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Large organizations typically mandate that managers attend budget meetings and exchange budget reports with their immediate supervisor and budget staff. We explored whether such organization-mandated budgetary involvement is related to managers’ budgetary communication with their supervisor in terms of budgetary participation, budgetary explanation, and budgetary feedback. Questionnaire data from 148 managers employed by 94 different companies were analyzed with regression. Mandatory budget meetings with supervisor had a positive relationship with all three forms of budgetary communication with supervisor, and mandatory budget reports from supervisor had a positive relationship with budgetary explanation from supervisor. Mandatory budget meetings with budget staff had a positive relationship with both budgetary participation with supervisor and budgetary feedback from supervisor. Mandatory budget reports from budget staff had a negative relationship with all three forms of budgetary communication with supervisor. The results failed to support proposed relationships between mandatory budget reports to supervisor and budgetary participation with supervisor, and between mandatory budget reports from supervisor and budgetary explanation from supervisor. Implications of the results for future research and budgetary system design are discussed.

This chapter is devoted to budget investments in the Russian Federation, which nowadays have a double meaning. This fact often causes confusion and misunderstandings in the implementation of investment activities.

Traditional Russian understanding of investment corresponds to the concept of capital expenditures or investments in fixed assets. As a result of budget investments, according to the budget legislation, the cost of public property necessarily increases. Such investments are budget expenditures for the creation (or purchase) of new capital assets. In this case, the budget investments are like a synonym for capital expenditures.

A new approach to the concept of cost of investments is linked to perception and rethinking of the concept of investment prevailing in the countries of Western Europe and North America. Under this approach, investments are understood as a commercial activity of the foreign investors, which consist of investing their funds in an unlimited range of objects of entrepreneurial activity in the territory of Russia. This approach is also embodied by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

However, in the second (not traditional for Russia) meaning, investment are carried out at the budget execution. These are, for example, assets of sovereign wealth funds of the Russian Federation, which are called the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund. These funds are formed by part of the revenues associated with oil production in the case of it exceeding its cost base per barrel, and the free assets of these funds are located in certain foreign currencies and securities.

This chapter defines the prospects of treasury technologies considering the current financial environment in Russia. The purpose of this chapter is to justify the promising treasury technologies, which improve the quality of budget flows’ management. The authors highlight the mission, role, and values of treasury institute. The evaluation of its functional activity and efficiency as well as the world experience in the development of the institution is provided. Comparative analysis of treasury technology for the implementation of foreign budgets with domestic practice is provided. The need for development of treasury technologies providing the liquidity of “single treasury account” is justified. This chapter suggests expanding the positive experience of the Federal Treasury using treasury technologies to ensure the efficient use of budgetary funds on both, regional and local levels.

The purpose of the study was to analyze how COVID-19 pandemic affects regional budgets and regional fiscal resilience in Russia.

The research article is structured as follows. Based on the official data from the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Treasure and the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, first, the state of Russian regional budgets before and under COVID-19 is analyzed. Second, due to the increase of regional spending commitments under pandemic the regional debt dependence is reviewed. Third, anticrisis fiscal measures which have been taken to combat the negative impact of COVID-19 are discussed.

In general, 2020 may be the most difficult for regional budgets, although the results of the first quarter do not show such tension. However, the impact of COVID-19 on budget indicators is ambiguous because the economic crisis of 2020 is dual, including the crisis in the oil markets. The pandemic has become a unique global phenomenon, the effect of which is difficult to identify and interpret outside of the economic aspects of life.

The value of the article is based on the overview of the state of regional budgets before and under COVID-19, on the analysis of how pandemic affects fiscal resilience of the regional budgets and on the forecast of how serious the volume of lost revenues are going to be.

Although the topic of performance budgeting has received considerable attention in the literature, it is mainly explored in the field of public management and administration, and little research exists in the field of public sector accounting. The purpose of this paper is to provide more insight into how non-performance indicators are integrated in budget documents, thereby bridging the gap between the literature in both fields. Furthermore, the influence of potential drivers of differences in the incorporation of non-financial performance indicators are explored.

This study starts with an overview of historical developments in Dutch local government for a period of 50 years. This is followed by an empirical assessment of the current incorporation of non-financial performance indicators based on a dataset of 107 municipal budget documents for FY2019.

The authors' historical overview shows that several initiatives were employed to encourage municipalities to integrate non-financial performance indicators in their budget documents. A search to connect policy and means can be observed, which has not developed linearly over time, but mostly in reaction to major changes in national legislation. The authors find a large variation among the municipalities in their current incorporation of non-financial performance indicators. Contrary to theoretical expectations, output indicators (and not outcome indicators) are most frequently incorporated. Furthermore, the authors find that more indicators are incorporated if a municipality is larger, more willing to innovate and if it has less financial resources.

This article contributes to the understanding of how to incorporate non-financial performance indicators in public sector financial statements. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is an area that is not explored before.

