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The purpose of this study is to examine corporate governance practices in an emerging economy. It focusses on how ownership control and board control systems operate in corporate organisations in an emergent economy, assuming that these systems are essential for enhancing good corporate governance practices in emerging countries.

The paper builds on descriptive multiple-case study with multiple units of analysis to divulge how ownership control and board control systems function to ensuring effective corporate governance in publicly listed corporate organisations in Ghana. A criterion-based sampling technique is used to select the companies. Thereafter, three techniques of data collection are used to gather data from the companies: archival records, semi-structured interviews and observation.

By linking the gathered data to the paper’s theoretical propositions, the study highlights that all the companies are characterised by the presence of large shareholders, and, in consequence, they tend to exert extensive control over the activities of the companies through their involvement in the decision-making processes. However, whilst the presence of large shareholders has the tendency to solve the agency problem, it poses challenges in regards to minority shareholders’ interests in these corporate organisations. The study also reveals that boards of directors tend to exercise control over corporate organisations when majority shareholders stop interfering in their dealings. This implies that when major shareholders fully partake in corporate decision-making processes of companies, boards of directors seem to be sheer advisory bodies to management.

This is a paper to shed light on corporate governance practices in four large publicly listed corporate organisations on the Ghana Stock Exchange, so the observable facts do not apply to other emergent economies. In addition, the sample does not represent all corporate organisations in Ghana; thus, the empirical observations cannot be generalised to other organisations that have not been included in this study. However, the empirical results can be applied to other similar corporations in Ghana and other emergent economies in an analytical sense. With the application of inductive reasoning, the results can be applied to provide important appreciation in an effort to understand the structure of corporate governance practices in organisations in developing countries.

A comparative analysis of the empirical observations from this study and the recommended guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana has been carried out, and aspects in which organisations need to reform and improve to fully comply with the guidelines are highlighted: director independence, director evaluation, introduction of new directors and board education. This could possibly be the foundation upon which corporate governance structures in these organisations can be restructured and further enhanced.

The majority of the studies of corporate governance in emergent economies have used quantitative techniques to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. However, this study takes a different approach to examine corporate governance practice in an emergent economy by using a comprehensive and defensible qualitative analysis to examine relations between ownership structure and shareholder control, and board of directors and board control. In addition, it highlights how ownership and board control systems interact in corporate organisations in emergent economies.

Using a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value.

Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue.

The main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.

Although the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance.

First, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.

This paper aims to understand the determinants of board structure of listed firms at institutional, industry and firm levels within an emerging economy. At the institutional level, the paper explores laws, managerial culture and the role of state in instituting and endorsing corporate governance practices. At the firm level, ownership patterns (family and non-family), experience in the capital markets, age and size of the firms are studied to find out the relation between these variables and the board structure.

The research domain of the study is listed firms operating on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The data for the study are collected at two phases; at the first phase, compliance reports, annual reports, articles of association and annual shareholders’ meeting reports of each firm in the sample are analyzed. At the second stage, secondary data are used for understanding the dynamics of Turkish institutional context.

The results of this study reveal that boards of directors of listed Turkish firms comply with the governance practices instituted by state agencies, except on issues as independent members and committees that will influence the majority owners’ control domain and private benefits.

This paper draws attention on institutional context and argues that “good governance” instruments developed for Anglo-Saxon stock market-controlled business systems provide limited explanation for an emerging economy that is characterized by close cooperation between the state, family-owned businesses and financial markets. The study offers insight to policy makers at a national level, interested in developing corporate governance principles regarding boards of directors of listed firms.

Corporate governance research suggests that board structure can impact organizational outcomes such as financial performance and executive remuneration. Agency theory posits that a board composed of independent directors and chaired by an independent chairperson can provide effective control over agency costs, while stewardship theory suggests that effective decision-making is facilitated when the board is chaired by the CEO and majority of directors are from the executive team. Empirical research into the association between board structure and performance in Jordan has provided mixed results, with no consensus supporting either theory. This study takes a different approach to researching the assumed association between board structure and performance by surveying directors’ perspectives on such assumed relationship between financial performance and four of boards’ characteristics (i.e., board independence, CEO duality, board size, and female ratio on board). Findings of this research indicate that Jordanian directors perceive a medium to strong association between financial performance and each of board independence, independent chair of board, and female ratio on board. However, directors of Jordanian boards perceive no association between financial performance and board size.

