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The purpose of this paper is to determine how board leadership affects the board strategic involvement in private firms in Kenya and how CEO power moderates this relationship.

The authors used a Kenyan data set to investigate what makes boards in private firms get involved in strategy. Survey data derived from a sample of 186 CEOs of private firms were used, and the hypotheses were tested using moderated regression analysis.

The results indicate that board members’ knowledge, board chairman’s leadership efficacy, board members’ personal motivation and board members’ background all have a positive and significant effect on board strategy involvement. The authors also found that CEO power moderates the relationship between board leadership and strategy involvement. The study concludes that when the CEO wields immense power, the board tends to become passive and to submit to the direction of the CEO.

The study adds value to the understanding of the effect of the board leadership on strategic involvement in private firms and how CEO power influences this relationship, particularly in a developing country like Kenya.

We investigate whether active involvement of private equity firms in their portfolio companies during the holding period of a later-stage private equity investment is related to increased levels in operating performance of these companies. Our analysis of unique survey data on 267 European buyouts and secondary performance data on 29 portfolio companies using partial least squares structural equation modeling indicates that private equity firms, that is, their board representatives, can increase operating performance not only by monitoring the behavior of top managers of portfolio companies, but also by becoming involved in strategic decisions and supporting top managers through the provision of strategic resources. Strategic resources, in particular expertise and networks, provided by private equity firm representatives in the form of financial and strategic involvement are associated with increases in the financial performance and competitive prospects of portfolio companies. Operational involvement, however, is not related to changes in operating performance. In addition to empirical insights into the different types of involvement and their effects, this chapter contributes to the buyout literature by providing support for the suggested broadening of the theoretical discussion beyond the dominant perspective of agency theory through developing and testing a complementary resource-based view of involvement. This allows taking into account not only the monitoring, but also the more entrepreneurial supporting element of involvement by private equity firms.

This paper aims to review how corporate governance is institutionalised in Nigeria and examine the relationship between board size, CEOs’ duality, board composition and the board's involvement in strategy.

A structured questionnaire was sent by post to the chairmen of 138 publicly quoted companies in Nigeria in November 2004.

Using primary and secondary data, our results suggest that the Nigerian public companies have embraced some principles of the Code of Best Practices for Public Companies. There is a high level of board involvement in strategy decision‐making process, but no correlation was found between board involvement and a number of governance variables (board size, board independence and CEO duality).

The sample of 39 responding companies is small although it represents a 28 per cent of response rate and is representative of the Nigerian stock market. However, we are unable to look at other factors such as industry sectors and we cannot generalise our findings regarding corporate governance practices in Nigeria.

The investment climate in Nigeria can become more reassuring than in the past although there is room for further improvements as the effectiveness of the corporate government practices is still in doubt.

This paper adds to the scanty literature available on corporate governance practices in developing, countries. Findings extend our understanding about the strategic functions of the board in Nigeria, which is Africa's most populous nation, and the world's sixth larger producer of oil.

On the surface, things haven't changed. In 1971, Professor Myles L. Mace, in his seminal study, Directors: Myth and Reality, reported that the typical board does not get involved in the establishment of objectives, strategies, and policies. Recently, more than a decade later, the author conducted a study of the boards of more than 225 U.S.‐based firms in which the majority of chairmen, contrary to what was subsequently found to be their practice, indicated that their boards are not involved in strategic planning.

There has been increasing interest in Australia regarding corporate boards, their role and the contribution they make to organisations' performance and success. There is however, a gap in our knowledge about what board members do. To better understand boards, we need to know more about the behaviour of those who sit on boards. Many chairmen and all non‐executive directors serve on corporate boards in a part‐time capacity, however, such part‐time service does not negate a role in strategy. The purpose of this paper is to ask how, if at all, do part‐time board members influence strategy in Australian public companies?

This paper first examines the literature on choice, change and control as key aspects of firms' strategic conduct. Second, attention turns to generating empirical data to examine how part‐time board members engage with these processes. Attention is given to the actions of part‐time board members vis‐à‐vis executive directors, both inside and outside the boardroom. Data from interviews with 20 board members are interpreted using the 1999 framework of McNulty and Pettigrew which conceptualises part‐time board members' involvement in strategy as: ”taking strategic decisions”, ”shaping strategic decisions” and ”shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy”.

Each of the three levels of part‐time board member involvement in strategy described by McNulty and Pettigrew engage part‐time board members in processes of choice, change and control in differing ways. Part‐time board members are able to shape both the ideas that form the content of corporations' strategies and the methodologies and processes by which those ideas evolve. In so doing, part‐time board members are capable of exerting control over management and influencing processes of strategic choice and change. Boards of directors have a role in strategy formulation, strategic decision‐making and strategic control.

