Search results

Sound real estate decisions are both financially and strategically essential to corporate success. Given their importance, this paper aims to illustrate how the actor network theory (ANT) can be a valuable alternate lens to bounded rational and political perspectives in providing insights into corporate real estate decision‐making processes.

This exploratory investigation uses a case study approach to retroactively examine the real estate decision‐making process over five to seven years in four organizations ranging in size from four to 125 employees. The study uses multiple data sources including 25 in‐depth interviews, site visits, archival data, websites, documents, and email correspondence.

Using the constructs of ANT, the findings reveal how real estate decision making involves iterative but identifiable phases through which heterogeneous actors seek to converge diverse interests and where artifacts affect behaviors and outcomes as much as or sometimes more than their human creators.

Given the case study method, this research lacks generalizability. Researchers are encouraged to test the findings in different contexts.

The ANT perspective helps managers faced with real estate decisions to appreciate the relevant matrix of need, power, and interests; recognize and seek to control the power of artifacts; and, view real estate decision making not as simply making a choice among logical alternatives, but as orchestrating a long, complex process.

This investigation compares the perspectives of ANT to the classical bounded rational and political lenses in examining corporate real estate decision making; demonstrates ANT's value in providing additional insights; and, discusses its implications for understanding and managing these complex processes.

This paper aims to explore the psychological process by which front-line employees (FLEs) in hospitality firms make decisions on hiding knowledge.

A qualitative methodology was used, with triangulated data collection from six different types of hospitality firms. By using the thematic analysis approach, a conceptual framework consisting of seven main themes was constructed to reflect the replicable logic of an individual’s knowledge exchange decision-making in various situations.

This study proposes a theoretical framework describing how hotel employees evaluate the cost and benefit of knowledge exchange implicitly. Using this framework, this paper illustrates the strategies that FLEs use to make a bounded-rational decision on knowledge exchange in situations characterized by time constraints and limited information.

Hotel managers can use the psychological process presented in this paper to better understand how FLEs make knowledge-hiding decisions in the workplace. Furthermore, specific measures are suggested to reduce FLEs’ knowledge-hiding behaviors in each stage of their knowledge exchange decision process.

This paper uncovers the psychological process of individuals’ decision-making regarding hiding knowledge from others in the hotel context, thus increasing the understanding of the rationale of FLEs’ knowledge hiding behaviors from the perspective of bounded-rational decision theory.

This paper aims to explore the relevance of bounded rationality to the practice of institutional investors in Malaysia. Understanding institutional investor behavior is important, as it can determine the asset prices and consequently the market behavior.

A set of questionnaires is used to solicit information regarding the understanding and practical application of behavioral finance theories and strategies among fund managers in the Malaysian investment management practice. In the process, bounded rational theory is aimed to be validated. Fund managers’ possible bounded rational behavior is assessed with reference to their investment management approaches and strategies right from individual beliefs and acquisition of information, as well as investment management and strategies used.

The findings lend support to the notion that institutional investors too, being normal human beings, are expected to think and behave in a boundedly rational manner as postulated in bounded rational theory. The sources of bounded rationality are individual, institutional and social forces. Thus, portfolio trading and investment management strategies are exposed to wide varieties of behavioral risks. Despite the notions that behavioral risks are real and the impact on fund performance could be pervasive, fund managers’ self-awareness regarding control and institutional readiness to govern behavioral risks in investment practices is still low.

Empirical evidence drawn in the current paper is subjected to small sample size and specific focus on Malaysian context. Despite this limitation, the sample is statistically sufficient and provides a fair representation, as well as quality opinions, of fund manager’s investment management behavior in Malaysia. This research provides valuable implications to practitioners (fund managers) and regulators (investment management and capital market policymakers). In practice, the current study draws some practical ideas, especially for buy-side institutional investors, on the source and impact of behavioral biases on fund management practices and performance. For regulators, this research highlighted the needs and possible ways to regulate these behavioral risks.

The current paper provides new insights on the theory and practice of the institutional investor. In theory, this research provides evidence of bounded rationality of institutional investor behavior, practicing in the asset management industry in the emerging markets of Malaysia. This evidence lends support to the validity of the bounded rationality theory in explaining institutional investor behavior. In practice, thisresearch provides new insights on the relevance of behavioral finance perspectives and strategies in the asset management industry practice and policy.

When developing a new product, a buying firm solicits revenue sharing bids from two competing suppliers. Bidding behaviors of suppliers do not always align with predictions from rational agent models due to task uncertainty and bounded rationality, which could result in non-optimal supplier offers and ultimately hurt buying firm interests. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.

The authors built an analytical model that considers the impact of supplier technological risk, buyer–supplier coordination cost and supplier loss aversion on the optimal bid of the supplier. Next, using limited information processing capacity as a theoretic lens, the authors explore antecedents to the size of a focal supplier's bidding error, the absolute difference between the actual bid and the optimal bid. The authors used quantitative lab experimental data to test the hypotheses.

