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This paper examines the transformation of Syrian political economy from 1970 until 2005. I argue that Syria has undergone two important phases of political and economic transformation, from building a centralized state and economy in the early 1970s to embarking on the path of market economy in the early 1990s. With the logic of competitiveness guiding the direction of economic development, the socio-economic changes of the mid-1980s and after have corresponded with an important process of class and state formation. After a brief discussion of the current transition in Syria, the following sections of the paper attempt to provide a critical study of the different strategies for economic development. Section two examines the process of state and economic centralization of the 1970s and 1980s and highlights the contradictions of this period. Section three assesses the impact of economic liberalization through a study of competitiveness in the economic policies of the 1990s and 2000. The final section examines the economic and political impasse that Syria has been faced with. In conclusion, I argue that the current path of market economy as the strategy for capital accumulation has not resolved the socio-economic problems that Syria has faced in the last two decades. This strategy will continue to face contestation by marginalized groups such as factions of the Baath Party, landless peasants, workers and small producers as Syria becomes even more integrated into the regional and global economy.

The history of Circassian diaspora by expressing experiences of Syrian Circassians with oppression and resistance was informed by Archer’s three-stage cycle in the context of analytical structure-agency dualism leading to social change. In the last period, Turkish Circassians’ political awakening in the name of “return to homeland” overlaps the last forced migration experience of Syrian Circassians. As a matter of fact, return to the homeland is nothing but a return to the past and a call to account for solidarity in the diaspora. Therefore, the new refugee experience of Syrian Circassians has strengthened social construction of return to the past and recalled a search for reassessing their past. But, more importantly, it shows transnational solidarity of diasporic subjects beyond nation-states.

A small private university in rural Indiana has connected itself irrevocably to the protracted Syrian conflict. Through the efforts of committed students, faculty, and community members – stupefied by the endless violence – this cohort of kindred souls has committed itself to creating solace and support for Syrian students, their families, and their countrymen everywhere. Inspired by a story of torture and displacement, a professor, along with her Syrian students and their American allies, have implemented outreach education programs, campus and community initiatives, local business partnerships, and social media support, creating agency for displaced Syrians, not as passive beneficiaries but as co-partners for change and solidarity.

Purpose – Drawing on the currently available research, the authors explore the effectiveness of programs aimed at reducing re-engagement into terrorism, otherwise known as “deradicalization.”

Methodology/Approach – Our approach is descriptive. The authors support their argument with findings from a wide range of studies on these phenomena for the purposes of stimulating discussion.

Findings – Though scientific research on deradicalization remains nascent, there is sufficient promise in emerging findings to support a case for the effectiveness of deradicalization – in short, deradicalization programs can be effective, but just not for everyone.

Originality/Value – Popular accounts characterize deradicalization in a simplistic, binary fashion – they are judged to be either effective or ineffective. The current reality is consistent with some of the earliest conceptual discussion – that is, deradicalization programs do not offer a one-size fits all solution, they cannot work for everyone, and they are of immense practical benefit in some cases. The authors’ fundamental argument is that deradicalization initiatives warrant continued investment.

Why use an artificial intelligence (AI) system to determine crucial, major changes in a post-COVID-19 world? Globalisation is both a system and a process characterised by complexity, that is, a referential in which heterogeneous agents are constantly interacting. It therefore requires an integral and dynamic approach, and even more so a tool in tune with complexity. That is the case of the AI system Mileva, specifically designed for tackling complexity, highlighting the fabric of its reality, its core issues, and to forecast the probabilities of the different possible evolutions. In this chapter, the authors first briefly describe globalisation with regard to complexity, at the crossroads of computational complexity theory and sociological complexity theory (Edgar Morin). The authors then present the AI system Mileva, its key principles and the main lines of its architecture. Finally, the aforementioned points will be illustrated by two examples of analyses provided by Mileva on the issue of major changes in a post-COVID-19 world: the situation of the international organisations and that of the world of work in relation to health, environment, development, and democracy.

The chapter uses the poliheuristic theory of decision to explain decision-making in Turkish foreign policy since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011 and until the end of 2012. Six decisions of Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are analyzed. The results provide strong support for the poliheuristic theory of decision and the importance of political calculations in Erdoğan’s calculus of decision.

Illegitimacy is widely identified as a cause of revolution and other forms of transformative political change, yet when and how it affects these processes is ambiguous. We examine when and how illegitimacy affects the stability of political regimes through a historical analysis of South Africa's National Party (NP) and its apartheid regime, which lasted from 1948 to 1994. Many scholars of South Africa identify the regime's illegitimacy as a catalyst for the end of apartheid. Yet, consistent with assertions that illegitimacy does not result in political instability, the NP maintained power for decades despite a domestic crisis of legitimacy and a global movement that decried the apartheid regime's illegitimacy. Interrogating this contradiction, we detail how the regime's illegitimacy contributed to the negotiated revolution in South Africa when it resulted in unacceptable costs for the allies that the government depended on for survival, motivating those allies to withdraw support. Building on our findings, we detail how turning attention to the ways that illegitimacy affects relationships with allies – rather than particular outcomes, such as revolution or state failure – allows us to account for variation in both when and how illegitimacy matters.