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1 – 10 of over 38000Mohammad Mahdi Moeini Gharagozloo, Mahdi Forghani Bajestani and Chen Chen
Corporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an…
Abstract
Purpose
Corporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an effective tool to control excessive risk and deter risky corporate strategies. In this study, the authors draw on behavioral agency model to put these well-established assumptions to the test in a different setting and argue for the context-specific effects of CEOs' long-term compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
Focusing on corporate mergers and acquisitions in a post-crisis period (2011–2017), the authors cast doubt on agency theory predictions on debt-like compensation, point to the more realistic assumptions of behavioral decision models, and call for more contingency approaches in theoretical arguments.
Findings
An analysis of more than 4000 observations reveals that neither CEOs nor shareholders react significantly to inside debt after the economy recovers. Firm risk is also influenced only marginally by long-term compensation in a normal period of time.
Originality/value
While extant literature is rather unanimous on risk-reducing impact of inside debt, the study periods span the financial crisis of 2007. This research is the first conducted in regular times to demonstrate that previous findings are biased and heavily influenced by an exogenous shock.
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Muhammad Zulfiqar, Shihua Chen and Muhammad Usman Yousaf
On the basis of behavioural agency theory and resource-based view, this study investigates the influence of family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or…
Abstract
Purpose
On the basis of behavioural agency theory and resource-based view, this study investigates the influence of family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established), family entering time on R&D investment and the moderating role of the family entering time on the relationship between birth mode and R&D investment.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors collected 2,990 firm-year observations from family firms listed on A-share in China from 2008 to 2016 in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. They used pooled regression for data analysis and Tobit regression for robustness checks.
Findings
Indirect-established family firms show more inclined behaviour towards R&D investment than direct-established counterparts. Family entering time positively affects the R&D investment of family firms. Moreover, family entering time plays a significant moderating role in the relationship between family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established) and R&D investment.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is a pioneering study that introduced the concept of family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established) and family entering time. This work is novel because it differentiated family firms according to their birth modes, an approach which is a contribution to the existing literature of family firms. Moreover, the investigation of the moderating role of family entering time has also produced notable results that help understand the impact of family entering time on different types of family firms. The interpretation of outcomes according to behavioural agency theory also produced useful insights for future researchers as well as for policymakers.
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The purpose of this paper is to focus on the interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on R&D output by analysing Chinese-listed industrial family firms. It proposes…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on R&D output by analysing Chinese-listed industrial family firms. It proposes modelling the moderating influence of quality of government (QOG) on the relationship between family firm governance types (family control and family management) and R&D output from the “twin agency” perspective (Stulz, 2005).
Design/methodology/approach
The data set is organised as an unbalanced panel. This study exploits random-effects GLS regression, analysing both cross-sectional and time variation, and estimating the mean effects. The GLS model corrects the variance- and sequence-related problems of linear model random items and remains consistent and robust when the error term is heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed.
Findings
The findings provide several empirical conclusions: in areas with a higher QOG, family firms with greater family control (i.e. voting rights of the board) achieve more R&D output than firms with less family control; and QOG has no significant interactive effects with family management (i.e. the ratio of family managers among top managers) on R&D output. The main contribution of this paper is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, greater R&D output for family firms depends on greater family control rather than family management. These findings give a better understanding of the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems in family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities, and may help both family firms’ leaders and government policy makers to foster innovation by controlling intrinsic and extrinsic agency problems.
Research limitations/implications
To date, most family firm innovation research has concentrated upon governance and R&D behaviour (Block, 2012; Brinkerink and Bammens, 2018; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Few studies, however, have been performed from the major strategic (control) and operational (management) orientations, into the influence of outside (QOG) and inside (governance) factors upon innovation. This study attempts to fill that gap. It uses patent counts to measure the economic and technological importance of innovation. It argues that different QOG may lead major controllers or executives in family firms to have different motivations, and hence to approach innovation differently from the agency perspective.
