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This article makes a contribution to the conflict resolution literature by examining the effect of relative hedonic utility on budgetary conflict resolution. A lab experiment, using practicing CPAs as subjects, has been conducted to examine the effect. The literature in this field supports the implication that a person's happiness, which classical economists call hedonic utility, depends not only on the true state she (he) is in, but also on her (his) perceived state relative to the state of others. The biased perception makes a decision maker look at the state of the world more often when the state is bad than when the state is good, according to a prior research study. Although the true state of the world is split evenly between a good state and a bad one, a biased perception makes a decision maker compare herself more often to her neighboring individual when the state is bad. Accordingly, a decision maker who feels unhappy more often, while the magnitude of the pain may be the same, would exhibit a more distributive, zero-sum game type conflict resolution mode relative to another decision maker who feels unhappy less often and shows a more integrative conflict resolution mode. The test results confirmed the hypotheses. Statistically significant test results show that there are distinct effects of biased perception of individuals on budgetary conflict resolution.

This chapter examines the relationship between purposes of budget use and budgetary slack, and the extent to which this relationship is mediated by two (potentially) slack-reducing mechanisms, budget participation and budget emphasis. In a sample of survey responses from 44 Dutch listed firms, intensity of budget use is negatively related to budgetary slack, and this relationship is partially mediated by both budget participation and budget emphasis. Furthermore, three purposes of budget use are identified: budget usage for (a) planning and communication purposes, (b) coordination and allocation purposes, and (c) evaluation and rewarding purposes. The direct effect of purposes of budget use on budgetary slack seems especially due to budget usage for planning and communication purposes, which is also the case for the mediating effect via budget emphasis, whereas the mediating effect via budget participation seems especially due to budget usage for coordination and allocation purposes. Exploratory analyses do not show similar relationships with purposeful slack, that is, with slack that was purposefully allowed in the business units’ budgets by the firms’ top management.

Prior research demonstrates a positive relationship between information asymmetry and managers’ use of budgetary slack and thereby suggests that minimizing managers’ private information is a potential tactic for reducing slack in budgets. Asymmetric information, however, often cannot be avoided when specialized technical expertise is required to operate a particular responsibility area. This study contributes to the literature by investigating whether favorable perceptions of fairness mitigate managers’ use of budgetary slack during participative environments in which managers hold private information. Overall, the findings demonstrate the benefits of fair budgeting practices. In particular, survey results suggest that the presence of budgetary slack in efficiency targets is lower for managers who hold favorable fairness perceptions. A gender effect is also demonstrated between perceptions of fairness and the presence of budgetary slack in spending targets. Factor analytical evidence toward the development of a more refined measure of budgetary slack is provided.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how a combination of Normative Commitment (NC) and Instrumental Commitment (IC) affects the creation of budgetary slack when the decision-making mode is individual versus group.

We use 86 students in a two-by-two experimental design (individuals vs. groups and a combination of NC/IC vs. no NC/IC), fully crossed between participants, to examine the combined effects of NC/IC on budgetary slack creation by individuals and group members.

The results show that groups without NC/IC create the highest budgetary slack and differ from the other three experimental cells (groups with NC/IC and individuals with and without NC/IC). In addition, individuals with NC/IC also differ from individuals without NC/IC.

Research limitations are formation of groups, validity threats common to laboratory experiments, and generalizability of the findings. We do not believe these limitations are affecting the results.

As organizations continue to increase the use of group decision-making for setting their budgets, they may want to monitor groups with low NC/IC due to higher slack creation.

Use of groups can impact prosocial behavior via creating a “label” and/or forming social ties in budgeting.

This study extends budgetary slack creation under individuals versus group decision-making, introduces the combined effects of NC/IC as a psychological contract to the accounting literature, and examines the combined NC/IC effect on groups as compared to individuals.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the reliance on a leader’s reputation as an informal control tool to mitigate subordinates’ budgetary slack. In addition, it seeks to explain whether this relationship is mediated by subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information.

A laboratory experiment was conducted involving 60 undergraduate business students who participated in the experiment. A 1 × 2 between-subjects design was employed for the experimental study. Each subject assumed the role of a production manager responsible for setting a budget target. The experimental task employed involved a simple decoding task adapted from Chow (1983).

