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The purpose of this paper is to draw on a small‐scale study that investigated the relationships between the budget‐setting process and slack, and how budgetary, behavioural and contextual factors can affect this relationship, to reconceptualise the phenomenon of budgetary slack as a budget risk management strategy.

A case study method was employed, which enabled the researchers to investigate factors suggested by prior literature that affect slack creation. In total, nine structured interviews were conducted in a state‐owned Egyptian petroleum company, which gave the researchers a different way of thinking about the budget slack phenomenon.

The authors found that slack is created, but not perceived negatively by managers, wherever they are in the organisational hierarchy. Few factors from the literature appeared to have any effect on the creation of budgetary slack, but the covert view of budget slack as a negative behaviour, adopted by early literature was perceived by participants as unethical and inconsistent with Egyptian culture. Managers did not recognise the notion of budgetary slack, though a “contingency” was created and was seen as entirely rational and acceptable by both superiors and subordinates. These findings are consistent with more recent literature in taking a more positive view, and with risk management thinking.

The evidence from this small study in a single organisation obviously cannot be generalised to the whole population. More research is needed in different contexts in order to discover whether managers may perceive this link between budget contingencies and risk management. Also, further research may explore the ethical dimension of behaviour and its possible foundation in religious values and beliefs, to see if this influences how building “contingencies” into budgets is perceived.

If we were to stop portraying the creation of budgetary slack as a negative behaviour and accept that practitioners find it acceptable in managing budgets in an uncertain economic environment, more managers may be open about it.

The main contribution of this paper is that it proposes that what was originally described as a negative behavioural phenomenon be rethought as a positive risk management strategy. Though other authors have viewed budget slack more positively, none has made the explicit link to risk management. The authors reposition budget slack in terms of contingency planning and show how this is consistent with risk management thinking.

This study examines the relationship between a number of goal characteristics and the propensity of divisional managers to create budgetary slack. These goal characteristics are variables in goal clarity and goal difficulty. Managers also consider communication and reward systems – which are significant factors affecting the relationship between goal characteristics and propensity to create budget slack. The communication and reward systems are affected by influencing power of managers, required explanation of budget variance, budgetary feedback, peer relations, and relationship between superiors and subordinates. Using a sample of 108 hotel managers in Macau, the findings indicate that the clear communication and reward systems can result in goal clarity and can help to solve budgeting problems under difficult goal situations. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the design of budgeting systems. The need to integrate results and develop frameworks for future research is noted.

This study extends prior balanced scorecard (BSC) research by incorporating the effects of uncertainty, payment schemes and the strength of causal relations proposed in the performance measurement model (PMM) on the budgetary dynamics. Our analysis was restricted to two strategic business units (SBU), engineering projects and electricity distribution service, from a Brazilian electric power concessionaire. We postulate a mediated moderation association between uncertainty (treatment), bonus scheme (mediator), dispersion of payment scheme and the strength of causal relations proposed in the PMM (moderators) on budgetary slack (outcome). Additionally, we postulate that the use of accounting-based measures (ABM) also mediates the effect of uncertainty on budgetary slack. We gathered monthly observations from 102 indicators containing the target and achievement values throughout 2002–2006. Managers were later asked to answer questionnaires about the possible cause–effect relations between these indicators, then 215 causal maps of the department and corporate indicators were drawn up. Econometric analysis provided evidence that the budgetary slack observed is directly impacted by uncertainty, and this impact is moderated by the dispersion of payment scheme. However, we did not find any evidence that supported the mediation process proposed between uncertainty, ABM and budgetary slack. Incomplete implementation of BSC and the level of analysis adopted are possible explanations for that.

To study the use of budgeting in the uncertain and unpredictable context of seasonal logistics in the Arctic. Specifically addresses the question of why and how budgeting turns out to be the main management control tool in an extremely unstable environment.

Built on a case study of a Russian oil-producing company operating in The High North, this chapter reports on the rationales for use of budgetary slack by different divisions within the company.

Inflexible budgeting better fits into the (natural/geographical) context than into the business process. In this respect, excessive budget detalization and informational update may be not facilitating the operational process but confusing. Decoupling demonstrated by a budgetary slack is the normal condition for stable organizational performance.

Instead of setting up fences between the divisions, budgeting may be considered a converging and an adjusting factor to assess collective performance. Social embeddedness of budgetary slack in contemporary organizations sets the scene for other types of budgeting games based on trust, norms of reciprocity and collective performance.

The new – cultural – dimension introduces decoupling in a new perspective by demonstrating the integrating or coupling meaning of cultural practices.

Ever since its introduction, the concept of organisational slack has constituted the basis for a considerable body of research within behavioural science. A great deal of this research has concentrated on budgetary slack, and within the field of public administration the focus has been on the slack‐ or budget‐maximising bureaucrat. As the reduction of slack is the purpose of many of the techniques which are part of the new public management, there is a need to focus on how to measure changes in the level of slack. The objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship between three central concepts within the research on slack: organizational slack, budgetary slack, and the discretionary budget; to assess whether these concepts are suitable for public organizations; and to discuss problems of measurement.

