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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the opinions of managers of Indian firms on stock splits and bonus shares (stock dividends) and relate them to explanations for stock distributions identified in the prior literature.

The authors use descriptive statistics from a mail survey to the company secretaries of 500 firms listed on the National Stock Exchange of India to elicit their responses about statements involving stock splits and bonus shares.

The survey evidence shows that among the competing motives for stock splits, the liquidity hypothesis receives the highest level of support followed by the attention-getting variant of the signaling hypothesis, signaling, and the preferred trading range hypotheses. Regarding bonus shares, respondents express strong support for the retained earnings, liquidity, and signaling hypotheses but lesser support for the cash substitution and preferred trading range hypotheses.

The survey evidence provides new insights into the stated motivations for stock distributions, especially bonus shares, among Indian firms but the ability to generalize the results is tempered by the relatively small number of respondents. This limits the ability to test for statistically significant differences between the various competing hypotheses. Hence, the results are suggestive rather than definitive.

The survey evidence suggests that no single explanation dominates all others for issuing stock splits or bonus shares in India. Thus, managers have multiple reasons for engaging in stock distributions.

Few studies use survey methodology to examine Indian dividend policy. Given the dearth of survey evidence on stock distributions among Indian firms, this study not only updates the limited evidence on stock splits but also provides the first survey evidence about managerial views on bonus shares.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes in the economic importance of performance-related-pay (PRP) in Britain through the 2000s using firm-level data.

The authors utilise nationally representative, monthly data on the total wage bill and employment of around 8,500 firms. Using these data, the authors decompose the share of the total economy-wide wage bill accounted for by bonuses into the shares of employment in the PRP and non-PRP sectors, the ratio of base pay between the two sectors, and the gearing of bonus payments to base pay within the PRP sector.

The growth in the economic importance of bonuses in Britain in the mid-2000s – and subsequent fluctuations since the onset of recession in 2008 – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing of bonus to base pay within the PRP sector. There has been no substantial change in the percentage of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over time. Furthermore, movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy are heavily influenced by changes in Finance: a sector which accounts for a large proportion of all bonus payments in Britain.

The paper demonstrates the importance of understanding further how firms decide the size of bonus payments in a given period.

This is the first paper to present monthly firm-level data for Britain on the incidence and size of bonus payments in the 2000s.

Project-based supply networks are an emerging form of organizing used to meet a buying organization's operational and innovation goals. Knowledge sharing among suppliers in the network plays a key role in successful project delivery but is challenging to achieve in practice. The authors draw on self-determination theory (SDT) to examine the interactive effect of incentive provisions (penalties and bonuses) and network governance (lead or shared) on knowledge sharing motivation by individual boundary-spanners within project-based supply networks.

A scenario-based behavioral experiment of 217 professionals within the UK using the online platform, Prolific, was conducted. A Hayes Macro PROCESS model was used to analyze the data. The authors pilot-tested the scenario with project management experts, senior managers, and directors.

The findings highlighted that the effectiveness of incentive provisions on knowledge sharing may be dependent on the mode of network governance. Where suppliers have shared responsibility for managing the network (shared governance), bonuses were more effective than penalties in motivating knowledge sharing through support of boundary-spanners’ autonomy needs. However, where the buying organization has transferred responsibility for managing the network to an external third-party organization (lead governance), the authors found no significant difference between the effectiveness of penalty versus bonus provisions in motivating knowledge sharing.

Prior research in operations and supply chain management (OSCM) has shown the positive effect of incentive provisions on knowledge sharing motivation, but largely overlooked the effectiveness of such incentives when nested within broader governance mechanisms used in projects and their networks. Moreover, while scholars have started to highlight the importance of governance mechanisms in knowledge sharing at the dyadic level, the authors know very little about the impact of network governance.

The paper aims to measure the magnitude of the event-induced return anomaly around bonus issue announcement days in Turkey for recent years. Also, by describing the information content of these announcements with the current data, the study tries to find out the factors that cause return anomaly in Borsa Istanbul when firm boards release the bonus issue decision.

The paper conducts event study methodology for detecting market anomaly around bonus issue announcements. For the pairwise comparison purpose, t-test and one-way ANOVA methods are applied to examine if abnormal returns vary according to the information content of the announcements.

