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Extant research on non-financial service firms indicates that board size is a key determinant of firm performance. Property-liability (P&L) insurers, however, face a different set of agency costs and a more intense regulatory environment than most non-financial firms. Both of these factors were reinforced by the implementation of the Financial Services Modernization Act in 2000. We document a significant inverse relation between publicly traded P&L insurer performance and board size in the post-Financial Services Modernization Act period. Publicly traded P&L insurer performance, measured by market-to-book ratio, return on revenues, and the operating ratio, was enhanced for firms with smaller board sizes in 2000 and 2001. Ironically, we find that publicly traded P&L insurers on average increased board size in 2000 and 2001. In a post-Financial Services Modernization Act environment, board size appears to be related to publicly traded P&L insurer performance, but more research is necessary to develop a complete understanding of its role in P&L insurer corporate governance.

Board size has received significant attention among researchers and regulators. However, the advisory role of boards has not been studied much. In this study I examine the notion that investors value larger boards for their advisory capabilities. Prior studies examine board size in the context of monitoring role of corporate boards and find opposite effects on debt holders and equity holders. Using market-based measures of total firm performance, which take both equity and debt into account; I find that larger boards are associated with greater economic value added (EVA). Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2003 and controlling for various firm and industry characteristics, I also find that the board size is positively associated with firm productivity and various other efficiency measures such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Sales-Turnover ratio. I argue that firms with larger boards, valuing the advisory role of directors offer greater compensation to the directors. Overall the results indicate that large board size has a positive impact on firm's performance. The results are robust to alternative measures of firm performance and other key variables.

Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to analyze the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) on firm performance without being able to establish a clear relationship. In this paper, we reassess the relationship between BGD and firm performance by using a quantile regression approach. Our results indicate that BGD matters only across a subset of the firm performance distribution. Moreover, when the possible endogeneity of the relationship between BGD and firm performance is taken into account, there are some conditions under which a positive and significant relationship is observed for the eight lowest quantiles.

Purpose – This paper aims at re-examining the predictions of agency theory with regard to the negative association between CEO duality (i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, CEO, serves also as the board chairman) and corporate performance. It also examines the role of other corporate governance mechanisms (board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as moderating variables in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This paper uses the financial statements for the year 2006 of most actively traded Egyptian companies to examine these predictions of agency theory. Moderated Regression Analysis is used to analyse the empirical data.

Findings – The findings indicated that the hypothesized relationships between CEO duality, the moderating variables and corporate performance have changed. For companies characterized by large boards and low top management ownership, corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and positively impacted by institutional ownership.

Research limitations/implications – A limitation of this study is the use of accounting-based performance measures because of the expected earnings management behaviours by CEOs.

Practical implications – The Egyptian Capital Market Authority should adopt a reform programme to encourage Egyptian listed companies to modify their governance structures by increasing top management ownership and reducing board sizes before incorporating the new governance rules into the listing requirements.

Originality/value of paper – The paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance and corporate performance by introducing a framework for identifying and analysing moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance structure changes in response to the dynamics of the new business environment after the Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 for the US trucking industry. We show that deregulation increases market competition in the trucking industry. The deregulated trucking firms not only adjust internal governance structure but also alter antitakeover provisions to adapt themselves to the competitive status of business environment after deregulation.

As there is inclusive evidence on relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the Thai context, and mixed findings of this relationship are usually reported from previous studies, this study tries to clarify a reason for the mixed finding by determining the impact of board structures on different quantile levels of firm performance. Building on extant literature and using a developed econometric technique, the Quantile Analysis, on a sample of 446 listed firms in Thailand for a 15-year period ranging from 2000 to 2014, empirical evidence is provided which is consistent with prior studies that some characteristics of the board as the core mechanisms of corporate governance, i.e., board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, and dual role leadership on board, have significant influence on performance of Thai firms. In particular, when considering different quantile levels of firm performance, board structures are found to have different effects across quantile of performance distribution. Board independence and dual role leadership on board are found to have a significant influence on only moderate-performing firms, while board size and board meeting frequency are revealed as having significant impact on only firms with high-performance which need more effectiveness of the board in overseeing and supervising decision-making of the executives. Thus, these findings indicate that considering different quantile levels of firm performance for the board structures and performance relationship should be a reason of previous mixed findings. Moreover, the findings should be important information in encouraging better understanding an optimal governance system in Thailand for related stakeholders such as policymakers, corporate firms, and investors.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and greenhouse gas (GHG) disclosures using evidence from the United States.

The study is based on a sample of 168 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the United States. Panel data are used covering a period from 2017 to 2020 involving 672 observations.

The results indicate that board size has a positive and significant effect on GHG disclosures while the effect of ownership concentration and insider ownership is negative and significant. The proportion of non-executive directors is not significant. In terms of control variables, firm size and financial slack have a positive effect on GHG disclosures.

The study results add evidence to the already existing literature on the relationship between corporate governance and GHG disclosures using evidence from the United States.

The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.