Practical implications
The main contribution of this study is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, higher R&D outputs of family firms depend on higher family control rather than family management, due to the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems. When family management is high, the direct effect is high, because family management may reduce the principal–agent agency cost (PAAC), but the interactive effect of QOG and family management is not significant. In areas with high QOG, although family management may reduce the PAAC, principal–principal and altruism agency costs may increase. Based on the twin agency theory, differing inside expropriation issues between strategic (family control) and operational (family management) orientations are the main differentiator, one accentuated by the external expropriation issues of QOG.
Social implications
These results contribute to a better understanding of family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities. The findings also show of interest for government policy makers who should be aware of the significance of FFs’ characteristics for innovation and their incentives to conduct R&D projects.
Originality/value
The research uses Stulz’s (2005) “Twin agency” concept to analyse the interacting effects of state-level agency problems of governments with firm-level agency problems of family firms on R&D output. This paper answers the main question: What are the interactive effects of QOG and family firm governance on R&D output? The main contribution of the paper is to bridging the current gap in the literature.
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Bartolomé Dey´‐Tortella, Luis R. Gomez‐Mejía, Julio O. de Castro and Robert M. Wiseman
Agency theoretic models have been used in the past to justify the use of stock options as an effective incentive alignment mechanism to create a common fate between principals and…
Abstract
Agency theoretic models have been used in the past to justify the use of stock options as an effective incentive alignment mechanism to create a common fate between principals and agents. In this paper, we use behavioral theory to reach the opposite conclusion – namely, that the design characteristics of the typical stock option plan foster perverse incentives for loss‐averse agents, leading to decisions with detrimental consequences for principals. We also consider alternative stock option designs and other equity‐based executive compensation plans and argue that they may suffer from the same problems as traditional stock option plans – namely, that loss‐averse executives will try to protect the endowed value of that equity through self‐serving decisions that do not enhance shareholder wealth.
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Luis Gomez-Mejia, J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler, Maria Belda-Ruiz and Gregorio Sanchez-Marin
The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock options and risk “systematic vs idiosyncratic” and the performance consequences “positive vs negative” of these option incentives.
Design/methodology/approach
Data on CEO’s stock option portfolios are collected from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) ExecuComp. This paper uses a panel data analysis for matched samples of CEOs in S&P’s 1,500 listed firms over the period 2006-2013.
Findings
The results indicate a more conservative, risk-averse posture in the case of female CEOs than for male CEOs when they are compensated with stock options for idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. The results also confirm that female CEOs in low systematic risk contexts, although more conservative, take more prudent risks that produce better long-term outcomes as compared to their male counterparts.
Practical implications
Important implications for the design of optimal CEO’s compensation packages emanate from this study. Findings provide useful tools for board of directors to design CEO’s pay packages that take into account the different risk behavior of male and female CEOs with the aim of enhancing firm performance.
Originality/value
This paper provides new evidence within the area of stock option-based compensation by focusing on the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk when the effect of CEO stock option is analyzed and performance implications of awarding options to male and female CEOs.
Objetivo
El objetivo de este trabajo es proporcionar una extensión del modelo comportamental de agencia o Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) centrada en el papel moderador del género del CEO en la relación entre la retribución basada en opciones o stock options y los niveles de riesgo –sistemático e idiosincrático– y en las consecuencias –positivas o negativas– sobre el resultado de la empresa.
Diseño/metodología/aproximación
Los datos sobre stock options de CEOs se recopilan de la base de datos Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este estudio utiliza un análisis de datos de panel para muestras emparejadas de empresas incluidas en S&P 1500 durante el período 2006-2013.
Resultados
Los resultados indican una postura más conservadora de las mujeres CEO en términos de niveles de riesgo idiosincrático en comparación con la llevada a cabo por los CEOs hombres cuando se les retribuye con stock options. Los resultados también confirman que las mujeres CEO en contextos de riesgo sistemático bajo, aunque más conservadoras, asumen riesgos “de mayor calidad” que producen mejores resultados a largo plazo en comparación con sus homólogos masculinos.