(1) Bounded rational bidders often fail to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant competitive information when placing bids, (2) loss aversion of a bidder significantly affects not only levels of bids, particularly for bidders with competitive disadvantages, but also sizes of the bidding error and (3) competitive information that has clearer performance implications are more influential in reducing sizes of bidding errors.

The results provide a comprehensive view of the bidding behaviors of a bounded rational supplier in an innovation outsourcing context with competition. With the results, managers now have a better understanding of behavioral influencers behind non-optimal supplier bids in an innovation outsourcing context.

Often farmers do not switch to a new bank even if it offers better interest rates than the house bank. This can be attributed partly to transaction costs, and partly to bounded rationality. The purpose of this paper is to better understand farm borrowers by analyzing the role of incomplete information and limited cognitive abilities in their finance decisions.

The data for the analysis were retrieved from a written survey conducted among German farmers who were “experimentally” confronted with a funding problem and who had to make a choice between two loan offers: one from the housebank, and one from a competing bank. Using contingent valuation, each farmer's willingness to pay (WTP) for continuing business with his house bank was assessed.

Approximately 90 per cent of the farmers misjudged the absolute losses caused by higher interest rates. In the frame “accepted interest rate surcharge” the WTP for staying with the house bank was, on average, ten times higher than in the frame “accepted surcharge in Euro”. The misjudgment was found to differ depending on education, the duration of the business relationship, etc. The findings indicate that bounded rationality is a relevant determinant of the “reluctance to switch”.

Complementing research on the decision making of lenders, this paper studies the demand side of the agricultural credit market. Two research questions are examined which, to the authors' knowledge, have not previously been investigated through empirical surveys: first, to what extent do farmers make bounded‐rational financing decisions? Second, which factors explain bounded rationality?

The purpose of this paper is to diagnose two types of causal relationships from the perspective of the structural equations model. First, the relationship is analysed between managers’ beliefs regarding the use of marketing information in making decisions and the rational premises of decision validity. Next, the rational premises of decision validity are considered in reference to managers’ abilities to select appropriate information from marketing research reports. Taking into account all of the above premises, the author in the empirical research conducted here introduced the following two research hypotheses which state that: H1: the high level of managers’ beliefs about the usefulness of information from marketing research does not yet positively influence their way of reasoning and making decisions in the light of the bounded-rationality theory. H2: managers who do not use the bounded-rationality criteria of decision assessment, lack of the analytical approach in solving decision problems, also reflect the inability of selecting proper information from a marketing research report.

In the conducted empirical research, that is, in the process of gathering the information, the internet questionnaire survey was used, which included the author’s own version of items measuring respective latent variables. Next, to the chosen group of the respondents (invited to the survey through the two social networking sites: LinkedIn and Golden Line), a direct link to the questionnaire was sent via personal e-mails. The method of providing answers to the questions in the online survey included indicating by the respondents the answers on a seven-point Likert scale for the statements which were expressed in agree/disagree format. The whole empirical research was conducted between March 1 and August 31 in 2014, and the process of choosing the appropriate respondents to the sample was conducted with the use of the two techniques: judgemental sampling and snowball sampling. The final size of sample equalled n=213 and its structure included the individuals in companies, who have borne the responsibility mainly for the organisation and planning of strategic and tactic marketing activities. In short, the sample structure consisted of the respondents responsible for decision-making processes and included: marketing directors (45 per cent), product managers (27 per cent), managing directors and chief executive officers (20 per cent), as well as marketing executives (8 per cent).

On the basis of findings and the obtained empirical results it is argued that decision makers in companies, despite their strong declarations regarding the use of marketing information, in reality prefer to act in a non-analytical way when making choices. Managers, when faced with difficulties in information processing, adopt simple solutions in solving decision problems which are much closer to the irrational sphere of making choices. Thus the full potential of information that is available to them from marketing research is not even considered. This irrational behaviour in decisions as well as the lack of analytical thinking result in further consequences pertaining to the way that information is selected.

In spite of all theoretical arguments supporting the bounded-rational theory of making choices, the irrationality or, simply, the non-analytical thinking in decision-making processes in organisations takes place. The inability to use effectively information by managers in companies and failure to scrutinise their own processes of decision making on the basis of logic and reasoning is admittedly the Achille’s heel of many information users. Using information from marketing research in decisions, as well as undertaking the sequence of steps to ensure the valid decision-making process, seems to be a huge problem for managers. Taking into account, the empirical research findings, one can argue now that in spite of the managers’ conviction about the usefulness of the information from marketing research, that is, despite their declarations pertaining to use of information in decision-making processes, such information is in practice often ignored and not taken into account.

In the paper the author explains why, as is supported by empirical evidence, managers in companies decide to conceal their real beliefs concerning the usefulness of marketing information. Taking this into consideration, the indirect question of the empirical research conducted here is whether managers ever seriously consider marketing research results when making decisions?

