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Like conflict in general, budgetary conflict is perceived by conflicting parties as a zero-sum game or distributive: one party's gain is the other party's loss. We identify an organizational culture that promotes this view as “traditional.” We propose that changing certain elements of organizational culture is sufficient to produce more integrative, nonzero-sum outcomes. We call this changed organizational culture “empowering.” We propose and test the effects of an empowering organizational culture (EOC) in contrast to the traditional organizational culture (TOC). We hypothesize that an EOC would produce more integrative conflict resolution than the typical TOC. Based on our review of the literature, we identify two elements of the EOC that are essential in producing more integrative solutions to budgetary conflict. The two elements that we simultaneously manipulate are the superior's empowering style (or lack thereof) as reflected in encouragement to freely negotiate, and the superior's intervention process in failed negotiations (a process that encourages the search for integrative solutions and avoids imposed compromises that dampen the desire to negotiate). Using a laboratory experiment, 84 subjects forming 42 dyads negotiated the allocation of discretionary budgets face-to-face. The results of the experiment confirm our hypotheses that the EOC produces more integrative budget negotiation outcomes, greater convergence, and greater satisfaction with the outcome than TOC.

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine the effect of accountability pressure as a monitoring control tool to mitigate subordinates' propensity to create budgetary slack. The results suggest that budgetary slack is (lowest) highest when accountability pressure is (present) absent under a private information situation. The results further reveal that accountability pressure is positively associated with subordinates' perceived levels of honesty, which in turn is negatively associated with budgetary slack creation. The findings of this paper have important theoretical and practical implications for budgetary control systems design.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the reason for the failure of implementing performance-based budgeting (PBB) at Iranian public universities and research institutes (PURI). This examination focuses on the actors participating in the budget processes and their perceptions.

The study uses grounded theory and employs deep semi-structured interviews of budget preparers at Iranian PURI.

The results indicate a loose coupling between perceived and regulated budgeting process. This leads to budgetary slack as a barrier for authentic information flow and indeed PBB implementation. In the analysis of the results, the authors suggest some ways to improve the current situation of the budgeting processes at Iranian PURI.

Public organizations that desire to transform their budgeting system need to consider their actors’ perceptions regarding the budgeting process. By explicitly considering their perceptions the organization may be able to solve any loose coupling as a result of internal, external and behavioral conditions.

This research examines issues that arise in the transformation of organizational processes. The focus on budget processes is critical for organizations which receive most, if not all, of their operational funds from a central authority. This research highlights the role of budget actors’ perceptions in transforming the budgeting process. An important result of this analysis is documenting the existence of loose coupling in the current budgeting process at Iranian PURI. This loose coupling results in slack creation and restricts the implementation of a PBB system. Additionally, this loose coupling limits the flow of authentic information.

This study aims to examine the public budgeting process in the higher education and research sectors of Iran. It focuses on the actors’ budgetary roles and uses their perspectives to identify deficiencies in the budgeting process that cause delays in the transition to a performance-based system.

This study uses an interpretive research paradigm. It applies the grounded theory methodology to analyze the interviews conducted with those responsible for budgeting at Iranian public universities and research institutes (PURI). The results are interpreted using Wildavsky’s (1964) budgetary roles paradigm.

Using Wildavsky’s (1964) paradigm, “spenders” and “guardians” are identified and their perceptions about the public budgeting process are described. The results suggest a decoupling between the actors’ perceptions based on their budgetary roles. Spenders consider budgeting as a negotiation-based process, while guardians’ decisions are largely based on “outputs” and “information.” This study demonstrates that the disagreement over the perceived budget process was due to different budgetary roles. This disagreement leads to delays in the transformation of the budget process in Iranian PURI.

While efforts are made to obtain a sample of individuals with different roles and responsibilities, the selection is limited by subjects’ willingness and availability. Therefore, sample size and diversity are potential limitations of this study.

When organizations attempt to transition to performance-based budgeting (PBB), it is critical to understand the current budgeting process to identify potential impediments. Understanding these impediments allows for alternate approaches to be considered. This is particularly important for universities that are mostly funded by the government (such as those in Iran). The results of this study show that the contradictory perceptions among budget actors have a significant impact on budgeting transition and require attention to understand budgeting decisions.

This study contributes to the budgeting literature in three ways. First, it examines the impact of endogenized shared values among budget participants on the budgeting transition process. Second, by focusing on budgetary roles, it contributes to the literature by examining disagreement on the perceived budgeting process and its implications for transforming the process into PBB. Finally, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the public budgeting process in a developing country – Iran.

Participative budgeting can benefita firm by incorporating subordinates’ private information into financing and operating decisions. In the managerial accounting literature, studies of participative budgeting posit superiors that range from passively committed to highly active participants, some of whom are permitted to communicate, choose compensation schemes, negotiate with subordinates, and reject budgets. This paper synthesizes and analyzes experimental research in participative budgeting with a focus on the role of the superior defined in the research design, and on how that role affects budget outcomes, subordinate behavior, and in some cases superior behavior. We demonstrate how superior type influences economic and behavioral predictions, and likewise affects budgeting outcomes and the interpretation of the results. This paper is intended to further our understanding of how superior type affects behavior in participative budgeting studies, and to facilitate the choice of superior type in future research designs.

This study aims to conduct two experiments to provide insight into the impacts of Congressional party loyalty on negotiating flexibility. Constituent support, term limits and bipartisan roles were explored as possible moderators of polarization in American political negotiations.

