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The study examines how blockholding, blockholding nationality and multiple blockholder structures (MBS) are related to agency cost in Nigeria.

Data sourced from the annual reports of 84 non-financial services firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2015, were analyzed using the hybrid model in Stata 15.

Blockholding showed a significant negative relationship with the expense ratio (ER) measure of agency cost at the between-firm level but not significantly related to asset utilization ratio (AUR). This result was driven more by foreign blockholding and concentration of control, which were negatively and significantly related to the ER. Concentration of control is negatively related to the AUR. Domestic blockholding and the number of blockholders were not significantly related to agency cost. Foreign-blockholder-firms had a significantly greater concentration of control (lesser contest for control) than domestic-blockholder-firms.

The findings suggest that foreign blockholding would be more effective in controlling agency costs in Nigeria. While the concentration of control (lesser contest for control) appears to be an efficient governance mechanism for reducing agency costs associated with expenses in Nigeria, it seems to exacerbate agency costs associated with asset utilization.

Previous researchers have not studied how foreign and domestic blockholding are related to agency cost. They also have not studied how MBS and the contest for control are related to agency cost and explain differences in the foreign/domestic blockholding-agency cost relationships in the Nigerian context.

Proper empirical tests of the effect of blockholders’ monitoring incentives on corporate governance are scant in the literature because the relationship between ownership structure and enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms is bidirectional. This study aims to address the endogeneity issue by examining the effect of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity, using the split-share-structure (SSS) reform in China as an exogenous shock to blockholders’ monitoring incentives.

This study uses a logit model for estimating the change in executive turnover–performance sensitivity around the SSS reform. Sub-sample analysis is conducted to examine whether the impact of SSS reform on the turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms with more contestable blockholders who might consider stock liquidity, risk sharing and diversification in their monitoring/trading decisions.

Top executive turnover, defined as CEO or board chair turnover, becomes less sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform, mainly for firms with contestable blockholders prior to the reform. Stock liquidity and blockholders’ demand for diversification can explain the impact of contestable blockholding. Moreover, blockholding is sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform but not before it.

With few exceptions, most studies in the blockholding literature focus on the effect of blockholder monitoring on firm value. Examining an exogenous shock to blockholding, this paper provides a set of new evidence for the impact of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity. The results call for more evidence of the impact of blockholding on executive turnover from other markets.

This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership by large shareholders (blockholders) on corporate cash holdings. The study further investigates heterogeneity in the relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings.

Building on the precautionary and agency motives of corporate cash holdings, the study focuses on publicly listed firms from 22 European countries for the period from 2006 to 2015. Multiple pooled ordinary least square and fixed effects regression models are employed to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and firms’ cash holdings.

This study documents a positive relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings which indicates the role of blockholders in influencing firms’ cash holdings policies. However, further analyses show that the effect of blockholding on cash holdings depends on the type of blockholder. While the relationship is still positive between cash holdings and ownership by strategic blockholders, it turns negative for the ownership by institutional blockholders.

This study provides evidence for the important role played by firms’ ownership structures, and especially blockholding, in shaping firms’ cash holdings decisions. The findings are therefore of great value for investors, firms’ management and board and policy makers.

This paper contributes to the literature by providing an explanation of the contradictory results documented in the literature on the impact of blockholders on corporate cash holdings. This study, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to examine the effect of blockholder ownership on cash holdings by distinguishing between different types of blockholder.

This paper seeks to address the effect that principle‐based corporate governance practices have on the financial performance of large publicly‐listed companies. In 2004, the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC) promulgated nine high level principles and guidelines for all business entities with an aim of improving corporate governance practices and boosting investor confidence in the New Zealand capital market. This event provides a point for empirically testing companies' responses.

Panel data for the NZX top 50 companies over the period 1999‐2007 are analysed using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) regression techniques to evaluate whether: those firms that were continuously compliant with the NZSC requirements perform better; and the firm performance post‐NZSC recommendations is better than pre‐NZSC recommendations. Tobin's Q, market‐to‐book (MB) and return on assets (ROA) metrics are used as dependent variables..

The findings indicate that large listed companies have universally adopted the Securities Commission recommendations, establishing subcommittees for audit and remuneration, and having a majority of non‐executive/independent directors on the board which, on average, have seven members. There is support for the view that the NZSC recommendations have had positive influence on firm performance measured by Tobin's Q, MB and ROA. The results show that the presence of a remuneration committee has had a positive influence on firm performance.