This study examines some aspects of budgetary control and performance valuation systems by utilising data based on a questionnaire survey of 42 medium and large size companies located in the State of Bahrain. The study finds that the onventional form of budget controllability principle is practised to a great extent; managers end to create slack to meet future uncertainty; the focus is on short‐term performance evaluation; a mixed type of performance evaluation style is followed; budget variances are used to evaluate managers' ability, and for cost control purposes. Bonus is affected by budget performance along with new assignments, but not salary.

Behavioural consequences of emphasis on budget‐related performance evaluation measures have been extensively researched in single countries, but not in cross‐cultural organizational settings. Contingency theory is invoked in this study to model the “fit” for international joint venture companies (IJVs) between two contingency factors — environmental uncertainty (EU) and organizational objectives conflict (OOC)—and the organizational control sub‐system variable of budgetary emphasis (BE). The impact of this “fit” on the effectiveness of managers from Chinese and Western sides of an IJV partnership is tested in respect of the effectiveness outcomes of self‐rated managerial performance (MP) and the creation of budgetary slack (BS). These two effectiveness constructs are chosen for this study because they provide a complementary picture of effectiveness in a budget‐related behavioural settings. To test the various “fit” hypotheses, this study provides results from a survey of Sino‐foreign JVs. Specifically, middle and senior managers representing the foreign partner to a Sino‐foreign JV were chosen in two groupings, Hong Kong Chinese managers and Western managers. Multiple regression was performed for the independent variables (EU, OOC and BE) in relation to the respective dependent variables (MP and BS) and the respective sample groups (HK Chinese and Western). Both main and interaction effects are reported in this study. Implications of the findings for the use of budgetary emphasis in management performance evaluation in IJVs are discussed.

This study investigates which dimensions of the management control system (MCS) increase the perception of organizational justice and reduce unethical behavior in the perception of managers. The purpose of this paper is to validate the theoretical model of the study of Langevin and Mendoza (2012), testing the theoretical hypotheses formulated by the authors.

A survey was performed in companies listed among the Best and Largest of Exame Magazine, and the sample is composed of 102 respondents of the research, which consists of 41 assertions.

The results of the structural equation modeling show that the definition of objectives increases the perception of procedural justice, but the same was not observed regarding the remuneration of the managers. Likewise, disregarding aspects that are uncontrollable by managers in performance evaluation does not lead to the perception of procedural and distributive justice. However, feedback quality leads to the understanding that the MCS is fair. Perception of procedural and distributive justice was also observed in the use of multiple measures of performance by the company.

Other factors that have not been investigated may interfere with and contribute to the reduction of unethical behavior (budget slack and data manipulation).

The only variable that interferes in the reduction of unethical behavior is feedback quality. The non-confirmation of all the hypotheses instigates the replication of the research in other contexts for empirical validation of the theoretical model of Langevin and Mendoza (2012).

To summarize the findings of empirical studies the authors have conducted regarding budgetary procedures fairness and to discuss key implications of these findings.

Summary and synthesis of the authors' empirical research.

Identifies criteria for, and types of attitudinal and behavioral reactions that managers have toward, formal budgetary procedures fairness and budgetary procedures implementation fairness. Provides information regarding how the two forms of budgetary procedures fairness work together to influence managers' attitudes and behaviors, and how they reduce managers' negative reactions to unfavorable budgets. Presents reasons that fair budgetary procedures are important to managers.

The authors' studies used questionnaire data where all variables were measured at a single point in time, which provides little control over unmeasured variables and direction of causality. Future research should seek to expand the sets of criteria for and reactions toward budgetary procedures fairness, as well as to further detail the processes by which budgetary procedures fairness works. Also, relationships involving budgetary procedures fairness should be examined by means of laboratory experiments.

Underscores the importance of promoting formal budgetary procedures fairness and budgetary procedures implementation fairness in organizational budgetary systems, and provides concrete guidance in this regard.

Provides useful information to accounting and audit staff, budget committee members, supervisors, and other employees involved in designing and implementing organizational budgetary systems and to budgeting researchers.

Recent years witnessed an exponential growth of the Portuguese real estate market. This growth has generated the need to implement effective management control tools to allow companies to improve their planning and monitoring of activities. Drawing on the agency and goal-setting theories, this paper explores the impact of companies' participative budgeting processes on employee performance in the real estate industry.

For this purpose, a questionnaire was developed and a sample of 116 employees that participate in the budgeting process of real estate organizations collected, with data analyzed using structural equation modelling.

The results show that participation in the budgeting process has an impact on employees' performance through budget goal commitment, trust and job satisfaction. However, no statistical support was found for the role of budgetary slack in this process.

This study was conducted in a single industry and is based on self-reported measures of employees that participate in the budgeting process of their organizations.

The findings highlight the need for real estate organizations to involve their staff in the elaboration of budgets, contributing to a higher level of commitment to established goals, job satisfaction, trust and performance. Real estate organizations should provide adequate working conditions, foster their employees' autonomy and recognize their work.

The findings encourage real estate companies to extend the participation in the budget process to employees and, ultimately, to mitigate the probability of budget failure.