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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of board secretaries’ characteristics on annual report readability using an original method that evaluates the readability of Chinese characters.

The authors manually collect board secretaries’ characteristics from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research database and obtain annual reports from the China Information website. Ordinary least square regression is applied to evaluate the impact, and then robustness tests and additional regression analyses are conducted.

Board secretaries’ legal-professional expertise, international expertise and role duality improve annual report readability. However, their political connections are negatively associated with it. The effect of expertise (role duality) is more pronounced for firms with lower ex ante litigation risk (board secretaries with equity holdings). Furthermore, higher readability increases the compensation of board secretaries, whereas lower readability increases their turnover. Finally, annual report readability is positively related to firm performance.

The authors only investigate listed firms in China from 2007 to 2017 because of the difficulties of obtaining data and text mining.

The authors provide managerial insights for regulators aiming to establish an effective governance mechanism with Chinese characteristics. First, certain requirements for board secretaries’ expertise can improve annual report readability. Further, firms can consider appointing board members or senior executives as board secretaries to enhance disclosure quality.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to verify the effect of board secretaries’ characteristics on disclosure quality, especially annual report readability. Moreover, this study proposes a novel measure of annual report readability for Chinese texts.

Extensively public concern on “Huge Executive Compensation” makes it urgent to investigate the reasonability of high executive compensation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on the specific responsibility of executives. More specifically, this paper is to examine whether high compensation is helpful to mitigate agency problems.

Considering that board secretaries of listed companies are responsible for information disclosure in China, this paper examines the effect of board secretaries’ excess compensation on firms’ disclosure quality using listed company data from 2007 to 2015. The first measure of disclosure quality is based on the disclosure violation behavior of firms, and the second is KV value that represents the extent to which the investors relay on the stock trading volume. To provide additional confidence that the findings are robust, this paper further conducts two indirect tests based on rumors and cost of equity capital.

The results show that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively associated with the probability of information disclosure violation and also negatively associated with firms’ KV value, suggesting firms that pay high compensation to their information providers are more likely to provide high-quality disclosures. Besides, this paper further finds that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively related to the incidence of rumors, the number of rumors incurred or the cost of equity capital.

Overall, the findings provide support to the efficient contracting of executive compensation, which implies that highly paid board secretaries would be better information providers than those poorly paid.

This paper provides empirical evidence that firms’ disclosure quality can be improved by modifying the compensation contract of information providers. This may indicate a new way to improve the quality of disclosures, so as to mitigate the agency problem.

In spite of the public criticism on executive excess compensation, the high compensation is not always a signal of manipulation, collusion and self-interest. It also can be a signal of individual talents and great efforts. Board secretaries are worth to be highly paid if they can improve firms’ disclosures, thereby reducing the incidence of rumors and reducing the cost of equity capital.

This paper is the first research to examine the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on information providers’ disclosure responsibility in the Chinese context. It documents a positive relation between board secretaries’ excess compensation and corporate disclosure quality.

Given the interest in better understanding the economic effects of political connections, this paper aims to review empirical studies in the accounting and finance domain investigating the effects of firms’ political connections on management’s decision in non-US settings.

Key words used to search for relevant studies include “political connections” linked with “tax avoidance,” “earnings quality” “voluntary disclosure.” The authors consult several editorial sources including Elsevier, Electronic Journals Service EBSCO, Emerald, Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, Sage, Taylor & Francis and Wiley-Blackwell. The authors’ search yields 46 published studies since 2006.

The review reveals a prevalence of studies conducted in Asia. A narrative synthesis of empirical findings shows mixed effects of political connections on earnings management, as measured by accrual-based or real earnings management practices. Mixed evidence also exists for the association between political connections and reporting policy (e.g. corporate social responsibility reporting). The review also reveals that firms with political ties adopt an aggressive tax policy aimed at reducing effective tax rates and are more likely to choose a Big 4 auditor.

The review discusses the political connections literature focusing on studies outside of the USA and the effect of such connections on decision-making by management. It identifies some limitations of this literature and offers guidance for future research avenues. The synthesis suggests that political connections can adversely or beneficially impact management’s decisions depending on the legal, institutional and cultural characteristics prevailing in a particular setting.

This paper aims to present the outcomes from 40 one-to-one semi-structured interviews and 12 focus group sessions with company secretaries, chairmen, CEOs, chief financial officer (CFOs), senior independent director (SIDs) and NEDs, about the role of the company secretary.

Lukes’ (1974, 2005) third dimension of power is engaged in thematic analysis of this strategic leadership role and its contribution to Board effectiveness.

The findings identify “discretionary capacity” as being critical to effective role contribution.

Whilst the inquiry included international participants, e.g. multi-national Board members and company secretaries, it was conducted within the UK.

Having a range of discretion is particularly necessary at this time, when the new governance regime is broadening its demands on the role of the company secretary to interact with wider stakeholders.

Better Board effectiveness is critical to broader sustainability of business in society.

An emergent model of the company secretary role is offered as a tool for building discretionary capacity, based on key technical, commercial and social characteristics, in their contexts – understood together as “Breadth” and “Majesty”. Breadth establishes a competency, whereas majesty, the refined high-level social qualities. This study concludes that the company secretary role is highly dependent on the preferences of the chairman, in enabling them to make an effective contribution to the Board.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

This study aims to examine the core challenges facing company secretaries in a two-tier board context. This study focuses on the key factors contributing to these challenges and how company secretaries can effectively address them.

An analysis of the narratives provided by 291 Dutch company secretaries in response to a series of open-ended questionnaire questions led to insights into the key challenges company secretaries face in their day-to-day work.

Company secretaries perceive a myriad of factors contributing to pressures on their time, the need to work for multiple organizational bodies and the processing of information. They believe process interventions and social interventions are needed to alleviate these issues.

The research highlights the need to deeply study boards from a holistic and systems point of view that recognizes the various actors, such as the company secretary, and their relationships in a boardroom context. Furthermore, the research shows how the two-tier board model may complicate these relational dynamics owing to the formal separation of decision management from decision control.

This study identifies various pragmatic ways to address the core challenges facing company secretaries so as to improve their contributions to decision-making at the apex of organizations.

This study sheds light on an important organizational actor (i.e. the company secretary) that hitherto has received scant attention in the governance literature.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

The authors examine the influence of powerful political corporate appointments on the usage of firm bribery channels. Party Secretaries within Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may simultaneously hold top management positions, thereby endowing powerful firm-level decision rights on those appointees, hereafter referred to as powerful dual role Party Secretaries.

This study employs panel data analysis with industry and year fixed effects. The authors use a sample of 1,143 Chinese SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2015.

The authors find that powerful dual role Party Secretaries are associated with greater bribery channel usage. Following the ongoing anticorruption campaign, SOEs with the powerful appointments significantly reduce their usage of both transparent (entertainment and travel costs) and opaque bribery (abnormal management expenses) channels. However, in general, Chinese SOEs respond to the anticorruption shock by switching from the more transparent to the opaquer bribery channel.

The authors contribute to the ongoing debate of politicians on corporate boards by examining the relatively unexplored area of government appointed top management and their influence on bribery at the firm level.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.