The purpose of this study is to understand the efforts of key social actors in influencing the reform of Iranian public universities budgeting system, from incremental to performance-based budgeting (PBB), the tensions that arose as competing efforts of institutional change were undertaken, and ultimately the impact of these efforts on the extent to which the Iranian government transitioned to a system of PBB in public universities.

Data comprises of semi-structured interviews with managers and experts involved in the budget setting process and an analysis of budgetary policy documents, reports and archival material such as legislation. An institutional work lens is employed to interpret the findings.

While actors advocating the change were engaged in institutional work directed at disrupting the old budgetary rules by disassociating the rules moral foundations and creating new budgetary rules (through new legislation), universities undertook subtle resistance by engaging in extended evaluation of the new proposed PBB rules thereby maintaining the old budgetary rules. The reforms undertaken to introduce PBB in Iranian universities achieved minimal success whereby incremental budgeting continued to constitute by far a larger percentage of the budget allocation formula for university budgets. This finding illustrates change and continuity in university budgetary systems resulting from institutional work of actors competing to control the basis of resource allocation under the proposed PBB system by proposing contradicting models.

The findings highlight the importance of understanding the interplay of institutional work undertaken by competing social actors as they seek to advance their goals in shaping budgetary reforms in the public-sector. Such an understanding may inform policy makers who intend to introduce major reforms in public-sector budgeting approaches.

Unlike prior studies that largely focused on how organization-level budgeting practices responded to changes in public budgeting rules (i.e. at the site of implementation of the rules), this paper highlights how strategies of change and resistance are played out at the site of setting budgetary norms.

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the influence of politics, culture and regulation on the budgetary slack and its impact on performance. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of culture, politics and regulation on budgetary slack and performance in local government.

Studies to develop model pengangaran good (good governance budgeting). Using the survey method. The total sample is 300 respondents in seven local governments in West Sulawesi. Respondents from the executive and legislative participate in the preparation of budgets in local government. The research instrument in questionnaire is tested using GSCA.

The third structural coefficient of the relationship is positive, indicating all three positive relationships. That is, the higher political, cultural, regulatory, will result in the higher budgetary slack. Thus, if one wants to reduce the budgetary slack, then one needs to reduce the problems of politics, culture and regulations. Other results obtained (a) significant political, cultural and regulatory effect on performance either directly or indirectly through budgetary slack. The sixth structural coefficient of the relationship is positive, indicating all six positive relationships. That is, the higher political, cultural and regulatory variables will lead to higher performance either directly or indirectly through budgetary slack; (b) information asymmetry and budgetary slack significantly affect performance. The second structural coefficient correlation is positive, indicating both positive relationships. That is, the higher information asymmetry and budgetary slack will result in higher performance; (c) budgeting participation moderating influence budgetary slack variables that are false and strengthen moderation. That is, the higher the value of participation budgeting (M) affects increasing influence through budgetary slack (Y1) on the performance (Y2).

The results showed that the political, cultural and regulatory variables significantly affect the budgetary slack. The structural coefficient of the relationship of these three variables had positive-marked, indicating that the relationship of all those three was positive. Thus, the higher political, cultural and regulatory variables will result in higher budgetary slack. Political, cultural and regulatory variables significantly affected the performance both directly and indirectly through budgetary slack. Structural coefficient of the relationship of those six had positive-marked, indicating that the relationship of all those six was positive. Thus, the higher political, cultural and regulatory variables will lead to higher performance both directly and indirectly through budgetary slack.

This paper conducts a research on mediation effect of budgetary slack in relationship between politics, culture and regulation toward performance; this research retests the research result from Fisher (2002) about information asymmetry and performance, Rubin (1993) about political, budgetary slack and performance, Scott (2000) about regulatory, budgetary slack and performance, Indriantoro (2000) about mediation of budgetary slack in relationship between politics, culture and regulation toward performance and Mardiasmo (2005) about budgetary slack and performance. No studies have examined this kind of relationship simultaneously. location of study (no previous research for this relationship): local governments in West Sulawesi.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a method integrating fault tree analysis and optimization model to allocate response budget from the preventive and protective perspectives.

The proposed method consists of two main steps. The first step is to analyze and calculate the probability and the loss of the risk. The second step is to build an optimization model for allocating response budget.

First, there exists an optimal response budget. Second, risk protection is preferred to risk prevention when the total budget is limited. Third, the protective budget should be first invested for the consequence event with greatest expected loss. Fourth, the preventive budget should be first allocated to the risk cause with highest occurrence probability that belongs to the OR set in the fault tree.

Managerially, our results indicate that project managers (PMs) should make a tradeoff between the budget invested for risk response and reduced expected loss of the risk. Then, in the case of inadequate response budget, PMs should pay more attention to risk protection and cope with the event that can cause severe loss. In addition, under this circumstance, PMs had to better allocate the risk preventive budget in proper order.

Project risk response is a critical issue in project risk management as PMs can take actions actively to cope with project risks in this phase. Effective risk response, in general, requires financial support in practice, and reasonable allocation of the total budget among risk response strategies can produce better response effects.