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We have used the Michigan computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of World Production and Trade to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S.–Japan trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. and Japan bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers by the two countries, and global (multilateral) free trade. The U.S. preferential agreements include the FTAs approved by the U.S. Congress with Chile and Singapore in 2003, those signed with Central America, Australia, and Morocco and awaiting Congressional approval in 2004, and prospective FTAs with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Thailand, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The Japanese preferential agreements include the bilateral FTA with Singapore signed in 2002 and prospective FTAs with Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States and Japan are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small in the United States and Japan, but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalization. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on nonmember countries for some of the FTAs analyzed. Data limitations precluded analysis of the welfare effects of the different FTA rules of origin and other discriminatory arrangements.

In comparison with the welfare gains from the U.S. and Japan bilateral FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States, Japan, and the FTA partners and global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The U.S. and Japan FTAs are based on “hub” and “spoke” arrangements. We show that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system.

In the above example, India is more productive in both, chemicals as well as ceramics. However, while Bangladesh is thrice as productive domestically in respect to ceramics as compared to chemicals, India is only twice as productive in the same product relative to chemicals. It will be worthwhile for Bangladesh to specialise in the production of ceramics in which it has a comparative advantage and for India to specialise in the production of chemicals. Both countries stand to gain through trade provided that for each unit of chemical Bangladesh imports from India it has to part with less than three units of ceramics to India, while India, too, gains if for each unit of chemical it sells Bangladesh it can get more than two units of ceramics. Thus, when trade takes place, it benefits both parties when the ratio of exchange for each unit of chemicals varies between >2 and <3 units of ceramics. The exact rate of exchange would depend on relative bargaining power of the traders. A value nearer to 3 will indicate larger bargaining power for the Indian exporter, and a value nearer to 2 would indicate greater bargaining power for the Bangladeshi exporter. In general, if the relative gains are higher the lower the elasticity of demand for the product and the greater the value addition to the product. Thus, manufactured products generally fetch better exchange as compared to primary products.

Any country including India which has registered remarkable growth has done so by participating in the economic integration process led by global and regional trade liberalization. India has an emerging web of cooperation with East Asian countries, especially Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN–India dialogue process, the bilateral free trade agreement with Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand and subregional initiatives such as the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC; Yong 2005).

India's free trade agreements and regional trade agreements with countries in this region have not been models of success in their implementation even when there were benefits. The main idea of the formal trade negotiation was to enhance ASEAN-India partnership, specifically in the economic arena. However, India's position in ASEAN's external trade and investment flows has not yet experienced any special momentum. The two-way trade between India and ASEAN is tilted toward ASEAN with the trade gap expanding rapidly.

Thus, to understand India's trade with ASEAN, the chapter would examine India's trade prospects with the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam) particularly in merchandise trade. This chapter would identify new products that India can export to the ASEAN, which will increase its share in ASEAN's market. In order to achieve this, the chapter seeks to discuss the detailed microanalysis at HS 6-digit level to capture the trade creation effects based on lower unit value items for estimating product-specific potential exports and imports to/from ASEAN.

Regional trading arrangements are proliferating at a rapid pace in the Asia-Pacific region, although the architecture that will eventually emerge remains uncertain. In this chapter we explore the economic implications for both China and its trading partners of the current crop of preferential arrangements and potential future developments in the Asia-Pacific region, using computable general equilibrium simulations. By doing so the chapter aims to identify factors that are likely to weigh heavily in the economic interests of the different participants in some of the alternative ways in which the trade architecture of the region might develop, and the extent of convergence or divergence in these interests.

This chapter provides a formal analysis of the economic welfare effects for large and small partners to free trade agreements. Michaely (1998) has demonstrated that large country welfare is U-shaped in the small country's size. I derive the welfare for the large country for all possible small country sizes, and show that the maximum possible loss for the large country is twice its tariff revenue. I identify the data necessary to estimate the welfare effects and consider how initial trade volumes, tariffs, and international price differences affect the large country's welfare.

Civil society, as represented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is exerting increasing pressure on national governments, multinational corporations, and international institutions. In this chapter we document the evolution of participation by civil society and NGOs in Western Hemisphere economic integration, focusing particularly on the NGO role in three important trade and investment agreements: the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas process. We find that NGOs are having increasing influence on the trade and investment agreements in the Hemisphere, and are poised to take on a major role in multilateral negotiations and agreements.

With the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexico entered a bilateral free trade agreement which not only lowered its own tariffs on imports but also lowered tariffs on its exports to the United States. We find that women’s relative wage increased, particularly during the period of liberalization. Both between and within-industry shifts also favored female workers. With regards to between-industry shifts, tariff reductions expanded sectors that were initially female intensive. With regards to within-industry shifts, we find a positive association between reductions in export tariffs (U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods) and hiring of women in skilled blue-collar occupations. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that household bargaining power shifted in favor of women. Expenditures shifted from goods associated with male preference, such as men’s clothing and tobacco and alcohol, to those associated with female preference such as women’s clothing and education.