Implicaciones prácticas
Importantes implicaciones para el diseño de paquetes de retribución óptimos para el CEO emanan de este estudio. Los resultados mostrados proporcionan herramientas útiles para el Consejo de Administración a la hora de diseñar paquetes de retribución para CEOs. Se deben tener en cuenta los diferentes comportamientos relacionados con la asunción de riesgos de CEOs hombres y mujeres con el objetivo de mejorar el resultado de la empresa.
Originalidad/valor
Esta investigación proporciona nueva evidencia dentro del área de la retribución basada en stock options al centrarse tanto en la distinción de riesgos (sistemático e idiosincrático) como en las implicaciones sobre el resultado de la empresa de las stock options dadas como parte de su retribución a hombres y mujeres que ocupan la posición de CEO.
Palabras clave Modelo comportamental de agencia, Opciones sobre acciones, Género, Riesgo sistemático, Riesgo idiosincrático, Resultado
Tipo de artículo
Artículo de investigación
Objetivo
O objetivo deste artigo é fornecer uma extensão da perspectiva do Modelo de Agência Comportamental (BAM) focada nas opções de ações examinando as influências e consequências do desempenho do CEO, considerando a distinção entre risco sistemático e idiossincrático sobre o efeito das opções de ações. em comportamento de risco.
Design/metodologia/abordagem
Os dados sobre portfólios de opções de ações do CEO são coletados do Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este documento utiliza uma análise de dados em painel para amostras correspondentes de empresas listadas no S&P 1500 no período 2006-2013.
Resultados
Os resultados indicam uma postura mais conservadora, avessa ao risco, no caso de CEOs do sexo feminino do que para CEOs do sexo masculino, quando eles são compensados com opções de ações para o risco idiossincrático (específico da empresa). Os resultados também confirmam que as CEOs do sexo feminino em contextos de baixo risco sistemático, embora mais conservadoras, assumem riscos mais prudentes que produzem melhores resultados a longo prazo, em comparação com os seus homólogos masculinos.
Implicações práticas
Implicações importantes para o projeto de pacotes de remuneração de CEOs ideais emanam deste estudo. Os resultados fornecem ferramentas úteis para o conselho de diretores, a fim de projetar pacotes de remuneração do CEO que levem em conta o comportamento de risco diferente dos CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino, com o objetivo de melhorar o desempenho da empresa.
Originalidade/valor
Este documento fornece novas evidências dentro da área de remuneração baseada em opções de ações, concentrando-se tanto no tipo de risco como determinante do seu efeito de risco quanto nas implicações de desempenho da concessão de opções a CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino.
Palavras-chave Modelo de agência comportamental, Opções de ações, Gênero, risco sistemático, Risco idiossincrático, Atuação
Tipo de artigo
Artigo de pesquisa
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Jörn Obermann, Patrick Velte, Jannik Gerwanski and Othar Kordsachia
Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is…
Abstract
Purpose
Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine how existing theories of agency and stewardship can be combined by using behavioral characteristics.
Design/methodology/approach
This study reviewed articles on the behavior of agents and stewards from the domains of finance, economics, management, corporate governance and organizational research. Additional theoretical and meta-analytical empirical literature from the fields of psychology and sociology was used to account for general patterns of human behavior.
Findings
The results indicate that goal congruency and the perception of fairness can serve as moderators distinguishing agency theory and stewardship theory. Goal congruency can be achieved by stipulating psychological ownership. The perception of distributive and procedural fairness is demonstrated by two major corporate governance mechanisms: performance-based compensation and board monitoring. The results are summarized in six hypotheses that allow a situational, customized corporate governance. These hypotheses can be tested in future research.
Originality/value
Prior work either focused on the merits of principal-agent theory or advocates the utilization of positive management theories, such as stewardship theory. However, little work has been done on bridging the gap between both constructs and develop a more extensive view of management theory.