Analyses the extent of Cadbury compliance and its impact on corporate performance in the UK. Comparing 1992 and 1995, we find that UK public companies have, in general, complied with the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best Practice and have adopted the recommended governance structures. However, compliance is more common among larger firms. Thus we find that duality is less common, firms tend to have more than three non‐executive directors and that there has been an almost universal adoption of board subcommittees such as the remuneration and audit committees. However, little evidence is found to suggest either that the board characteristics recommended by Cadbury lead to improved performance or that moving towards them improves performance. The only governance mechanism which does positively affect performance is the presence of remuneration and audit committees.

This study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.

This research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.

While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.

This paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.

The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

Following the introduction of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2012 (MCCG 2012), this study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance structure on the quality of sustainability reporting from the perspectives of agency theory and resource dependence theory.

Based on an analysis of 126 firms’ annual reports for the year ended 2010 and 2014, this study analyses sustainability reporting quality before the introduction of MCCG, 2012 (year ended 2010) and after (year ended 2014).

The findings of the study show that there was a significant increase in the quality of sustainability reporting from 2010 to 2014. Results from multiple regression analyses indicate that the number of sustainability-related training attended by the board of directors and the percentage of directors with sustainability-related experience have a significant impact on the quality of sustainability reporting.

Observations from the study provide useful insights into the importance of the appointment of directors with sustainability-related experience as part of the criteria for directors’ appointment. Moreover, the board of directors is encouraged to attend sustainability-related training to help firms improve sustainability practices and reporting.

The increase in the quality of sustainability reporting indicates that companies are committed in ensuring that environmental degradation is put at the minimum level if not eliminated. It appears that companies are embracing the concept of sustainability reporting, and hence, contributing to improving and enhancing social well-being.

This study contributes to the discussion of both internal mechanisms (board independence and board capital) and external mechanisms (compliance to the code on corporate governance) of corporate governance structure on the quality of sustainability reporting. The findings can be used to identify necessary mechanisms that should be enhanced to strengthen the practice of sustainability reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine to which extent ownership and board structure improve financial institutions’ credit ratings.

Ordered Probit regression models were used to examine the association between corporate governance attributes and banks’ credit ratings. The sample consists of 97 publicly traded financial institutions on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stock exchange markets and cover the period 2010–2019. All GCC countries were considered in this study which are United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Qatar.

The results show that banks’ credit ratings are positively associated with the size of the board of directors and with the number of female directors serving in the board of directors. And it is negatively associated with the frequency of board meetings. Furthermore, this study finds evidence that nonbank financial institutions’ credit ratings are positively associated with CEO duality and with frequency of board meetings. Also, this study shows that their credit ratings are negatively associated with the ownership percentage held by the major five shareholders and with the number of board members serving in the board of directors.

Unlike previous research, this study focuses on the effect of the role of two different corporate governance dimensions, namely, ownership and board structure on the rating of financial institutions. This paper contributes to the extant literature in various ways. It bridges the gap of this topic in the GCC region. And, unlike previous research, this study focused on the financial sector and divided the sample into banks and other financial institutions to examine both subsamples separately. Also, this study introduced new ownership and board structure variables for the purpose of investigating the impact of corporate governance on financial institutions’ credit ratings such as the presence of women in the board of directors.

From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO).

A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.

While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.

This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.

This paper aims to understand the current governance practices and governance structure of Islamic banks (IBs) in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Southeast Asia countries with the purpose of providing relevant information in guiding the future development of the governance system for IBs. As well, the paper discusses and compares the state of the governance system in GCC countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and Southeast Asia countries (Malaysia and Indonesia).

The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach in extracting and analyzing data collected for 83 IBs observed for the period 2002-2011. The authors test for differences in means and medians of corporate governance attributes between a sample of IBs in GCC countries and another one for Southeast Asia countries. They use selected variables of corporate governance of different governance structures, namely, the ownership structure, the board of directors, the Shariah board and the CEO attributes.

The paper findings argue that there are significant differences and divergence of corporate governance structure of IBs in GCC countries and those in Southeast Asia countries. This position acknowledges that there are shortcomings to the existing governance framework for IBs which needs further improvement and standardization.

The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in guiding the future development of corporate governance of IBs. As well, the paper provides relevant guidelines for improving regulations and laws covering the governance of IBs.

This paper provides fresh data and recent information on the actual corporate governance system in IBs in GCC and Southeast Asia countries. As well, the paper discusses a significant shortage in corporate governance literature of Islamic finance.