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Before 1500 Britain was not considered a major European power. Three hundred years later Britain led the way for the Industrial Revolution and held sway economically and militarily during the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw the United Kingdom lose her empire, her military leadership and, most of all, her capacity to lead the world in technological innovations. What were the circumstances which first thrust England into world leadership and then led her into technological decline? Examines the rise and fall in a sociocultural context and attempts to generalize the results into a modern context to understand better the innovation phenomenon.

The British Gross National Product is only three times that of Sweden, although our population is eight times larger. West Germany's GNP is twice ours, although her population is only a tenth larger. France, with a smaller population than our own, has a GNP more than half as much again. And the gap between us and the others has been widening ever more rapidly over the last two decades. This is the measure of our failure as an industrial and commercial nation.

A newly discovered energy source is expected to make a positive contribution to the economic growth of the country. To some extent, it is even thought that this is the underlying difference between developed and developing countries today. However, in history, it is seen that the countries that find new energy sources are not always able to benefit from it. The state mechanism without the necessary financial institutions and absence of dynamic economic and commercial life may lead to the inability to benefit from the newly found energy source. In this study, we will compare two nineteenth-century empires, Ottoman and British, which found coal in their homeland. As history as shown, we argue that the political institutions and the state reflexes are critical when it comes to utilizing a newly found energy source.

Estimates are developed of the major macroeconomic aggregates – wages, land rents, interest rates, prices, factor shares, sectoral shares in output and employment, and real wages – for England by decade between 1209 and 2008. The efficiency of the economy in the years 1209–2008 is also estimated. One finding is that the growth of real wages in the Industrial Revolution era and beyond was faster than the growth of output per person. Indeed until recently the greatest recipient of modern growth in England has been unskilled workers. The data also create a number of puzzles, the principal one being the very high levels of output and efficiency estimated for England in the medieval era. These data are thus inconsistent with the general notion that there was a period of Smithian growth between 1300 and 1800 which preceded the Industrial Revolution, as expressed in such recent works as De Vries (2008).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the theory of a control revolution in nineteenth century England, and its social and technological implications for the information society. It takes up where most historical interpretations of the industrial revolution end, and before most analyses of the digital era begin. The work focuses on three distinct types of technological advance – in transportation, in communication, and in the processing of information – without adopting a technologically deterministic argument.

Historical analysis, based on both primary and secondary sources.

The article first considers the introduction of the railways, and makes a case in that there were two crises of control involving railway technology in the nineteenth century: a crisis of communication, and a crisis of organisation. It goes on to assess the growth of bureaucracy and organisation in commerce. The expansion of government surveillance power towards the end of the nineteenth century is also discussed.

This paper is broad in its scope and therefore some necessary omissions and limitations have been made. Many of the terms used throughout have entire literatures on their meanings, but it is not the intention of this paper to engage further with these debates, and it is acknowledged that within this limited discussion there is room for some ambiguity surrounding terms. Such concepts have been defined as far as possible within the article. The impact of warfare and military organisation are key themes, and while extremely relevant, deserve fuller discussion elsewhere. Also, while there would have undoubtedly been effects upon the British Empire from English industrialisation and the resulting crises of control, it has not been possible to discuss the implications of differing socio‐economic and political conditions within the Empire in this paper. The increasing sophistication of other professions such as finance and accounting in this period have not been considered, although again, this is an area which deserves individual study[1].

The research takes a step towards demonstrating that the origins of the information society can be traced back to the structural and organisational implications of the control revolution of the nineteenth century. The methods of control created the basic communication infrastructures still used in 2005, and set the precedent for government intervention and social surveillance. It concludes by discussing the potential crises of control within the information society.

Attempts to find answers to such theoretical questions as the character of Soviet‐type societies and the major tendency of their development. Argues that, as long as the analysis is conducted in convenient and extreme terms of “either capitalism or socialism or communism”: as long as the yardstick for the comparison remains capitalism of laissez‐faire; and as long as the general trend and the particular forms of the world economic development are ignored ‐no satisfactory answer to the nature and fate of such societies can be found. If, however, one looks at Soviet‐type systems as socio‐economic and political structures destined to solve the problem of the industrial revolution and modernization of backward and peasant nations under the conditions of the twentieth century, then the enigma disappears. Soviet‐type societies become what they are in reality: a variety of capitalism that, having fulfilled the “archaic” act of industrialization, is moving into its post‐industrial era.