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After briefly reviewing the past history of Bayesian econometrics and Alan Greenspan's (2004) recent description of his use of Bayesian methods in managing policy-making risk, some of the issues and needs that he mentions are discussed and linked to past and present Bayesian econometric research. Then a review of some recent Bayesian econometric research and needs is presented. Finally, some thoughts are presented that relate to the future of Bayesian econometrics.

Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of choices, particularly those that involve risk. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward those choices might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective risk perceptions might not accord with expert assessments of probabilities. In addition to these challenges, we are faced with the need to jettison naive notions of revealed preferences, according to which every choice by a subject expresses her objective function, as behavioral evidence forces us to confront pervasive inconsistencies and noise in a typical individual’s choice data. A principled account of errant choice must be built into models used for identification and estimation. These challenges demand close attention to the methodological claims often used to justify policy interventions. They also require, we argue, closer attention by economists to relevant contributions from cognitive science. We propose that a quantitative application of the “intentional stance” of Dennett provides a coherent, attractive and general approach to behavioral welfare economics.

Several activity-based transportation models are now becoming operational and are entering the stage of application for the modelling of travel demand. In our application, we will use decision rules to support the decision-making of the model instead of principles of utility maximization, which means our work can be interpreted as an application of the concept of bounded rationality in the transportation domain. In this chapter we explored a novel idea of combining decision trees and Bayesian networks to improve decision-making in order to maintain the potential advantages of both techniques. The results of this study suggest that integrated Bayesian networks and decision trees can be used for modelling the different choice facets of a travel demand model with better predictive power than CHAID decision trees. Another conclusion is that there are initial indications that the new way of integrating decision trees and Bayesian networks has produced a decision tree that is structurally more stable.

Several inferential procedures are advocated in the literature. The most commonly used techniques are the frequentist and the Bayesian inferential procedures. Bayesian methods afford inferences based on small data sets and are especially useful in studies with limited data availability. Bayesian approaches also help incorporate prior knowledge, especially subjective knowledge, into predictions. Considering the increasing difficulty in data acquisition, the application of Bayesian techniques can be hugely beneficial to managers, especially in analysing limited data situations like a study of expert opinion. Another factor constraining the broader application of Bayesian statistics in business was computational power requirements and the availability of appropriate analytical tools. However, with the increase in computational power, connectivity and the development of appropriate software programmes, Bayesian applications have become more attractive. This chapter attempts to unravel the applications of the Bayesian inferential procedure in marketing management.

We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

This chapter documents an exchange between Leonard Savage, founder of the subjective probability approach to decision-making, and Karl Popper, advocate of the so-called propensity approach to probability, of which there is no knowledge in the literature on probability theory. Early in 1958, just after being informally tested by Daniel Ellsberg with a test of consistency in decision-making processes that originated the so-called Ellsberg Paradox, Savage was made aware that a similar argument had been put forward by Popper. Popper found it paradoxical that two apparently similar events should be attributed the same subjective probability even though evidence supporting judgment in one case was different than in the other case. On this ground, Popper rejected the subjective probability approach. Inspection of the Savage Papers archived at Yale University Library makes it possible to document Savage’s reaction to Popper, of which there is no evidence in his published writings. Savage wrote to Popper denying that his criticism had paradoxical content and a brief exchange followed. The chapter shows that while Savage was unconvinced by Popper’s argument he was not hostile to an axiomatically founded generalization of his theory.

The overall goal of science is to build a valid and reliable body of knowledge about the functioning of the world and how applying that knowledge can change it. As personnel and human resources management researchers, we aim to contribute to the respective bodies of knowledge to provide both employers and employees with a workable foundation to help with those problems they are confronted with. However, what research on research has consistently demonstrated is that the scientific endeavor possesses existential issues including a substantial lack of (a) solid theory, (b) replicability, (c) reproducibility, (d) proper and generalizable samples, (e) sufficient quality control (i.e., peer review), (f) robust and trustworthy statistical results, (g) availability of research, and (h) sufficient practical implications. In this chapter, we first sing a song of sorrow regarding the current state of the social sciences in general and personnel and human resources management specifically. Then, we investigate potential grievances that might have led to it (i.e., questionable research practices, misplaced incentives), only to end with a verse of hope by outlining an avenue for betterment (i.e., open science and policy changes at multiple levels).

Jeliazkov and Poirier (2008) analyze the daily incidence of violence during the Second Intifada in a statistical way using an analytical Bayesian implementation of a second-order discrete Markov process. We tackle the same data and modeling problem from our perspective as cognitive scientists. First, we propose a psychological model of violence, based on a latent psychological construct we call “build up” that controls the retaliatory and repetitive violent behavior by both sides in the conflict. Build up is based on a social memory of recent violence and generates the probability and intensity of current violence. Our psychological model is implemented as a generative probabilistic graphical model, which allows for fully Bayesian inference using computational methods. We show that our model is both descriptively adequate, based on posterior predictive checks, and has good predictive performance. We then present a series of results that show how inferences based on the model can provide insight into the nature of the conflict. These inferences consider the base rates of violence in different periods of the Second Intifada, the nature of the social memory for recent violence, and the way repetitive versus retaliatory violent behavior affects each side in the conflict. Finally, we discuss possible extensions of our model and draw conclusions about the potential theoretical and methodological advantages of treating societal conflict as a cognitive modeling problem.