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Consumers are inclined to join longer queues due to social interactions in service consumptions. This purchase behavior brings in operational challenges in terms of capacity planning, which affects consumers’ demand, leading to an unstable and fluctuated arrival process. This paper aims to investigate the dynamic characteristics of the arrival process of a service system with boundedly rational consumers whose purchase decisions are influenced by the queue length under social interactions.

Consumers’ bounded rationality is modeled based on the random utility theory. Due to social interactions, the equilibrium queue length and its interaction with the expected waiting time affect consumers’ value perception. The authors first analyze the optimal service capacity decision with or without considering the influence of social interactions in a static setting. They then focus on the dynamic characteristics of the arrival process by a one-dimensional dynamical model in terms of the arrival rate.

This paper finds that the service system can behave chaotic in terms of arrival rate dynamics under social interactions. The results highlight the dynamical complexity of a simple service system due to consumers’ behavioral factors and the influence of social interactions, which may be the critical drivers leading to fluctuated and uneven demand.

The findings demonstrate that due to consumers’ limited cognitive ability and the influence of social interactions, the demand to a service system can be stable, periodic or even chaotic in terms of the arrival process. This study provides an alternative explanation to the observed demand fluctuations in various service processes under the influence of social interactions, which is important for service providers to effectively manage service capacity to achieve a stable service process and improve operational efficiency.

To evaluate the comparative effectiveness of perceptions‐based market segmentation strategies: to what extent do consumers' choice rules and the distinctness and variability of consumer preferences determine the success or failure of PBMS strategies?

The computer simulation is run on an artificial consumer market. Its firm and consumer agents enjoy a certain extent of autonomy and a limited capability of learning. Strategies for incorporating the choice information into the firms' segmentation schemes, consumers' brand choice rules, initial preference patterns and their variability over time are factors in the experimental design.

The market factors “brand choice rule” and “distinctness” and “adaptivity” of preferences significantly influence the profit performance of the segmentation and positioning strategies. The distinctness of the initial pattern of consumer preferences turns out to be least influential while the choice rule is most important.

Computer simulation cannot replace analyses of real‐world data. When, however, advanced explanatory models are made to fit to empirical data the results sometimes are disappointing (and then do not get published). Computer simulation on artificial markets assists in exploring the reasons for success or failure.

Boundedly rational consumers; product classes which are technologically homogeneous and subject to communications‐driven differentiation; consumer preferences that are directly inaccessible and must be inferred from actual brand choice; consumers' perceptions and preferences evolving over time are realistic settings.

Controlling for conditions such as the consumers' choice rules and the distribution and variability of preferences in real markets demands a prohibitive research effort. No empirical study so far has tried to systematically relate the profit performance of marketing strategies to choice rules and preference distinctness and variability.

The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative view of marketing that Donald F. Dixon spent much of his distinguished career developing – a paradigm that we refer to as the Dixonian systems perspective of marketing. It is a paradigm that presents marketing as a phenomenon that reaches far beyond the micro/managerial marketing mix paradigm.

Analysis and interpretation of Donald F. Dixon's and colleagues' scholarly work to distill the essence of Dixon's view of marketing, which we refer to as the Dixonian systems perspective of marketing.

The Dixon's systems perspective of marketing offers a framework for the analysis of macromarketing issues that is not provided by the conventional marketing mix micro/managerial paradigm.

The paper provides a concise overview of the macro/systems ideas and concepts of marketing contained in Donald F. Dixon's and his colleagues' extensive writings that to date has not been available from any other source.

The study examines influence of behavioural economic theories of add-on goods and contingent charges on the regulation of two touchstone markets in the UK. These markets, the payment protection insurance (PPI) market and the market for overdrafts can both be characterised as add-on goods, have displayed excessive levels of profitability and been the focus of continuing and substantial public mis-trust. Despite these similarities, the regulatory treatment of these two markets has been very different. The purpose of this paper is to explore the context of these cases and examine why these differences in regulatory reporting have developed.

The research questions are examined through a detailed review of the regulatory reporting in the UK PPI and overdraft market. This review of over 20 regulatory reports, numerous enforcement actions, associated legal proceedings and related international evidence is employed to determine commonalities and differences in the regulatory actions proposed, motives adopted and success of these regulatory processes.

It is reported the dynamic and fragmented regulatory structure, multiple policy agendas and a successful legal intervention have all influenced how these financial services markets have been regulated and behavioural economic concepts applied. In particular aspects of overdraft markets remain challenging to address as it is still possible to exclude competition within aftermarkets. The regulatory intervention into PPI markets by contrast addressed concerns raised by add-on good theory and amended the form of distribution underlying this market more directly and successfully.

There have been numerous excellent reviews of behavioural economics and finance published on a diversity of topics. Despite such a wide coverage, a relatively under-researched aspect of this literature remains the application of these relatively new theoretical insights within markets and how these have influenced regulatory practice. This review of regulatory reporting addresses this gap in the literature through considering two of the most problematic financial services markets of the last decade in the UK.