Announcement returns for bonus issues from internal resources outperform the issues that are distributed from last year's net income as bonus shares. Findings indicate different return behaviour among internal resources sub-groups. Findings also suggest that investors in Turkey welcome larger-sized issues, while cumulated returns for the initial offers significantly differ from the latter issues.

Findings are limited to the Turkish equity market. Also, the Public Disclosure Platform of Turkey, which is the main data source of the study, does not provide bonus issue announcements before 2010. Therefore, the previous year's data cannot be included in the analysis.

This paper is novel in terms of considering the main resources of the bonus issue in detail to measure the announcement's impact on stock returns.

A small literature has shown that individual wellbeing varies with the price of company stock, but it is unclear whether this is due to wealth effects amongst those holding stock, or more general effects on sentiment, with individuals taking rising stock prices as an indicator of improvements in the economy. The authors contribute to this literature by using two data sets to establish the relationship between share prices on the one hand and worker wellbeing on the other.

First, the authors use over 20 years of British panel data to show that employee happiness and job satisfaction moves with share prices among those whose pay is partly determined by company fortunes. The authors then examine share price movements and employee stock holding in a single corporation and provide suggestive evidence that an increase in the firm’s stock price increases the well-being of those who belong to its employee share purchase plan (ESPP). These effects are greatest among those making the largest monthly contributions to the program who have the most to gain (or lose) from stock price fluctuations. There is also tentative evidence that the well-being effects of a higher share price are larger for those who hold more shares. Taken together these results suggest that, although stock price movements have little effect on well-being in the population at large, the well-being of those holding stock in their own company rises when the price of that stock is higher, suggesting the effects of share prices work at least partly via changes in wealth.

Taken together these results suggest that the wellbeing effects of share prices work at least partly via changes in wealth.

The authors cannot be certain that the job satisfaction movements they see are causally linked to share plan participation and bonus receipt. Future research might fruitfully examine the mechanisms at play, and whether the effects identified here are linked to differences in employee motivation and effort over the business cycle.

Firms may wish to consider the appropriateness of linking their workers’ pay to firm performance through share plans or profit shares to establish whether this improves worker wellbeing.

The utility of workers may increase where firms offer some compensation via a share plan or profit share.

The literature suggests a link between share price movements and worker wellbeing, but the reasons for the link are contested. Using two very different data sources, the authors are able to show that share price increases induce higher worker wellbeing, at least in part, through wealth effects.

This paper aims to examine the impact of executive compensation on firm risk-taking behavior, measured by the volatility of stock price returns. Specifically, this analysis explores three hypotheses. First, the impact of short-term and long-term executive compensation packages on firm risk is analyzed to assess whether the packages incentivize risk-taking behavior. Second, the authors test how these compensation and risk relationships were impacted by the financial crisis. Third, they expand the analysis to see if the relationship varies across different industries.

The econometric approach used to examine the executive compensation and firm risk relationship takes the form of two different panel model specifications. The first model is a pooled model using the panel data of executive compensation, the firm-level control variables and volatility of stock market returns. The second model highlights the differences in the relationship between executive compensation and riskiness of firm behavior across industries.

The authors find a significant and robust relationship, showing that during the post-financial crisis period firms tended to use long-term compensation shares to reduce firm risk. They also find that the relationship between various compensation components and firm risk varies across industries. Specifically, the bonus share of compensation negatively impacted firm risk in the financial services industry, while it positively impacted risk in the transportation, communication, gas, electric and services sectors. Additionally, long-term compensation share exhibits an inverse relationship with firm risk in the financial services, manufacturing and trade industries.

The conclusions of this paper suggest that there is indeed a relationship between executive compensation and firm risk across industries. There was a notable change in the relationship however between firm risk and long-term compensation following the financial crisis, where firms used long-term compensation to reduce firm riskiness. In other words, the financial crisis changed the nature of this relationship across S&P 1500 firms. The last key finding is that there exist differences in risk and compensation relationships across industries, and these differences across industries are highlighted across both bonus share and long-term incentive share variables. This is the first study to explore this relationship across industries.

