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The purpose of this paper is to revisit the determinants of audit committee activity in UK listed companies after over a decade since the last investigation of this matter and with numerous significant changes in the regulatory and corporate governance framework globally.

Underpinned by agency theory, the study undertakes a multiple regression analysis of listed companies in the UK in order to determine the determinants of the activity of the audit committees in these companies.

The study finds that audit committee activity is an increasing function of boards' independence and diligence. Interestingly, it also finds a significant negative relationship between audit committee activity and ownership structure. A higher number of large shareholders with at least 3 percent of the firm's issued equity share capital are associated with a decrease in a committee's activity. Audit committee expertise, size and the availability of an audit committee charter were not significant determinants of audit committee activity.

The findings from the study suggest the need for more research into the factors that can explain the determinants of the activity of the audit committees in the UK and elsewhere. It also opens up the discussion on the effects of changing global corporate behaviors on corporate governance mechanisms.

This study shows that there is a positive relationship between board independence and the activity of the audit committees. In other words, to improve the performance of the audit committees in UK listed companies, board independence should be increased. There also seems to be substitution between governance mechanisms. The presence of large shareholders slowed the activity of the audit committees, as evidenced in a significant negative relationship.

The study revisits the determinants of the audit committees after over a decade since the initial investigation in the UK. However, the study is undertaken in a very different context with far‐reaching changes in the corporate landscape and regulations.

The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture‐capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium‐sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non‐family firms, that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often‐argued‐for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners' inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Food, Drink and Tobacco Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations, appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and with the bodies established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership industries in which the said activities are carried on to a substantial extent and in exercise of his powers under section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964 and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Road Transport Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and with the bodies established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership industries in which the said activities are carried on to a substantial extent and in exercise of her powers under section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964(a) and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Engineering Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and with the bodies established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership industries in which the said activities are carried on to a substantial extent and in exercise of his powers under section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964 and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—

On the surface, things haven't changed. In 1971, Professor Myles L. Mace, in his seminal study, Directors: Myth and Reality, reported that the typical board does not get involved in the establishment of objectives, strategies, and policies. Recently, more than a decade later, the author conducted a study of the boards of more than 225 U.S.‐based firms in which the majority of chairmen, contrary to what was subsequently found to be their practice, indicated that their boards are not involved in strategic planning.

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Civil Air Transport Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and with the bodies established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership industries in which the said activities are carried on to a substantial extent and in exercise of her powers under section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964 and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—

This purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency.

The determinants studied are related to the ownership structure and to the board characteristics. The study is conducted in an agency setting featured by high ownership concentration and large insider shareholders. Hypotheses are developed based on agency theory. The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of Italian listed companies. Negative binomial regression is used in the multivariate analysis to test the relationships. Robustness checks provide further empirical support.

The paper finds that insider ownership negatively impacts – either on the board or on the audit committee meeting frequency – whilst the proportion of independent directors in the board has a positive impact. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insider ownership and board independent monitoring are substitute control mechanisms. The findings also show that audit committees are more active in larger firms.

The paper provides an agency theory‐based explanation of the board and the audit committee meeting frequency, in a setting featured by large controlling shareholders.

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Construction Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and with the bodies established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership industries in which the said activities are carried on to a substantial extent and in exercise of powers conferred by section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964(a) and now vested in him(b), and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—

The Secretary of State after consultation with the Furniture and Timber Industry Training Board and with organisations and associations of organisations appearing to be representative respectively of substantial numbers of employers engaging in the activities hereinafter mentioned and of substantial numbers of persons employed in those activities and in exercise of her powers under section 9 of the Industrial Training Act 1964 and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf hereby makes the following Order:—