This study provides empirical support for the corporate governance recommendations made by the NZSC in 2004, giving support to the principle‐based corporate governance practices to be adopted in New Zealand. The sequential testing of each NZSC recommendation provides a comprehensive picture of performance outcomes which has not been achieved in prior research. The interdependency issues are of interest and the correlation between recommendations provides useful insights.

This study offers insights for policy makers interested in adopting principle‐based corporate governance practices within their country. Within New Zealand, public policy developments and stock exchange listing requirements/regulatory issues with associated compliance burdens are better informed as a consequence of the research.

The purpose of this study was to explore the motives (especially the agency motives) for corporate diversification from the perspective of corporate executives who make such strategic decisions and manage the diversified firms daily.

A qualitative research approach was adopted, and 12 chief executive officers (CEOs) of diversified firms in Nigeria were interviewed for their perspectives on the motives for corporate diversification.

Stewardship motives – diversification to use excess capacities in assets and resources to exploit opportunities in the market and defend against adverse environmental developments – were the most cited reasons for diversification. The relevant agency problem related to corporate diversification motive in Nigeria is the principal–principal (majority shareholder-minority shareholder) one. CEOs with substantial holdings in their firms indicated that they use diversification to reduce their investment risk and retain control of their portfolio.

The findings suggest that in corporate environments such as Nigeria that feature blockholding prominently, the corporate strategy-related agency problem that policymakers should pay greater attention to is the principal–principal conflict rather than the traditional agent–principal problem that has influenced corporate governance over the years. There is also a need to revise the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy motivated by the self-seeking behavior of managers who have little or no shares in the companies they manage.

The few studies on motives for corporate diversification that incorporated the perspectives of corporate executives did not address the agency motives of diversification. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has done so.

In a review of America's capital investment system, Michael Porter concluded that the most critical determinant of competitive advantage is “sustained investment in physical as well as intangible assets, things like employee skills and supplier relationships” (1992: 65). Why supplier relationships? This study measures firm returns associated with one form of interfirm investment—stock blockholdings—and tests how investing firm returns are affected by alternative measures of firm size.

Following previous studies the paper seeks to use disclosure scores to examine corporate governance practices of Ghanaian listed firms. The study is motivated by the dearth of literature on corporate governance practices in the developing world despite the increasing interests in the topic in both the developed and the developing world.

The data for the analysis are gathered from 22 listed companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE representing 95 percent of the Ghanaian market capitalization). The paper also examines the extent to which factors such as ownership structure, dispersion of shareholding, firm size, and leverage influence disclosure practices.

Consistent with findings reported in studies from other developing countries the study finds that the level of disclosure in Ghana is low. Furthermore, ownership structure, dispersion of shareholding, and firm size (measured as total assets and market capitalization) all have significant effect on disclosure. However, the correlation between disclosure and leverage is insignificant.

The findings of the research will help policy makers and practitioners in formulating corporate governance policies. However, this research is limited because it focuses on only companies listed on the GSE. The results may therefore not be representative of all companies operating in Ghana.

The study is important because of the recent surge in international capital into the developing world (including Ghana) as a result of the ongoing World Bank and IMF led economic reforms. These reforms have emphasized transparency and accountability. There is therefore the need to understand corporate governance practices in these environments.

This study aims to investigate the nature and extent of compliance to the principle-based corporate governance initiatives by the listed companies in the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) in Fiji. Three important questions are addressed: whether listed companies in Fiji have complied with the principle-based governance practices? Did compliance with principle-based recommendations lead to an improvement in the listed company's financial performance and legitimacy? How the institutional factors have contributed towards corporate governance practices in Fiji?

Panel data for the SPSE companies over the period 2008-2011 are analysed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA) metrics are used as dependent variables.

The findings indicate that listed companies have adopted the Capital Market Development Authority's (CMDA) recommendations by establishing subcommittees for audit and remuneration, having non-executive/independent directors on the board and separate chair and CEO positions in order to gain legitimacy from stakeholders. Results support the view that the CMDA recommendations of board sub-committees (audit and remuneration) have had positive influence on company performance measured by Tobin's Q. The findings of this study give support to the principle-based corporate governance practices adopted in Fiji to gain legitimacy.

The study adds to the governance literature by focusing on the principle-based governance practices in a small remote island country, Fiji which has relatively small economy, capital market and company size. Finally, the study adds to institutional theory by showing how companies' corporate governance choices are affected by the severity of agency conflicts and the way corporate governance is regulated.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.

Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.

After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.

The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.

The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.

Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.

Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.

The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.

A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.

With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.