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Research on whistle-blowing has focused on the questions of who blows the whistle, who experiences retaliation, and who is effective in stopping wrongdoing. In this article, we review research pertinent to the first of these questions. Since the last known review (Near & Miceli, 1996), there have been important theoretical and, to a lesser extent, empirical developments. In addition, the U.S. law is changing dramatically, which may serve to promote valid whistle-blowing, and international interest in whistle-blowing is widespread and increasing. Unfortunately, evidence strongly suggests that media, popular, and regulatory interest is far outpacing the growth of careful scholarly inquiry into the topic, which is a disturbing trend. Here, we argue that the primary causes of the underdevelopment of the empirical literature are methodological, and that workable solutions are needed but very difficult to implement. By calling attention to these issues, we hope to help encourage more research on whistle-blowing.

Prior research suggests both formal and informal norms influence employee behavior. While increased training is a typical recommendation to strengthen formal norms by increasing adherence to organizational codes of conduct, and therefore improve ethical behavior, there is little empirical evidence that code training actually strengthens formal norms or improves ethics-related behavior. Conversely, prior observations of unethical behavior serve as strong indicators of informal norms. These observations may be unknown to management and therefore difficult to moderate using other means, including with training on a code.

We test the impact of prior observations of unethical behavior and training for a code of conduct on intentions to report unethical behavior in the future, as well as possible mediators of these relationships. We find some support that training on the code increases intention to report and strong support for the notion that prior observations of unethical behavior decrease intentions to report. Responsibility to report and norms against whistle-blowing both mediate the prior observation-to-reporting intentions relationship, but not the training-to-reporting intentions relationship. An interesting by-product of training seems to be that, by increasing awareness of unethical behavior, and therefore the salience of prior observation, training may have indirectly influenced intentions in the opposite direction intended.

This chapter considers how observers can effectively and safely engage with unethical organizational behaviors. Engagement methods need to be aligned with the situational contexts of specific cases. Micro-level individual, meso-level organizational, and macro-level environmental contextual obstacles to effective and safe engagement are considered. Five types of observer ethics engagement methods are considered in the context of specific cases and contextual obstacles. Engagement methods considered are as follows: (1) evocation and framing of dialogic engagement as consistent with the identity, vision, and values of the organization; (2) win–win incentive and ethics networking methods; (3) internal and external whistle-blowing methods; (4) if the observer is in a position of organizational power, top-down forcing methods; and (5) linking of observed unethical behaviors with strong external social movements.

The act of reporting illegal and unethical practices in the workplace has become an increasingly important issue for researchers and organizational management over the past several decades. This study tested a model of whistleblowing in which perceived organizational retaliation and upward communication satisfaction were hypothesized to act as predictors of types of whistleblowing intentions using a representative sample of employees working in Kirklareli, Turkey (n = 1,012). Structural equation modeling indicated that perceptions of upward communication satisfaction were positively associated to blowing the whistle to internal channels like immediate supervisor and upper management and negatively related to staying silent and external whistleblowing. In addition, perceived threat of retaliation from an organization was negatively related to blowing the whistle to internal channels and positively related to staying silent and external whistleblowing. The present study has contributed to our understanding of whistleblowing in a relatively new national context by clarifying its associations with perceived organizational retaliation and communication with management.

This chapter considers viable and nonviable methods for corruption and ethics reform. Among the different types of methods considered are: vision and values based methods; win-win incentive and ethics networking methods; power-based top-down compliance and bottom-up whistle-blowing methods; alternative institution building methods; and, social movement methods. The chapter analyzes how the different types of methods can be more and less viable depending upon the specific multilevel situational factors related to micro individual, meso organizational, and macro institutional level, political-economic, and cultural obstacles to corruption and ethics reform.

This chapter examines the external validity of lab experiments on corruption by evaluating the extent to which experimental results are robust to the degree of field context included in the experimental design. To do so, we follow Harrison and List (2004) and partition corruption experiments into four classes depending on their field context. A comparison of the results obtained within each class reveals that similar treatment effects tend to emerge. Although a definitive answer to the external validity question has yet to be provided, these preliminary results provide some support to the external validity of lab experiments on corruption.

Some of the best information for preventing accounting violations is received from employees who have observed the unethical behavior (Henning, 2016). However, receiving information about accounting violations or other unethical behavior in organizations requires employees to voluntarily report the behavior. Employees may be particularly hesitant to report unethical behavior when the behavior benefits them. Employees may also justify their own unethical behavior as morally appropriate when their moral identity allows the behavior. The authors draw on psychology and ethics literature to examine the relationships among moral identity, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In the exploration of behavior, the authors examine both commissions and omissions. While unethical commissions are violations directly committed by an individual without cooperation from others, unethical omissions are violations resulting from an individual failing to take steps necessary to correct another's unethical behavior.

The authors conduct a survey about cheating with a sample of college students. Using structural equation modeling, the authors find that intentions to engage in unethical commissions are positively associated with moral disengagement, while unethical omissions do not appear to create the moral disengagement that can arise from cognitive dissonance. The authors also find a feedback loop from moral disengagement to future intentions, which suggests moral disengagement created from one unethical act increases intentions for future unethical behavior. Finally, the authors find a simple intervention that can help to increase the moral intensity of observed unethical behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the impact student enrollment manipulations have on the allocation of state resources among higher education institutions, and is motivated by a concern that gamesmanship in accounting for student enrollments leads to a lack of accurate and transparent reporting and ultimately inequities in intrastate funding of higher education institutions. To explore this issue, we use a case study methodology to analyze a State Auditor's Office investigation of a whistle-blower's complaint that a university employee wrongfully inflated the university's student count to increase state funding for the institution. We find that while the method the employee used to inflate student enrollments was ultimately condemned, another method of enrollment manipulation with much greater funding implications was not. Further research is needed to determine the scope of funding implications for similar types of enrollment manipulations across state-funded academic institutions.