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Over the past decades, growing interest in the behaviour of boards of directors has brought forth empirical studies on actual board behaviour. An important stream within this research followed the model proposed by Forbes and Milliken in 1999 in which the board processes, effort norms, cognitive conflict and the use of knowledge, are hypothesized to influence the performance of boards of directors. This paper aims to take stock of the results from this stream of research. The sometimes inconsistent results, and assumed methodological flaws of this research, leave open the question whether it makes sense to continue with this line of research.

Through a research synthesis of 17 primary studies on (parts of) the model proposed by Forbes and Milliken (1999), this question is addressed directly by clarifying what is known from the research done so far and by identifying possible distorting methodological moderators.

Strong empirical support is found for the effect of effort norms and the use of knowledge and skills on board task performance. The evidence for cognitive conflicts however was found to be inconclusive. Common method and respondent bias seem to be a lesser concern than often stated.

Future studies should not only look closely at the construct validity of conflict, but should also have to account for the multidimensionality of conflicts and the interdependency and endogeneity in the relationship between behaviour and performance in boards.

This is the first paper that systematically integrates and reviews the empirical results of the research following the Forbes and Milliken model and sketches roads for future research on board behaviour.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the implications of board human capital heterogeneity for company innovation by focusing on the educational and the functional background of directors. Moreover, it examines the moderating effect of the CEO expertise-overlap within the innovation domain on the relationship between board human capital heterogeneity and firm innovation.

The hypotheses are tested through a set of ordinary least squares regressions on a unique dataset of 149 Italian high-tech companies observed between 2012 and 2015.

Findings show that the educational and the functional background heterogeneity of directors increase both the innovation input and output. However, results highlight that these relationships are negatively moderated by the CEO expertise-overlap within the innovation domain.

The paper emphasizes the importance of appointing directors with different and specific educational and functional backgrounds to foster the company innovation.

The paper fills a gap in the literature as it has devoted limited attention to the performance implications of board human capital heterogeneity in the high-tech industry where knowledge and skills are the primary sources of value. Moreover, the paper integrates the research on the CEO-board interface by shedding light on how the CEO expertise within the innovation domain affects the contribution of heterogeneous boards to company innovation.

To demonstrate transparency and accountability, the three boards in this study are required to meet in public in front of an audience, although the boards reserve confidential issues for discussion in private sessions. This study examines boardroom public accountability, contrasting it with accountability in board meetings held in private. The study adopts Erving Goffman's impression management theory to interpret divergences between boardroom behaviour in public and private, or “frontstage” and “backstage” in Goffman's terminology.

The research observes and video-records three board meetings for each of the three boards (nine board meetings), in public and private. The research operationalises accountability in terms of director-manager question-and-answer interactions.

In the presence of an audience of local stakeholders, the boards employ impression management techniques to demonstrate accountability, by creating the impression that non-executive directors are performing challenge and managers are providing satisfactory answers. Thus, they “save the show” in Goffman terms. These techniques enable board members and managers to navigate the interface between demonstrating the required good governance and the competence of the organisations and their managers, while not revealing issues that could tarnish their image and concern the stakeholders. The boards need to demonstrate to the audience that “matters are what they appear to be”, even if they are not. The research identifies behaviour consistent with impression management to manage this complexity. The authors conclude that regulatory objectives have not met their transparency aspirations.

For the first time, the research studies the effect of transparency regulations (“sunshine” laws) on the behaviour of boards of directors meeting in public. The study contributes to the embryonic literature based on video-taped board meetings to access the “black box” of the boardroom, which permits a study of impression management at board meetings not previously possible. This study extends prior impression management theory by identifying eleven impression management techniques that non-executive directors and managers use and which are unique to a boardroom context.

Reaching decisions in a deliberative manner is of utmost importance for boards, as their decision-making impacts entire organisations. The current study aims to investigate (1) the quality of group decisions made by board members, (2) their confidence in, satisfaction with, and reflection on the decision-making, and (3) the effect of two discussion procedures on objective decision quality and subjective evaluations of the decision-making.

Board members of various Dutch non-profit organisations (N = 141) participated in a group decision-making task and a brief questionnaire. According to the hidden-profile paradigm, information was asymmetrically distributed among group members and should have been pooled to reach the objectively best decision. Half of the groups received one of two discussion procedures (i.e. advocacy decision or decisional balance sheet), while the other half received none.

Only a fifth of the groups successfully chose the best decision alternative. The initial majority preference strongly influenced the decision, which indicates that discussion was irrelevant to the outcome. Nevertheless, board members were satisfied with their decision-making. Using a discussion procedure enhanced participants' perception that they adequately weighed the pros and cons, but did not improve objective decision quality or other aspects of the subjective evaluation. These findings suggest that board members are unaware of their biased decision-making, which might hinder improvement.

Rather than using student samples, this study was the first to have board members participating in a hidden-profile task.

This study aims to analyse trust and distrust as specific board processes between the board chair and chief executive officer (CEO) aimed at reducing corporate governance (CG) risk partially mitigated by regnant CG mechanisms. This study incorporates the nascent literature that posits trust and distrust as two separate constructs that co-exist simultaneously to recasts them in the CG domain.

