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In this chapter, I draw from theory and research on intergroup relations and decoupling to critique prevailing conceptions of behavioral strategy, and then propose a viable alternative. I suggest that prevailing definitions of behavioral strategy exclude or marginalize theoretical perspectives that should logically be included, which has (1) created undesirable ingroup/outgroup dynamics in the strategy field and (2) resulted in decoupling between behavioral strategy as defined by category leaders and the actual content of research conducted by category members. I contend that this state of affairs has likely reduced the impact of behavioral strategy on other disciplines, and also likely constrained its impact on non-academic audiences. As an alternative, I propose a more interdisciplinary approach that involves identifying behavioral mechanisms that explain how social and psychological processes at different levels of analysis interact and interrelate to affect strategy and performance.

Behavioral decision research focuses on cognitive biases and other barriers to economic rationality. However, if cognitive biases are costly to eliminate, the second-best solution to bounded rationality may be less rationality rather than more. I define the concept of behavioral rationality and discuss two extreme forms of strategizing, which I call Romantic and Mercenary. Using twentieth century humanitarian Albert Schweitzer as a case study, I discuss the optimization of economic and behavioral rationality. I argue that the success of behavioral strategy as a field does not depend on removing cognitive biases but on helping people deliver more effective strategic actions.

Despite widespread interest in “behavioral strategy,” it is not clear what this term, or its associated academic subfield, is all about. Unless a critical mass of scholars can agree on the meaning of behavioral strategy, and professionally identify with it, this embryonic community may face a marginal existence. We describe three alternative conceptions for the academic subfield of behavioral strategy, along with assessments of the pros and cons of each. The “small tent” version amounts to a direct transposition of the logic of behavioral economics to the field of strategic management, specifically in the style of behavioral decision research. The “midsize tent” view is that behavioral strategy is a commitment to understanding the psychology of strategists. And the “large tent’ view includes consideration of any and all psychological, sociological, and political factors that influence strategic outcomes. We conclude that the midsize tent represents the best path forward, not too narrow and not too broad, allowing rich scope but with coherence. The large tent conception of behavioral strategy, however, is not out of the question and warrants serious consideration.

This paper reflects on the evolution of implicit and explicit behavioral ideas in the field of strategic management using Herbert Simon’s scholarship as a starting point, that is, his emphasis on empirically driven; interdisciplinary theorizing allowing and enabling two-way street learning. We argue that historically, there were plenty of behavioral ideas embedded in the field and, together with the recent movement towards explicit “behavioral strategy,” these provide several possible paths for future developments in strategic management research. In the spirit of broadening the tent for behavioral strategy in the future (Hambrick & Crossland, 2018), we suggest some topics and approaches for behavioral strategy in empirically driven, interdisciplinary directions which allows also for two-way street learning between concepts and real-world strategic phenomena.

The earliest contributors to discussions of strategy were advisors to military leaders, and that model was carried into early business schools, where the teachers of strategy were, for the most part, people with extensive experience as executives or advisors to them. The key course materials were anecdotes and cases, and the standard intellectual discourse was organized around recollected episodes in organizational history. The central contributions of the early teaching of strategy were consciousness of the complications introduced by complexity, competition, and attention to the second-order surprises of intentional action. There was neither a pretense of theory nor a significant involvement in research.

Although it shared in the onus of a general academic skepticism about the academic legitimacy of research on business, the “discipline” of strategy sought to emulate the attributes of more established disciplines. The new field was typified by an early open interdisciplinary flavor that facilitated the differentiation of a new field, and a subsequent refinement that restricted access. By the start of the twenty-first century, this process had run much of its course, and the field of strategy had taken its place as a reasonably respectable academic specialty. The history of an emphasis on real organizations in real situations led to an openness to anchors drawn from sources other than conventional economics. These included particularly the theory of games, the evolutionary theory of the firm, and the behavioral theory of organizations.

The struggle for respectability in economics was repeatedly frustrated by the difficulty of discovering a formulation that honored the litany of economics while fitting the observations of real strategy making. The future seems likely to be more of the same, a combination of efforts to secure recognition through emulation of the standards and barriers to entry that characterize established disciplines, and of exploratory gambits that are mostly destined to be forgotten. The optimal balance is likely to be as elusive as it is in other domains.

The general theory of behavioral strategies includes a set of propositions supporting alternative configurations of objectives, contextual features, and beliefs/assessments by executives. The theory includes the outcomes of selections of specific decision alternatives. Building behavioral-strategy models in contexts enriches one or more goals of science and practice: description, understanding, prediction, and influence/control. This chapter is a primer to the general theory. A brief review of relevant empirical studies supports the general theory. The empirical studies include the use of alternative data collection and analytically tools including true field experiments, think aloud methods, long interviews, statistical hypothesis testing, ethnographic decision tree modeling, and building and testing algorithms (e.g., qualitative comparative analysis, QCA). The general theory is the blending of cognitive science, economics, marketing, psychology, and implemented practices in explicit contexts. Consequently, behavioral-strategy theory is distinct from context-free microeconomics, market-driven, and competitor-only decision-making. Capturing and reporting contextually driven alternative routines to strategy setting by a compelling set of propositions represents what is particularly new and valuable about the general theory. The general theory serves as a useful foundation for advances theory and improving the practice of implemented strategies.

We review the literature on stress in organizational settings and, based on a model of job insecurity and emotional intelligence by Jordan, Ashkanasy and Härtel (2002), present a new model where affective responses associated with stress mediate the impact of workplace stressors on individual and organizational performance outcomes. Consistent with Jordan et al., emotional intelligence is a key moderating variable. In our model, however, the components of emotional intelligence are incorporated into the process of stress appraisal and coping. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of these theoretical developments for understanding emotional and behavioral responses to workplace.

We return to the problem that motivated the original behavioral theory of the firm, price adjustment, but from the standpoint of post-Carnegie School perspectives on cognition, attention, and routines. Whereas work in the Carnegie School tradition has tended to develop models of firms in opposition to economic theory, we seek to understand how economic ideas are used to shape decision processes. Using a combination of interview, observational, and archival data gathered at a large manufacturing firm that produced parts to maintain machinery, we develop a behaviorally plausible story of how organizations shape price adjustment. We follow three successive waves of managers seeking to improve the pricing routines through shifting attentional perspective, managing attentional engagement, and structuring attentional execution. We demonstrate how managers redesign routines to shape cognition and attention, thereby developing greater coherence in the market representations of the sales force. Our findings show how reshaping cognition and attention in pricing routines can improve organizational intelligence in pricing decisions. Economists treat markets as the ideal – the best that can be imagined – and organizations as second-best options – the best that can be achieved, but our findings invert the story, suggesting that in modern market economies, organizations and routines are essential to making the price system work.