The results of this study indicate that budgetary slack is lower when a leader’s reputation is favourable than when it is unfavourable. In addition, it is found that subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing private information fully mediates the relationship between a leader’s reputation and budgetary slack.

This paper extends the limited literature on the reliance of informal controls in mitigating budgetary slack by examining a leader’s reputation as an informal control. The findings of this study provide important implications for the design of effective management control systems.

The purpose of this study is to investigate differences between individual and collective budgeting decisions with respect to budgetary slack creation and task performance. While a great deal of research exists in the area of budgeting, to our knowledge, no prior studies have dealt with budget settings in a collective (e.g. small group or cross-functional team) environment. Accordingly, the current study examines differences in slack creation and task performance using a two (decision mode: individual vs. collective decision) by two (incentive contract: slack-inducing vs. truth inducing) between-subjects experimental design. A total of 295 students participated in the experiment (79 individuals and 72 three-person collective units). As expected, individuals and collective decision-makers created significantly more slack under a slack-inducing contract than a truth-inducing contract. Additionally, as anticipated, collective decision-makers created more slack than individuals under a slack-inducing contract. Unexpectedly, however, collective decision-makers created more slack than individuals using a truth-inducing contract. Task performance was significantly different between individuals and collective unit members, such that performance of former exceeded latter, as hypothesized. Finally, preliminary analysis indicated that choice shift occurred in the collective units, such that the units became more cautious in setting budget goals than individuals under both incentive contract conditions.

This chapter uses agency theory and ethics literature to assess the moderating effect of manager's moral equity on the relation between budget participation and propensity to create slack. Moral equity is the major evaluative criterion for ethical judgment, is based on the overall concept of fairness, justice and right and is often very influential in contemporary moral thought (Robin & Reidenbach (1996) Journal of Business, 5(1) 17–28). The results indicate that a manager's moral equity moderates the effect of budget participation. For managers with high moral equity, the relationship between participation and manager's propensity to create slack is significantly negative while, for managers with low moral equity, the relationship is significantly positive. Further analyses indicate that high budget participation and high moral equity result in less propensity to create slack than high budget participation and low moral equity.

Purpose of paper: A growing number of studies of the issues of budget process and budget participation have recently emerged in management accounting literature. This paper extends this literature by explaining budget process and budget participation. This research explores the budget process in JPUs, studies the level of budget participation in these universities, and highlights the views and perceptions of budget preparers about the government budget format.

Design/methodology/approach: Nineteen interviews were conducted in 11 universities in Jordan and in the Ministry of Higher Education during 2008.

Findings: The data suggest that the budget usage varies between JPUs, and budget participation in some universities is not consistent where management is centralized. Although respondents understand the importance of budget usage, most of them are dissatisfied with the ministry budget format.

Research implications: The influence of budget participation on the university's overall performance and on performance of head of department may consider one of the important topics to be researched in the future. While, studying the impact of the ministry budget format on the university performance, the reverse impact and relation might be of vital interest to verify the government's expectation about the universities’ compliance and to highlight the importance of implementing a unique standard for all Jordanian universities.

Originality/value of paper: This study contributes to the literature as prior studies have researched budget process and participation in commercial companies in developed countries; this study combines the budget process, participation level while researching the governmental budget format in HEIs in a developing country.

This study extends prior balanced scorecard (BSC) research by incorporating the effects of uncertainty, payment schemes and the strength of causal relations proposed in the performance measurement model (PMM) on the budgetary dynamics. Our analysis was restricted to two strategic business units (SBU), engineering projects and electricity distribution service, from a Brazilian electric power concessionaire. We postulate a mediated moderation association between uncertainty (treatment), bonus scheme (mediator), dispersion of payment scheme and the strength of causal relations proposed in the PMM (moderators) on budgetary slack (outcome). Additionally, we postulate that the use of accounting-based measures (ABM) also mediates the effect of uncertainty on budgetary slack. We gathered monthly observations from 102 indicators containing the target and achievement values throughout 2002–2006. Managers were later asked to answer questionnaires about the possible cause–effect relations between these indicators, then 215 causal maps of the department and corporate indicators were drawn up. Econometric analysis provided evidence that the budgetary slack observed is directly impacted by uncertainty, and this impact is moderated by the dispersion of payment scheme. However, we did not find any evidence that supported the mediation process proposed between uncertainty, ABM and budgetary slack. Incomplete implementation of BSC and the level of analysis adopted are possible explanations for that.