This paper analysed data from 20 in-depth interviews conducted with board representatives at four financial services firms in The Netherlands, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

This paper found that the foundational bases of the chair–CEO relationship determine how trust and distrust are apportioned between them, which impacts board dynamics. This paper also confirmed that the constructs of trust and distrust are separate thus do not sit at opposite ends of a single continuum. Finally, this paper found that high levels of task-based distrust (as opposed to mistrust) are necessary during periods of organisational distress and more effective if there are also high levels of relational trust between the parties.

This paper empirically examines the relationship between trust and distrust in CEO–chair dyadic relationships in multiple companies across multiple countries. This paper also introduces the concept of tempered trust, which is defined as interpersonal trust tempered by task-based distrust, recasting the traditional characterisation of trust and distrust in the CG domain, thereby making a useful contribution to the literature on board dynamics.

This paper describes a quality improvement project to improve oversight of quality at national board level using statistical process control (SPC) methods, complimented by a qualitative experience of patients and frontline staff. It demonstrates the application of the “Picture-Understanding-Action” approach and shares the lessons learnt.

Using co-design and applying the “Picture-Understanding-Action” approach, the project team supported the directors of the Irish health system to identify and test a qualitative and quantitative picture of the quality of care across the health system. A “Quality Profile” consisting of quantitative indicators, analysed using SPC methods was used to provide an overview of the “critical few” indicators across health and social care. Patient and front-line staff experiences added depth and context to the data. These methods were tested and evolved over the course of six meetings, leading to quality of care being prioritised and interrogated at board level.

This project resulted in the integration of quality as a substantive and prioritised agenda item. Using best practice SPC methods with associated training produced better understanding of performance of the system. In addition, bringing patient and staff experiences of quality to the forefront “people-ised” the data.

The application of the “Picture-Understanding-Action” approach facilitated the development of a co-designed quality agenda item. This is a novel process that shifted the focus from “providing” information to co-designing fit-for-purpose information at board level.

This study investigates the relationship between board gender diversity (BGD) and the time to Initial Public Offering (IPO), which stands as an entrepreneurially risky choice, particularly challenging in family firms. We also investigate the moderating role of family ownership dispersion (FOD).

We draw on an integrated theoretical framework bringing together the upper echelons theory and the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) perspective and on hand-collected data on a sample of Italian family IPOs that occurred in the period 2000–2020. We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and alternative model estimations to test our hypotheses.

BGD positively affects the time to IPO, thus, it increases the time required to go public. FOD negatively moderates this relationship. Our findings remain robust with different measures for BGD, FOD, and family business definition as well as with different econometric models.

The article develops literature on family firms and IPO and it enriches the academic debate about gender and IPOs in family firms. It adds to studies addressing the determinants of the time to IPO by incorporating gender diversity and the FOD into the discussion. Finally, it contributes to research on women and outcomes in family firms.

This study aims to examine the effects of board dynamics produced by reaching a certain proportion of women on board tasks (monitoring, strategy and advisory).

Using a panel of 35 listed companies belonging to FTSE-MIB index, for the years 2008–2015, the hypotheses can be tested by applying random effect regressions. The introduction of gender board quota law in Italy has created a quasi-natural experiment that is applied in the study.

This research provides evidence that reaching 33% women on boards, which is the threshold mandated by the Italian gender board quota law, makes a difference for strategy tasks but not for monitoring tasks. This proportion of women on boards creates the board dynamics necessary to empower all board members, allowing the varied knowledge, skills, backgrounds and personal qualities to be leveraged and used in strategy tasks. For monitoring tasks, obtaining a proportion of 20% women on boards, as a first threshold enforced by the law, is enough to voice their opinion during board meetings and challenge management.

The results show that each set of board tasks requires different dynamics trigged by a specific proportion between a minority (women) and a dominant subgroup (men). To enhance monitoring tasks performance, it is enough to reach a proportion between men and women which makes the women less isolated and more inclined to speak up during the board meetings. In the case of strategy tasks, the improved performance is achieved when the dominant group enticed to hear women’s opinions and responsive to various perspectives. This paper expands the debates going beyond monitoring tasks, showing the importance of board dynamics for engagement in strategy and advisory tasks.

The purpose of this study is to examine how informational faultlines on a board affect the management of knowledge owned by directors and the consequences on organizational performance. In this study, informational faultlines are defined as hypothetical lines that divide a group into relatively homogeneous subgroups based on the alignment of several informational attributes among board members.

The study uses unique hand-collected panel data covering 7,247 board members at 106 publicly traded firms to provide strong support for the hypothesized U-shaped relationship. The authors use a fixed effects approach and a system generalized method of moments approach to test the hypothesis.

The study finds that the relationship between informational faultlines on a board and organizational performance is U shaped, with the least optimal organizational performance experienced when boards have moderate informational faultlines. More specifically, informational faultlines within boards are negatively related to organizational performance across the weak-to-moderate range of informational faultlines and positively related to organizational performance across the moderate-to-strong range.

By explaining the mechanisms through which informational faultlines are related to organizational performance, the authors contribute to the literature in a number of ways. By conceptualizing how the management of knowledge plays an important role in the particular setting of corporate boards, the authors add not only to literature on knowledge management but also to the faultline and corporate governance literature.

This study offers a rationale for prior mixed findings by providing an alternative theoretical basis to explain the effect of informational faultlines within boards on organizational performance. To advance the field, the authors build on the concept of knowledge demonstrability to illuminate how informational faultlines affect the management of knowledge within boards, which will translate to organizational performance.