore the true value of the BOT financial model.

Six main reasons for this radical change are derived from the analysis: shorter take‐off time for the project; difference in legal systems causing difficulties in drafting BOT agreements; more government control on tolls; private sector uninterested due to unattractive economic package; avoid allegation of collusion between business and the governments; and a comfortable financial reserve possessed by the host governments.

The findings from this paper are believed to provide a better understanding to the real benefits of BOT and the governments' main decision criteria in delivering major infrastructure projects.

The Built Operate Transfer (BOT) model has been increasingly used in transportation investments in Vietnam. However, there is still an inadequacy of risk management applications in these projects and lack of research in this area. The study aims to improve the success of projects implemented through the BOT model in Vietnam.

The study followed a sequential design including interviews and a questionnaire survey to investigate the perception of stakeholders from public and private sector regarding the probability of occurrence and the severity of impact of risks in BOT transportation projects in Vietnam. Quantitative data from the survey was subjected to descriptive and inferential statistics to explore the priority of risks as well as the differences in the perception between the public and private sectors.

The results showed that the top five most significant risks in BOT transportation projects in Vietnam are: (1) problems with land acquisition and compensation, (2) inappropriate location of toll booths, (3) public resistance to pay, (4) high toll rate and (5) lack of cash flow. With the exception of “lack of cash flow,” there were no statistically significant differences in the rankings of individual risks between the public and private sector. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation in the overall rankings of all risks for both sectors.

This study contributes to the body of knowledge by exploring the probability of occurrence and the severity of the impact of risks in BOT transportation projects in a developing country like Vietnam which has not been extensively explored yet. Second, it provides an insight into the perception of stakeholders from the public and private sector regarding the level of risks which is very useful for potential stakeholders in making decisions when they intend to participate in such partnerships. Third, it enables the Vietnamese government to establish suitable policies related to such projects. These contributions are very important in improving risk management in PPPs in developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to appraise the sustainability of the Nigerian Army Shopping Arena urban renewal project in Oshodi‐Lagos, Nigeria.

Case study research design was adopted for the study and both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used. Data were collected from randomly selected 94 business operators in the shopping complex using structured questionnaires, while oral interviews were conducted with two purposively selected members of the project management team. Data were also collected through non‐participant observation and analysed by using both descriptive statistics and content analysis.

The project was executed using the build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) arrangement, and users were generally satisfied with facilities provided, except for the provision of utilities. Access to public facilities, creation of job opportunities, community involvement and sense of ownership, as well as the provision of facilities for pedestrian and vehicle users were considered as contributing optimally, while adherence to the principle of green design and construction was rated as contributing minimally to the sustainability of the project.

The adoption of BOT can facilitate access to funds for urban renewal projects in the developing countries. Creation of job opportunities, ensuring users' satisfaction, community involvement and compatibility with environment can promote the sustainability of urban renewal projects in the developing countries.

The study extents our understanding of funding mechanisms, users' satisfaction with, and the sustainability of urban renewal projects from the Nigerian perspective.

This paper explores the impact of both government subsidies and decision makers' loss-averse behavior on the determination of transportation build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession periods based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The prospect value of a transportation project under traffic risk can be formulated according to the value function for gains and losses and the decision weight for gains and losses. As an extra income for investors, government subsidy is designed for highly risky aspects of BOT transportation projects: uncertain initial traffic volumes and fluctuating growth rates.

A decision-making model determining the concession period of a transportation BOT project is proposed by using the Monte-Carlo simulation method based on CPT, and the effects of risky behaviors of private investors on concession period decision making are analyzed. A subsidy method related to the internal rate-of-return (IRR) corresponding to a specific initial traffic volume and growth rate is proposed. The case of an actual BOT highway project is examined to illustrate how the method proposed can be used to determine the concession period of a transportation BOT project considering decision makers' loss-averse behavior and government subsidy. Contingency analysis is discussed to cope with possible misestimating of key factors such as initial traffic volume and cost coefficients. Sensitivity analysis is employed to investigate the impact of CPT parameters on the concession period decisions. An actual BOT case which failed to attract private capital is introduced to show the practical application. The results are then interpreted to conclude this paper.

