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Unlike many militaries in Europe, the Canadian Forces (CF) have no union or representative association. Although two separate studies have shown that more than one-third of military members think positively about forming a union (Bradley & Charbonneau, 2004; Deneumoustier, 1971), there has traditionally been little movement towards any form of associationism within Canada's military. While there is no formal ‘contract’ between the CF and the government of Canada, an informal social contract has appeared to be successful in maintaining the status quo. Critics of the social contract argue the agreement is one-sided; that is, the responsibilities of the member to Canada are well defined in the National Defence Act and Queen's Regulations and Orders but there is “no such articulation of the responsibilities of the Government of Canada to the men and women of the CF” (Milner, 1998, p. 10).

Britain is now one of the few EC countries without some form of military representative body. Yet, probably the first military trade union was formed in the British Armed Forces in 1919. At the outset, the organisation grew rapidly with the formation of 49 branches and an estimated membership of 10,000 (Englander, 1989, p. 10). But the efforts of the Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmens’ Union (SSAU) to organise the armed forces and secure a right of representation were short-lived. The authorities were quick to react to the perceived socialist threat by demobilising and discharging “men who [were] largely imbued with unionism tinged with socialism” (Englander, 1989, p. 11) and, following a raid by the intelligence services on the SSAU headquarters, the union rapidly disappeared.

This chapter focuses on the development of concordance theory with respect to India's civil–military relations and Pakistan's early yet significant state of discordance, which led to subsequent domestic military interventions. On a regional level, discordance is far more prevalent, and India operates in a South Asian environment where domestic military interventions are not uncommon – Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka being clear examples.

Moreover, the influence of China in the region cannot be overlooked, since India's defense policy is often a reaction to the role of China and the presence of conventional and nuclear forces. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, threatens a delicate balance in a highly volatile region where China exerts enormous influence on neighboring states including Pakistan. An argument can be made that India's domestic concordance between the military, the political elites, and the citizenry contributes to the preservation of regional stability, because India has chosen to maintain its regional strength vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while continuing to search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue with allies such as the United States. India's most recent and ongoing nuclear deal with the United States originally struck in 2005 is an example of the delicate synergies taking place to offset potential threats from China, Pakistan, and Iran, while maintaining domestic military and technological strength.

Although India's successful domestic course encourages partnerships among international political and corporate allies, Pakistan's continuous domestic discordance has resulted in recent difficult relations with the United States, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan's inability to quell al-Quaeda extremism has contributed to a lack of domestic confidence in General Musharraf's political agenda. Musharraf has continued the discordant political and social relationship begun by his predecessor Ayub Khan. As a result of Khan's initial and dramatic alienation of the East Bengali community, Pakistan's military and political elites have never recovered the domestic credibility needed to partner with other political groups and the citizenry – a credibility so vital to domestic concordance and international foreign policy.I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.– Mahatma Gandhi

This study employs Stein Rokkan's methodological approach to analyse state formation in the Greater Middle East. It develops a conceptual framework distinguishing colonial, populist and democratic pacts, suitable for analysis of state formation and nation-building through to the present period. The framework relies on historical institutionalism. The methodology, however, is Rokkan's. The initial conceptual analysis also specifies differences between European and the Middle Eastern state formation processes. It is followed by a brief and selective discussion of historical preconditions. Next, the method of plotting singular cases into conceptual-typological maps is applied to 20 cases in the Greater Middle East (including Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey). For reasons of space, the empirical analysis is limited to the colonial period (1870s to the end of World War 1). Three typologies are combined into one conceptual-typological map of this period. The vertical left-hand axis provides a composite typology that clarifies cultural-territorial preconditions. The horizontal axis specifies transformations of the region's agrarian class structures since the mid-19th century reforms. The right-hand vertical axis provides a four-layered typology of processes of external intervention. A final section presents selected comparative case reconstructions. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first time such a Rokkan-style conceptual-typological map has been constructed for a non-European region.

Despite the apparent philanthropic concerns of the new imperialism and the rhetoric of the civilising mission, the Second Boer War (1899–1902) revealed British irrational ambition, military reverses, scandals and evidence of inadequate administration. In this context, the South African concentration camps where the Boers, mostly women and children whose houses and farms had been destroyed by the British forces, were concentrated, stand out as examples of a seemingly arbitrary power. The controversies over such camps, and over the War itself, were heightened after Emily Hobhouse's Report was made public. Emily Hobhouse, an active humanitarian, obtained permission to visit the camps in order to write a report on the living conditions there. Upon returning to England, she had a meeting with Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the Liberal Party, who eventually denounced the methods of barbarism carried out in such places. The Report appeared soon after the meeting and waves of protest ensued. Both Emily Hobhouse and Campbell-Bannerman were under crossfire.

My intention in this paper is, firstly, to briefly address the social, political and economic context underlying British imperial expansion and struggle for space at the turn of the nineteenth century, as far as controversies over the Boer War are concerned; secondly, to study the characteristics and living conditions in South African ‘concentration camps’ relying, to a great extent, on Emily Hobhouse's account; and thirdly, to analyse the social and political impact of the denunciation of such camps as places of wholesale cruelty in Hobhouse's (in) famous Report.

This paper attempts to understand how the interaction of natural disasters and human behaviour during wartime led to famines in three regions under imperial control around the Indian Ocean. The socio-economic structure of these regions had been increasingly differentiated over the period of imperial rule, with large proportions of their populations relying on agricultural labour for their subsistence.

Before the war, food crises in each of the regions had been met by the private importation of grain from national or overseas surplus regions: the grain had been made available through a range of systems, the most complex of which was the Bengal Famine Code in which the able-bodied had to work before receiving money to buy food in the market.

During the Second World War, the loss of control of normal sources of imported grain, the destruction of shipping in the Indian Ocean (by both sides) and the military demands on internal transport systems prevented the use of traditional famine responses when natural events affected grain supply in each of the regions. These circumstances drew the governments into attempts to control their own grain markets.

The food crises raised complex ethical and practical issues for the governments charged with their solution. The most significant of these was that the British Government could have attempted to ship wheat to Bengal but, having lost naval control of the Indian Ocean in 1942 and needing warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1943 chose to ignore the needs of the people of Bengal, focussing instead on winning the war.

In each of the regions governments allowed/encouraged the balkanisation of the grain supply – at times down to the sub-district level – which at times served to produce waste and corruption, and opened the way for black markets as various groups (inside and outside government ranks) manipulated the local supply.

People were affected in different ways by the changes brought about by the war: some benefitted if their role was important to the war-effort; others suffered. The effect of this was multiplied by the way each government ‘solved’ its financial problems by – in essence – printing money.

Because of the natural events of the period, there would have been food crises in these regions without World War II, but decisions made in the light of wartime exigencies and opportunities turned crises into famines, causing the loss of millions of lives.