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This article provides a brief overview of the literature on board of director performance, highlighting the difficulties in attempting to directly measure the performance of boards of directors and how various studies have tackled this challenge. As an illustration, I show that two current measures of board of director performance, board meeting activity and director attendance, suggest that the boards of Asian firms do not compare favorably to the boards of firms from developed markets. Suggestions for future research on the performance of corporate boards are provided, as well as implications for board of director practices in Asia.

Boards of directors have been the subject of growing concern over the past decade. Today, pressures are building for increased reform within the corporate boardroom. An apparent increase in director responsibilities and liabilities makes this subject an issue of deep and current concern to the whole corporate community. Such varied sources as the SEC, the courts, Ralph Nader, Professor Stone, Authur Goldberg, and others have made suggestions for reform ranging from federal chartering to placing outside and public directors on boards, with separate staffs to serve these outside board members. If we are to preserve our present free‐enterprise system, then we must work quickly to develop our corporate boards into effective operating units.

There is a large literature advocating the importance of a greater proportion of women directors on boards of publicly listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to examine the numbers and proportions of women directors, including women executive directors, on listed Australian Real Estate Management and Development (REMD) companies to identify how prevalent women directors are on such boards.

The study examines the numbers and proportions of women directors for 35 REMDs in 2011 and compares this to the broad board composition data on 1,715 Australian Stock Exchange listed entities. Statistically significant findings are evident due to the identified low proportions.

The study finds that of all the Financials Sub Industry sector groups, REMDs have the lowest proportion of female directors on theirs boards – eight women on each of 35 company boards compared to 159 men on these 35 boards at 2011. Of the eight, there were only two women executive directors on boards compared to 50 men. Statistically, it appears that having women directors on REMD boards is not considered important. Even at December 2014, there are only ten women on seven company boards and only one remaining executive director of an REMD company.

Given that female board representation is positively related to accounting returns and that there is a growing voice for legislation to impose mandatory proportions of women directors on boards around the world, it may be in the interests of REMD boards to consider appointing more women more quickly.

The study is the first to examine the numbers and proportions of women directors amongst REMD companies to identify the paucity of such women directors.

This paper critically reviews the role and function of the corporate board and finds that boards of directors that have a leadership role in corporate strategic planning go beyond merely caring for shareholder interests and take a proactive role in the success of the business. They do this by setting the strategic direction and evaluating company performance.Findings

Recent research has begun to push back the ignorance surrounding the development of leadership boards. This is examined in order to define the barriers standing in the way of more empowered directors. It is then used to identify the actions and approaches that can be used by directors to develop their involvement in and influence over, corporate strategic planning.Originality/valueThe paper contains a critical discussion of boards that places the issue in their contemporary policy context. This leads to the conclusion that the organisation of partnership between board and management is important and that business success increasingly rests on openness and trust supported by creative and challenging dialogue. Practical suggestions for the revision of company law are provided.

The conflict between “serving” and “supervising” an owner manager is an important reason for the role difficulties faced by directors of private companies. Explores the conflicting motivations of owners who establish boards of directors; discusses the role of both owner‐manager entrepreneurs and directors in making private company boards work; and gives guidelines for reducing conflict and increasing board effectiveness. It is based on a survey of 25 directors of private and public company boards.

This research study focuses on two critical questions. First, to what extent are US corporate directors now taking independent steps to protect stakeholders from future corporate débâcles, such as Enron and Tyco? Second, how have these débâcles personally impacted US corporate directors in other companies?

A total of 114 corporate business directors replied to a mail questionnaire.

Respondents reported that: the number of board‐initiated voluntary changes being considered is very modest; managements are not doing a good job communicating changes in internal control procedures to boards; the recent corporate débâcles caused only about 9 percent of director respondents to become uneasy about their directorships; greater “due diligence” is needed currently before accepting a board position (it is still an “honor” to be asked to join a board); some senior managers are not being realistic about the significant time commitment needed to be a director in the twenty‐first century.

Despite the modest sample size, the very broad range of the firms’ sales data suggests that the sample may be somewhat representative of US business boards. Other studies have been based similar size samples.

Recent changes in corporate governance have been less rigorous than reported, despite many press reports concluding that corporate America is in a period of accelerating change. Outside directors seem to be unwilling to confront management on critical issues. Consequently, US directors need to be more proactive in making changes, or stakeholders can look forward to continuing débâcless like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom.

To provide a comprehensive overview of corporate governance practices in the top listed companies in ten European countries.

Presents comparative empirical research based on public data from public companies. This survey has been published biennially ever since 1999. We selected the top companies by market capitalization from national indexes (e.g. CAC 40, DAX 30). Each of the 294 companies was rated individually in order to produce a country average, from which we generate a European average. The weighted rating criteria as the same as in our 3 previous surveys, and take into account the working and composition of the board, and disclosure levels.

The study shows significant progress and more convergence in corporate governance practices. The best‐performing countries in the three previous surveys – the UK, the Netherlands and France – are still at the top, and there is a reduced variance within countries. Boards also continue to work harder, partly explaining the rise in Directors' compensation. Committees are almost universal, although their composition could be improved. Boards are gradually becoming more independent but remain more domestic than the companies themselves. International directors (16 percent) and women directors (now 7 percent) are still not enough in evidence. More progress in corporate governance practices can be expected in the future as we can expect an even greater convergence of board practices between and within European countries.

This study is unique as it provides a reliable comparative picture of board practices across ten European countries and ever since 1999, with the comments of local experts of corporate governance in each market.

The era of the passive, rubber‐stamping, old‐boy‐network corporate board is over.

Outlines previous research on the links between board composition, firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and presents a study of CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, board independence and performance in the US banking industry. Explains the methodology and presents the results, suggesting that for large bank holding companies with average performance, increased board independence reduces pay‐performance sensitivity because internal monitoring is sufficient without extra alignment incentives. Adds that when performance is poor this no longer holds true and compensation contracts are then used to align the interests of managers and shareholders.

IF I had to choose a text under which to write this article it would be “A board is not a necessity for management”. I will come back to this point at the end.