This paper describes how financial professionals' behavioral biases influence their financial forecast and decision-making process. Most of the earlier studies are focused on well-developed financial markets, and little is researched about financial professionals, such as institutional investors, portfolio managers, investment advisors, financial analysts, etc., in emerging markets.

An expert-validated questionnaire measure four prominent behavioral biases and Indian financial professionals' rational decision-making process. The final sample consists of 274 valid responses using the purposive sampling technique. IBM SPSS and AMOS structural equation modeling (SEM) software are used to build measurement and structural models, multivariate analysis including regression, factor analysis, etc.

The results provide empirical insights into the relationship between behavioral biases and the decision-making process. The results suggest that the structural path model closely fits the sample data. The presence of behavioral biases indicates that financial professionals' forecasting and decision-making is not always rational but bounded rational or irrational due to these factors. Furthermore, these biases (except overconfidence bias) have a markedly significant and positive relationship with irrational decision-making.

It is critical to eradicate these psychological errors, but awareness and attentiveness toward behavioral biases may help financial professionals to make informed decisions. Investors can improve their portfolio decisions and investments by recognizing their judgment errors and focusing on specific investment strategies to mitigate the impact of these biases. It is necessary to incorporate behavioral insights while developing training techniques for financial professionals. Rules of thumb, visual tools, financial coaching and implementing social-cultural elements in training programs enable financial professionals to develop simple, engaging, appealing and customized approaches for their clients.

This novel study is the first of this kind of research that examines the relationship between financial professionals' behavioral biases and rational decision-making process. This study significantly and remarkably provides insights into irrationality in financial professionals' decision-making.

This study aims to examine the international market selection process of entrepreneurs operating internationally.

Four small and medium-sized comparative and rich-information case studies were purposefully selected from among Australian and Arabian firms. Data were collected via in-depth personal interviews, follow-up interviews and questionnaire instrument.

The results revealed that entrepreneurs used a four-stage systematic decision-making process to attain profitable foreign market choices. The decision process was influenced by cognitive boundaries as entrepreneurs relied on the availability experiential, anchoring and adjustment heuristic.

The research’s findings and the proposed decision model will, significantly, assist entrepreneurs, willing to expand internationally, in enhancing their decision-making to attain profitable foreign market choices. Further, it provides benefits to foreign investment policymakers in host countries by assisting them to attract more inward foreign direct investments, and, accordingly, enhance the economic and social development movement in their countries.

This study provides a significant theoretical contribution to the literature on the internationalization process of entrepreneurs and small- and medium-sized enterprises through developing a decision model for selecting and entering foreign markets by entrepreneurs in a cross-country context. Further, the study provides significant methodological contributions with regard to the effectiveness of the qualitative case study method in capturing elements of the foreign market selection process.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of the special interests of key decision makers in entrepreneurship policy formation at the national level. The core question is: what is the role that special interests play in a situation with significantly improved evidence through a growing number of high-quality international benchmark studies on entrepreneurial performance.

An ethnographic method is applied to analyse in depth the 2005 decision by the Danish Government to shift from a volume-oriented to a growth-oriented entrepreneurship policy. This decision process is an extreme case since Denmark has world-class evidence of its entrepreneurial performance.

Even in such a well-investigated country, which since 2000 has had a pioneering role in the development of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor study and international register-based studies, the special interests of a few top-level politicians and civil servants have significantly influenced the decision to shift the overall policy. These special interests guided the interpretation of the ambiguous evidence provided by these two benchmark studies.

Policy makers are made aware of the need to take a critical view on international benchmark studies, asking what is studied and how and realising that “the truth” about a country’s entrepreneurial performance cannot be found in just one study.

The theoretical value of this paper is its challenge to the widespread rationality view in the entrepreneurship policy field and a deepened understanding of how the pursuit of special interests is related to ambiguous evidence and system-level rationality.

The purpose of this viewpoint article is to serve as a discussion starting point regarding organizational leadership’s increasing reliance on AI – in particular, how the technology is used as a supplemental tool for supporting rational decision-making. Practical implications and directions for further research are presented.

With its inception in economics, the concept of rationality has a rich history across multiple research domains. Based on that literature, coupled with the recent advancements in AI, the paper asks: will AI afford organizational leadership the ability to move from making bounded rational decisions to making fully rational decisions? The paper only scratches the surface of such a large question; however, the goal is to start the discussion around the topic.

While bounded rationality supports efficient decision-making, a complete understanding of any given decision is typically limited, and as a result, neither accuracy nor effectiveness is guaranteed. As AI systems grow in speed and accuracy, they should provide positive support for organizational leaders to make fully rational decisions. AI’s ability to collect and organize data, analyze it, and offer decision alternatives may help close the gap between bounded and rational decision-making.

Although AI research is not new, the recent developments in natural language processing engines has rapidly brought about new possibilities for their use in rational decision-making in the business and organizational context. This is fertile ground for future research, particularly in the area of organizational decision-making.