The board's role is in the driver's seat not as a rubber stamp. A process whereby board members can engage and exert a controlling influence over strategic direction and outcomes of the corporation is of benefit not only to Australian corporations but has global corporate benefit. The paper describes and analyses the contribution to strategy made by board members in five Australian companies

This paper describes and analyzes the contribution to strategy made by board members in five Australian companies.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between boards and board activity and subsequent business performance, in the context of high-growth companies, through the lens of decision making and business performance.

A critical realist approach was used to conduct a longitudinal multiple-case study of two medium-sized, quasi-public high-growth companies. Data collection included first-hand observations of boards in session, semi-structured interviews with key actors and the inspection of board and company documentation. An iterative approach to analysis was used to gain an in-depth understanding of how the boards worked and how they sought to exert influence.

The paper provides empirical insight about board involvement in strategic management. A proactive involvement by boards in the strategy development process and assessment of strategic options, and a collaborative form of board involvement in strategic management together with management is indicated as being important if the board is to exert influence beyond the boardroom. A conceptual model of a collaborative form of board-management interaction is developed.

The paper provides guidance for boards, suggesting that a more direct level of involvement in strategic management by the board together with management may be material to improved business performance.

The paper responds to calls for more research on the relationship between boards and business performance. It contributes much-needed first-hand evidence from within the boardroom.

The purpose of this research is to explore the potential role and the measurement of the effectiveness of boards of directors in strategy formulation and implementation – two aspects that have so far been left largely unaddressed by corporate governance research and practice.

Based on insights from strategy process literature, the paper suggests that, by ensuring consistency between resource allocation processes and the firm's intended strategy, boards could fulfil a meaningful role in strategy implementation. The proposed outside‐in analysis of resource allocation decisions is illustrated by a single case study of a major Swiss pharmaceutical company.

The proposed approach enables corporate governance scholars to look at how boards fulfil their role in strategy implementation from a perspective similar to that of financial analysts. It might thus be suited to complement existing methods in empirical corporate governance research.

The presented outside‐in analysis of resource allocation decisions helps board members to prevent role conflicts with executive management. In addition, boards may benefit from an analysis of implementation consistency, because it enables them to detect weak early warning signals of strategic divergence that require early intervention.

The paper contributes to the discussion of alternative methods for exploring strategy issues in corporate governance research. The suggested approach outlines a potential new vantage point to investigate board involvement in strategy implementation in the event that action research is not feasible. The tentative findings from the case study put forward a set of indicators for measuring the effectiveness of boards in guiding strategy implementation.

The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the ability of family small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to develop ambidextrous innovations and their influence on the internationalization processes, showing how this relationship varies due to family involvement.

The analysis is based on a sample of 186 Spanish family SMEs. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling.

The results indicate that family SMEs' innovation activities are a stimulus for their internationalization process, and show the importance of family involvement in this relationship. Specifically, the findings suggest that family-specific characteristics such as the generation in charge of the business and the level of family involvement in the top management team (TMT) shape the relationship between innovation and internationalization.

Family SMEs need to focus on exploratory and exploitative innovations to obtain a competitive advantage in foreign markets, and thus, increase their internationalization level. Furthermore, the study contributes to a better understanding of the consequences of family involvement, increasing our knowledge of family firms' idiosyncratic behaviors in strategic activities. The study suggests that in order to improve the effect of innovation on internationalization, family owners should consider involving new generations and non-family managers within the decision-making structures.

To date, research on innovation-internationalization link in family SMEs has been fragmented and has not obtained conclusive results. This study provides new evidence on the relationship between these two important strategies. Furthermore, it contributes to the understanding of the influence of the family in shaping strategic decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of the size of the board of directors and board involvement in strategy on financial performance in the private club industry.

Data were collected in a web‐based survey of chief operating officers (COOs) and general managers (GMs) who are members of the Club Managers Association of America (CMAA). Hierarchical regression analysis of data from 360 respondents was used to examine the proposed model.

The results showed that board members' involvement in strategy and the size of the board of directors have a positive influence on a private club's financial performance.

Further research is indicated to include other board‐related influences such as group composition and the quality of relationships between board members and GMs/COOs to measure a club's financial performance.

The paper contributes to the limited existing literature on the association between a board of directors and financial performance in the private club industry.

Personnel functions are increasing their involvement in human resource strategy and decreasing their involvement in operational personnel issues. This is generally seen as being fundamental to the achievement of any of the visions of HRM as a change from personnel management and the consequent increase in the status and influence of the personnel function. The paper, based on ESRC‐funded research in 214 British businesses, questions the assumption that relying on strategic involvement, while “giving away” operational and technical personnel activities, will increase the influence of the personnel function.