Experiment 1 used a 2 (party loyalty: loyal/thoughtful) × 2 (constituent support: consistent/mixed districts) experimental design. In experiment 2, party loyalty was constant, and participants were assigned to one of four conditions created by a 2 (term limits: restricted/not restricted) × 2 (role: coordinator/whip) design. In both experiments, flexibility was measured as the percentage of movement on four key budget allocation issues. Participants were recruited using Prolific.

Experiment 1 demonstrated that loyalty produced less flexibility, particularly with regard to one’s own preferred issues. Constituent support did not influence flexibility. The second experiment found that absence of term limits and presence of bipartisan roles resulted in more movement on the other’s preferred issues.

While the authors’ manipulations have experimental validity, further field research is suggested to assess the fidelity of the authors’ simulation and the ecological validity of the experimental findings.

These findings extend the list of situational levers that impact negotiation flexibility. In particular, based on the authors’ findings, embedding bipartisan roles into traditional Congressional processes could help increase negotiating flexibility and cooperation.

Both the experimental task and variables manipulated in these experiments are embedded in a US Congressional context.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether trust and distrust in upper-level managers exert different influences on the budgetary proposals of middle managers. Such proposals involve different levels of managerial effort that impact overall budgetary slack.

This paper is based on a laboratory experiment with 160 business managers.

The results show that the more (less) middle managers trust (distrust) their upper-level managers, the more (the less) effort they commit to budgetary proposals. The authors also find that middle managers with low trust are prone to invest more effort and thus create less budgetary slack than managers with high distrust. The results also show that the introduction of suspicion does not vary this initial choice of effort and budgetary slack.

This paper shows the importance of trust and distrust as informal control systems in organizations. The findings support the importance of extrinsic motivation for enhancing effort and reducing budgetary slack. There are a wide range of exogenous variables that have an effect on the development of trust and distrust.

Practitioners may improve their management control by facilitating trust and preventing distrust in interpersonal relationships because both are informal controls that can reduce and increase, respectively, dysfunctional behaviors in organizations, such as budgetary slack.

This paper is among the first to show the distinct effects of trust and distrust (high and low) in the efforts of middle managers. This study provides a dynamic viewpoint of trust through the introduction of suspicion in a budget negotiation.

This paper aims to show the aligned development that took place in public administration and public financial management toward serving public values. By analyzing the mode of institutions’ interaction, the paper attempts to pinpoint the changing trends in budget institutions in Egypt, probing the extent to which they can be read from an administrative perspective and the possibility of enhancing budgetary outcomes under the existing administrative arrangements.

An analytical framework for public management administrative and budgetary institutions’ alignment is presented. A ladder analysis is developed to highlight the consistency of rationale between the two sets of institutions. The alignment is demonstrated at three consecutive levels: control and discipline, efficiency and effectiveness and openness and communication.

The international experience reveals that the alignment of administrative and budgetary institutions is both theoretically traceable and practically applicable in the case of developed economies. Whereas, in the case of Egypt, both sets of institutions have been exposed to best practices; yet, they are not seen as complementary and enforcing each other. The internalization of the benefits of reforms in the two tracks into an integrated public management context in the case of Egypt is not reached.

Egypt needs to ensure the alignment of both dimensions to maximize the benefits of reform.

The ladder approach sorts the developments in both administrative and budgetary institutions into three levels to help assessing the maturity and conformity in countries’ public management systems.

Purpose of paper: A growing number of studies of the issues of budget process and budget participation have recently emerged in management accounting literature. This paper extends this literature by explaining budget process and budget participation. This research explores the budget process in JPUs, studies the level of budget participation in these universities, and highlights the views and perceptions of budget preparers about the government budget format.

Design/methodology/approach: Nineteen interviews were conducted in 11 universities in Jordan and in the Ministry of Higher Education during 2008.

Findings: The data suggest that the budget usage varies between JPUs, and budget participation in some universities is not consistent where management is centralized. Although respondents understand the importance of budget usage, most of them are dissatisfied with the ministry budget format.

Research implications: The influence of budget participation on the university's overall performance and on performance of head of department may consider one of the important topics to be researched in the future. While, studying the impact of the ministry budget format on the university performance, the reverse impact and relation might be of vital interest to verify the government's expectation about the universities’ compliance and to highlight the importance of implementing a unique standard for all Jordanian universities.

Originality/value of paper: This study contributes to the literature as prior studies have researched budget process and participation in commercial companies in developed countries; this study combines the budget process, participation level while researching the governmental budget format in HEIs in a developing country.

Although the budgeting literature well documents managers' creation of budgetary slack in developed economies, lack of attention has been paid to this behaviour in emerging economies. It is doubtful that some unique characteristics, only existing in emerging economies, cause this behaviour to be different than the budgeting literature predicts. Since there is no study examining managers' creation of budgetary slack in emerging economies, such as Vietnam, to get insight into whether or not these characteristics cause the differences, the aim of this study is to replicate prior budgeting studies by using Vietnamese samples. Particularly, we investigated the impact of budgetary participation, budget emphasis, information asymmetry, and the interactions between these variables on managers' creation of budgetary slack. Data obtained from the questionnaire sent to 99 Vietnamese managers shows that the last two variables and the interaction between them induce managers' creation of budgetary slack. However, the results also indicate that the first variable and the interaction between this variable and the other two variables respectively have no impact on managers' creation of budgetary slack. These results provide some insight into the creation of budgetary slack of Vietnamese managers for future studies to extend the line of research.