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative firms’ performances of equity‐based compensation schemes using a panel regression approach from Taiwanese experience.

Previous theory considers executive stock options as an important input in the production process, but the empirical support for the performances of equity‐based compensation schemes is mixed in developed countries. This paper uses a panel data regression to analyze the influence of stock bonus and executive stock option on performance.

The evidences in Taiwan suggest that there exist positive associations between the amount of stock bonuses and firms’ operating performance. It is also found that firms with larger firm size or high growth opportunity tend to adopt stock bonus

The first limitation is that we the dataset over our sample period 1999‐2001 is still incomplete because the executive stock options allowed by the regulation are not prevalent in Taiwan over that period. The second limitation is the unique stock bonus system in Taiwan is not observed for developed countries.

The result imply a positive association between stock bonus and firm's operating performance. Companies with well‐designed bonus compensation may lead to better performance.

The unique stock bonus compensation schemes in Taiwan are used in general to contribute to the success of the high‐tech companies. This paper first addresses the importance of the stock bonus on compensation issue for high‐tech companies. This added knowledge is beneficial to practitioners and academics whose interest lies in equity‐based compensation and performance.

This paper aims to examine the stock return behaviour around the bonus issue announcements in eight emerging markets for 2010–2019 by addressing the signalling, cash substitution and liquidity hypotheses.

Besides using the standard event study technique to test the presence of an anomaly, country-based regression analyses are performed. Firm-specific factors are used to understand the motive behind the anomaly observed pre- and post-announcement periods. Also, the Amihud illiquidity measure examines the liquidity hypothesis, while standardized profitability and investment ratios compare the long-run operational performance of bonus issuers to test the validity of signalling.

The findings provide evidence that abnormal returns can be detected ten days before the announcement in some countries, which is a sign of information leakage. The presence of the effect continues only in two countries after the announcement is released. The size of the bonus issue is found strongly significant in most countries, while a weak relation between abnormal return and other factors is detected. Moreover, the signalling hypothesis does not hold in the sense of long-run profitability increase, while liquidity assertion is partially presented.

Due to an inadequate number of announcements in other emerging markets, the number of sample countries is limited by eight.

The research is novel regarding analyzing a wide range of emerging countries with various variables. Also, the paper is distinguished from other studies by applying multiple set of regressions under nine different event windows.

This chapter describes the spread of new work and pay practices in Danish private sector firms during the last two decades. The data source is two surveys directed at firms and carried out ten years apart. The descriptive analysis shows that large changes in the way work is organised in firms have occurred during both decades, whereas the progression of pay practices predominantly took place in the nineties. There is considerable firm heterogeneity in the frequency of adoption of the practices. In particular, the prevalence of both incentive pay and work practices is higher in multinational companies and firms engaged in exporting.

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence for how business group firms transfer financial resources among affiliated firms by examining the differences in the level of debt financing and the choices of new equity financing between group affiliated and non‐affiliated firms in an emerging market, Turkey. The role of affiliated banks for internal capital market transactions is also to be examined.

Univarite analysis and simple pooled OLS regression analysis are performed to examine the role of group affiliation on the level of several debt financing measures. Additionally, a Logit regression analysis is used to analyze the behavior of affiliated firms in their equity financing decisions by issuing new shares.

Group affiliated firms transfer funds in the group by using transactions such as trade debt, and issuing cash rights and bonus shares. The affiliated firms – especially with a bank in the group – support their higher growth with new equity issues in the forms of cash rights and bonus shares along with higher trade debt. Moreover, non‐affiliated firms utilize a higher percentage of debt to shareholders, while affiliated firms without a bank utilize a higher financial debt. These findings are consistent with the idea that the role of the group bank is very important in financing choices of affiliated firms.

This paper provides direct measures of external and internal funds by focusing on new equity issues and debt structure, which can be applied in different economic environments, rather than using indirect measures or not readily available datasets such as connected party transactions.

The paper provides additional evidence to assess the efficiency of the use of internal capital markets. Moreover, the role of group affiliated banks among affiliated firms has not yet been extensively addressed in the literature and an examination of this issue leads to a better understanding of their roles in diversified business groups.