Based on comparisons drawn between a concession period decision-making model considering the psychological behaviors of decision makers and a model not considering them, the authors conclude that the concession period based on CPT is distinctly different from that of the loss-neutral model. The concession period based on CPT is longer than the loss-neutral concession period. That is, loss-averse private investors tend to ask for long concession periods to make up for losses they will face in the future. Government subsidies serve as extra income for investors, allowing appointed profits to be secured sooner. For the benefit side of contingency variables, the normal state of initial traffic volume, average annual traffic growth rate and bias degree and the government subsidy need to be paid close attention during the project life span. For the cost side of contingency variables, the annual operating cost variable has a significant impact on the length of predicted concession period, while the large-scale cost variable has minor impact.

With an actual BOT highway project, the determination of transportation BOT concession periods based on the psychological behaviors of decision makers is analyzed in this paper. As the psychological behaviors of decision makers heavily impact the decision-making process, the authors analyze their impacts on concession period decision making. Government subsidy is specifically designed for various states of initial traffic volume and fluctuating growth rates to cope with corresponding high risks and mitigate private investors' loss-averse behaviors. Contingency analysis and sensitivity analysis are discussed as the estimated values of parameters may not be authentic in actual situations.

Governments throughout the world are being forced to review how to fund the increasing demand and rising expectations of their citizens. This is especially relevant for developing countries, which often have limited capital resources to meet the soaring needs for essential infrastructure. This has consequently led to increased involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services, using various forms of Public‐Private Partnerships (PPPs). It is, however, important for both the public and private sectors to understand the various risks associated with PPPs throughout the whole life cycle of the projects in order to guarantee long‐term success. This is especially true in Nigeria and other countries where the use of PPPs are still in the early stages of development. Sixty‐one PPP risk factors were identified from literature and classified into exogenous and endogenous risks. This paper presents the results of the questionnaire survey that investigated the perception of Nigerian construction professionals on the relative importance of the identified risks and their preferences of allocation between the public and private sectors. The results show that the three most important PPP risk factors in Nigeria are “unstable government”, “inadequate experience in PPP” and “availability of finnance”. The respondents’ risk allocation preferences show that while most of the endogenous risk factors could be assigned to the private sector partner, the public sector should retain political and site acquisition risks, while relation‐ship‐based risks should be shared between the private and public sector partners

The aim of this paper is to identify the combinations of economic, normative, reputational and cognitive mechanisms that can prevent post‐award governance challenges on build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) projects in India.

The paper uses an empirical, case‐study based methodology to collect data and analyzes the cases through the use of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) technique. The paper first identifies and classifies the various kinds of governance challenges and preventive mechanisms in BOT projects based on the extant literature. Empirical evidence on 11 BOT projects in India is gathered and QCA is employed to unearth the linkages between specific governance mechanisms and post‐award challenges on these projects.

Project governance issues were identified across two dominant interfaces – one between the public and private sector and the other between the project and the societal stakeholders. Governance mechanisms based on providing shared incentives combined with the capacity to administer projects are effective in combating governance challenges across the public‐private sector interface. Cognitive mechanisms which make the project more accountable to the societal stakeholders are most effective across the project‐stakeholder interface.

These findings can be validated on larger data sets, across geographies, sectors and variety of PPP projects – currently the authors have only studied the BOT variant of PPPs.

The authors’ “contingency” approach to governance can help decision makers select specific governance mechanisms based on a project's structure and risk profile to better ensure successful delivery of a BOT project's objectives.

Post‐award governance of PPP projects is a theme that has received comparatively little attention in the extant literature. Further, while post‐award issues as well as governance mechanisms have been separately identified, very little work exists that links these two sets of constructs. This paper seeks to contribute to knowledge in this area by proposing some preliminary findings on the link between post‐award issues and governance mechanisms. In addition, the paper employs an innovative technique called QCA to analyze the case‐study data.