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Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

The purpose of this study is to examine the trade-off between accrual and real activity earnings manipulation by considering gender and punishment as one aspect of clawbacks.

To achieve the research objectives, experimental design research was used, involving 183 professional accountants in Indonesia. This was followed by interviews with board members of public companies in Indonesia.

After the adoption of clawbacks, the intention to manipulate accruals decreased more among women than among men. However, the possible unintended consequences of clawbacks, particularly an increase in real activity manipulation, did not differ between women and men.

There are still few studies that use experimental designs to examine the consequences of clawback. Our study is expected to provide a novel contribution to the literature on the consequences of clawbacks as we use an experimental method. Besides, previous research that tested the consequences of clawback, using both archival and experimental data, had not considered the gender aspect, thus prompting this study to fill the research gap related to the consequences of clawback adoption by including the gender variable.

This study investigates the relationship between outside directors, managerial compensation, and firm performance in the Korean insurance industry.

The authors employ a simultaneous equation framework by using three-stage least squares (3SLS) to address the endogeneity problems that could result from the joint determination of outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in Korean insurance companies.

The authors find that the ratio of outside directors on the board is negatively associated with insurance firm's value and financial profitability. In addition, this study's evidence shows that greater representation on the board by outside directors leads to a higher level of executive pay. In particular, the authors provide evidence that variable compensation scheme and outside directors who have backgrounds in the legal profession and former high-ranking government officials drive this study's main results.

This study adds to the literature by first demonstrating the interaction effects between outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in the Korean insurance industry. Unlike previous studies that typically focus on US companies, the authors study the Korean insurance sector that is an emerging power in the global insurance market, ranking seventh in terms of total premium volume, and show that the Korean insurance firm's outside directors system does not work in the manner that it is intended to function.

The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.

The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.

The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.

The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.

The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.

The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between self-determined motivation and organizational commitment, with the mediating role of cross-cultural adjustment of low-skilled workers who come from an emerging economy working in a developed economy. This study also aims to determine the interaction effect between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on organizational commitment.

This study collects a sample data of 236 Vietnamese laborers in Taiwan. Structural equation modeling is used to analyze data and test hypotheses.

Results show that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are positively related to organizational commitment. Cross-cultural adjustment positively mediates the relationship between intrinsic motivation and organizational commitment and that between extrinsic motivation and organizational commitment. Furthermore, extrinsic motivation positively moderates the relationship between intrinsic motivation and organizational commitment.

This study helps to untangle the relationship between self-determined motivation and organizational commitment of low-skilled workers in an unfamiliar environment. Furthermore, this study also clarifies the mediating and moderating mechanisms of cross-cultural adjustment and extrinsic motivation in this relationship. The findings provide implications for researchers and managers to plan and implement policy and management systems that combine tangible and intangible incentives to motivate foreign workers and induce positive outcomes for companies in a new cultural context.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

Investors often utilize brokers to assist them in property acquisitions. These brokers are compensated through a cooperative commission, or bonus, that is publicized on the listing service. The purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship between advertised compensation packages and selling price, time-on-market and listing characteristics.

To examine variables likely to influence earnings of the buyers' broker, this study utilizes multiple and logistic regressions. Given the range of prices found in the 196,276 listings, the data was sorted on listing price and then split into ten, approximately equal, deciles.

The explanatory power of models with cooperative commission as the dependent variable was highest in the lowest deciles with type of financing, size and distressed status being highly significant. When comparing list- to selling price the average was 96.1%. As cooperative commission increased, the higher priced parcels sold at a higher price relative to list price. This potentially justifies higher cooperative commissions or exemplifies the principal-agent problem where effort is based on potential earnings. Fixed bonuses were used predominately for parcels under $62,234, likely to provide a minimum earnings amount. However, surrounding the median, it seems they may differentiate a property.

This research provides insight for practitioners on the impact of different variables, including cooperative commissions, on sale price and time-on-market. For example, cooperative commission increased for properties in the outer deciles implying that agents may be compensating for suspected difficulty. Additionally, the seasonality findings imply that agents can determine when to list and when to provide a fixed bonus to solicit attention. Results also suggest that practitioners will find it beneficial to market at an appropriate price rather than list high to create negotiating room.

This paper follows only one paper that covered a similar topic. However, this paper uses twenty years of multi-unit property listings from a major US city from 1996 to 2015. The focus on multi-unit properties is an effort to focus on a more sophisticated group of buyers that may be more experienced and make decisions more rationally.