This paper investigates the buy online and pick up in-store cooperation (BOPSC) of online and offline retailers. Specifically, this study solves the following questions: (1) What is the impact of BOPSC on their optimal price and sales volume of products? (2) When should an online retailer and an offline retailer conduct the BOPSC strategy with each other?

The paper first establishes two game models to explore the equilibriums of online and offline retailers in non-BOPSC and BOPSC. Then the condition for online and offline retailers to implement BOPSC strategy are determined. Furthermore, the applicability of the BOPSC strategy is enhanced by incorporating numerical analysis.

The study’s findings reveal that BOPSC strategy will not always beneficial to online and offline retailers, which depends on the total cost of online shopping and the product valuation of consumers. BOPSC strategy leads to the increase of prices and online orders, and the demand of offline retailer is eroded. Moreover, BOPS cooperation between different retailers is easier to achieve than omni-channel integration strategy. When the convenience difference between offline shopping and BOPSC pick-up is moderate, the effectiveness of BOPSC strategy can be improved.

This study has the following two main contributions: Firstly, the authors investigate the effects of BOPSC strategy on the prices of online and offline retailers. The study results show that the BOPSC strategy alleviates price competition and promotes a win–win situation between online retailers and offline retailers. Secondly, this paper mainly studies the cooperative behavior between online and offline retailers and reveals the optimal conditions for online and offline retailers to adopt BOPSC strategy. It can help small- and medium-sized online and offline retailers to choose suitable products for BOPSC strategy, so as to achieve the purpose of increasing profit.

Housing choice is always a complicated decision with its dual functions as a roof over the head and as an investment good. This paper aims to investigate the boundedly rational behaviours that affect the housing choice three bounded behaviours play roles in explaining the decision-making behaviour of homebuyers when they acquire/sell a property. These behaviours are endowment effect, loss aversion and herding, which have implications on the decision-making process.

The research is based on cross-sectional questionnaires and collected from 587 respondents. Factor analysis and reliability tests were used to identify the latent construct of bounded rational housing choice behaviour. In the meantime, the study used one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine whether there are any differences in the housing choice based on the respondents’ demographic backgrounds.

The findings indicated that a total of 11 items were reduced to three factors that accounted for the decision-making in housing choice. There are significant differences in herding behaviour amongst respondents with different level of education and their purpose of looking for a house.

This paper helps to identify latent constructs that shed light on the housing choice, especially on the bounded rational behaviour.

This is one of the few studies to explore boundedly rational behaviours in housing choice from the angle of homebuyers. Previous studies addressed housing choice in terms of price, demand and supply in general but not on individual homebuyers. The results will be useful to developers, policymakers, homebuyers as well as scholars in understanding the decision-making process in housing choice.

We test the determinacy properties of the standard and financial-sector-augmented Taylor rules in a new Keynesian model with a presence of banking activities. We extend the basic fully rational environment to the setting with heterogeneous expectations. We observe that the benefits from extra financial targeting are limited. Financial targeting, if well designed, can compensate for the improper output-gap targeting through the financial-production channel. The analysis demonstrates however possible threats resulting from the misspecification of the augmented rule. A determinate mix of output-gap and inflation weights can turn indeterminate if compensated by too extreme financial targeting. The results are robust to the presence of heterogeneous expectations.

George Loewenstein, a prominent behavioral economist, recalls thatIn 1994, when Thaler, Camerer, Rabin, Prelec and I spent the year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, we had a meeting to make a kind of final decision about what to call what we were doing. Remarkably, at that time, the name behavioral economics was not yet well established. I actually advocated “psychological economics,” and Thaler was strong on behavioral economics. I'm kind of glad that he prevailed; I think it's a better, catchier, label, although it creates confusion due to association with Behaviorism. (G. Loewenstein, personal email to author, June 16, 2008)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the ability of monetary policy to generate real effects in laboratory general equilibrium production economies.

To understand why monetary policy is not consistently effective at stabilizing economic activity, the author vary the types of agents interacting in the economy and consider treatments where subjects are playing the role of households (firms) in an economy where automated firms (households) are programmed to behave rationally.

While the majority of participants’ expectations respond to monetary policy in the direction intended, subjects do form expectations adaptively, relying heavily on past variables and forecasts in forming two-steps-ahead forecasts. Moreover, in the presence of counterparts that are boundedly rational, forecast accuracy worsens significantly. When interacting with automated households, updating firms’ prices respond modestly to monetary policy and significantly to anticipated marginal costs and future prices. The greatest deviations in behavior from theoretical predictions arise from human households (HH). Households persistent oversupply of labor and under-consumption is attributed to precautionary saving and debt aversion. The results provide evidence that the effects of monetary policy on decision making hinge on the distribution of indebtedness of households.

The author present causal evidence of the effects of potential bounded rationality on agents’ consumption and labor decisions.