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Fanny Caranikas‐Walker, Sanjay Goel, Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía, Robert L. Cardy and Arden Grabke Rundell
The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that…
Abstract
The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that boards of directors incorporate human judgment into the evaluation and reward of CEO performance in order to balance managerial risk with agency costs. We test Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) proposition that insider‐dominated corporate boards rely on subjective performance evaluation to reward the CEO, and we argue that R&D intensity influences this relationship. Using a sample of Fortune firms, findings support our contention that human judgment is important in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance.
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Roberto Pascual and Martí Larraza‐Kintana
The control role of the Board of Directors is aimed at monitoring the decisions and actions undertaken by managers in order to protect stockholders’ interests. Considerable…
Abstract
The control role of the Board of Directors is aimed at monitoring the decisions and actions undertaken by managers in order to protect stockholders’ interests. Considerable theoretical and empirical research has analyzed whether directors’ behavior is consistent with their fiduciary responsibility, but this research has reported inconsistent findings. This paper offers a comprehensive review of both theoretical and empirical literature on the control role of the board and suggests several guidelines for future research.
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Martin Larraza‐Kintana, Luis R. Gomez‐Mejia and Robert M. Wiseman
This paper seeks to analyze how compensation framing influences the risk‐taking behavior of the firm's chief executive officer (CEO), and the mediating role played by risk bearing.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper seeks to analyze how compensation framing influences the risk‐taking behavior of the firm's chief executive officer (CEO), and the mediating role played by risk bearing.
Design/methodology/approach
The study employs a sample of 108 US firms that issued an initial public offering in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Data from a survey filled out by the CEO of the firm are completed with secondary information. A structural equation model is estimated which explicitly considers the mediating effect of risk bearing on the compensation framing‐risk taking relationship.
Findings
The analyses indicate that while the performance targets included in the CEO's compensation contract indirectly influence the riskiness of the CEO's strategic decisions through its influence on the employment risk component of executive risk bearing, the level of compensation relative to peers does not. It shows that not all reference points are equally relevant in determining the CEO's willingness to take risk, nor do all the elements of risk bearing play the same role in that partial mediation.
Research limitations/implications
The paper provides a refinement of previous work on modelling the risk‐taking behavior of managers.
Practical implications
The paper provides a guideline to think about the behavioral consequences of the pay level in the market for executives and the performance targets included in the compensation contracts.
Originality/value
The paper proposes and tests a model on how different reference points used to frame compensation influence CEO risk taking. It also provides the first test of a central proposition of the behavioral agency model: risk bearing partially mediates the influence of compensation framing on risk taking.
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Mayank Joshipura, Sachin Mathur and Hema Gwalani
Since 2018, there has been a resurgence in initial public offering (IPO) pricing studies. The authors aim to consolidate the knowledge and explore current dynamics, understand…
Abstract
Purpose
Since 2018, there has been a resurgence in initial public offering (IPO) pricing studies. The authors aim to consolidate the knowledge and explore current dynamics, understand knowledge progression, elicit trends, and provide future research directions for IPO pricing research.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors conducted a two-stage hybrid review based on 512 high-quality Scopus articles on IPO pricing published over the last decade. The authors deploy bibliometric analysis, and then, based on 61 curated articles, the authors conduct content analysis and offer future research directions.
Findings
Four key research streams emerged: information asymmetry, agency problems, legal, regulatory, and social environment, and behavioral finance. Future research may focus on behavioral explanations for IPO underpricing, the role of investor sentiment in IPO pricing, text analytics, machine learning, and big data in alleviating information asymmetry and agency problems. The authors summarize and present content analysis using the classic Theory, Context, Characteristics, Methods (TCCM) framework.
Research limitations/implications
Using different databases, bibliometric analysis tools, sample period or article screening criteria for the study might give different results. However, the study's major findings are robust to alternative choices.
Practical implications
This study serves as a ready reckoner for the research scholars, practitioners, regulators, policymakers, and investors interested in understanding the nuances of IPO pricing.
Originality/value
The study sheds light on the most influential documents, authors, and journals, offers an understanding of knowledge structure, identifies and discusses primary research streams and related implications, and provides future research directions.
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