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This paper aims to highlight the new regulatory framework established by Basel III.

This paper provides a critical review of the existing literature concerning bank supervision while providing an overview of the transition from Basel I to Basel III rules and critical appraisal of the current regulatory framework. Review of the existing literature.

Basel III introduces new measures in favor of bank stability and in order to mitigate the propagation of financial shocks. But on the other hand the new regulatory framework adds an extra burden to banks’ business plans affecting credit policies and thus the real economy. Another issue that is not properly addressed is the rising of financial innovations that are able to pass by the new regulations. Overall Basel III rules are moving to the right direction but need to stay always up-to-date in order to catch up with the modern ever-evolving financial system. Pros and cons. Need for improvement.

The paper presents an up-to-date review of Basel rules with future prospects.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to aid understanding of the changes in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) regulatory strategies after the global financial crisis.

The author uses the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) charge reform as a test case for inquiring whether BCBS has departed from its pre-crisis facilitative regulatory strategy path. The regulatory strategy of the CVA charge is discussed.

The charge exhibits a new regulatory strategy that BCBS has adopted. It seeks to manipulate market structures by imposing risk-insensitive capital charge methodologies.

The paper offers a new heuristic to analyse regulatory initiatives and their significance. The CVA charge has not been subject to a regulatory theory-based analysis in prior literature.

This paper aims to examine the connection between information system (IS) availability and operational risk losses and the capital requirements. As most businesses today become increasingly dependent on information technology (IT) services for continuous operations, IS availability is becoming more important for most industries. However, the banking sector has particular sector-specific concerns that go beyond the direct and indirect losses resulting from unavailability. According to the first pillar of the Basel II accord, IT outages in the banking sector lead to increased capital requirements and thus create an additional regulatory cost, over and above the direct and indirect costs of an outage.

A Bayesian belief network (BBN) with nodes representing causal factors has been used for identification of the factors with the greatest influence on IS availability, thus helping in investment decisions.

Using the BBN model for making IS availability-related decisions action (e.g. bringing a causal factor up to the best practice level), organization, according to the presented mapping table, would have less operational risk events related to IS availability. This would have direct impact by decreasing losses, related to those events, as well as to decrease the capital requirements, prescribed by the Basel II accord, for covering operational risk losses.

An institution using the proposed framework can use the mapping table to see which measures for improving IS availability will have a direct impact on operational risk events, thus improving operational risk management.

The authors mapped the factors causing unavailability of IS system to the rudimentary IT risk management framework implied by the Basel II regulations and, thus, established an otherwise absent link from the IT availability management to operational risk management according to the Basel II framework.

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the remodeling of risk management, risk-averse mechanism and the importance of Basel-III framework to cope with the current financial challenges in the regime of post global financial crises of 2008-2011 by evidences in the banking sectors of emerging economies of Bahrain, the UAE and Pakistan.

To ensure deep understanding in this cross-cultural study, two fold data collection techniques are used; one through distribution of questionnaires to relevant staff members and second through personal interviews of selected risk officials. Respondents are selected on the basis of minimum five years banking experience and relevant professional education of finance or risk management. Multistage sampling technique is used for data collection. To ensure the consistency from respondents, personal interviews were conducted with an interval of six months after receipt of questionnaires. Various statistical and econometric techniques were used to test the study hypotheses and to satisfy the study objectives.

Based on statistical analysis and personal surveys, research findings concluded that banking sectors of study-countries have deep concern with potential risk challenges and they are in continuous process to improve risk measurement framework in accordance with the latest regulatory obligations. All three types of banks have clear understanding of RM practices and strong relationship is observed between predictors and endogenous variables. Respondent banks of study-countries have deep attentiveness to manage all key risks and they recommend to transform existing regulatory framework including Basel-III reforms to develop a more comprehensive “one-size-fits-all” regulatory framework to cover loopholes of existing financial system.

This study is limited to the findings of remodeling of risk management to cope with the new financial challenges for the banking sector. Empirical investigation is conducted in emerging economies of the sub-continent and gulf and evidences are obtained from the UAE, Bahrain and Pakistan. Following this research model, future research can be extended to enlarge the sample size, by including other regional countries or a comparison between eastern and western countries to make it more useful to understand the risk management strategies, minimize banking default risks and to make this significant economic sector more strengthen.

Respondent countries of this study are fast growing and emerging economies of the sub-continent and gulf. Results of this cross-cultural study are likely to be beneficial for credit analysts, bankers and academic researchers. Findings are also beneficial for local and international business investors while they are taking prudent investment decisions in respective capital markets.

This is the first comparative study to empirically investigate the RM practices and risk-averse mechanism in banking sectors of Bahrain, the UAE and Pakistan. In perspective of study-countries, a critical analysis on risk-averse mechanism and Basel-III regulatory implications is demonstrated in this study.

Following the recent global financial crisis, US regulatory agencies issued laws to implement the Basel III accords to ensure the resiliency of the US banking sector. Theories predict that enhanced regulations may alter credit issuance of the regulated banks due to increased capital requirements, but the direction of changes might not be straightforward especially with respect to the agricultural loans. A decrease in credit availability from banks might pose a serious problem for farmers who rely on bank credit especially during economic recessions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study, the impact of Basel III regulatory framework implementation on agricultural lending in the USA is examined. Using panel data of FDIC-insured banks from 2008 to 2017, the agricultural loan volume and growth rates are examined for agricultural banks and all US banks.

The results show that agricultural loan growth rates have slowed down, but the amount of agricultural loan volume issuance still remained positive. More detailed examination finds that regulated agricultural banks have decreased both the agricultural loan volume and their loan exposure to the agricultural sector, showing a possible sign of credit crunch.

This study examines whether the implementation of the Basel III regulation has resulted in changes in agricultural loan issuance by US banks as predicted by the lending channel theory.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between regulation, market discipline and banking distress.

To address the empirical question put forward above, a multivariate logit model is applied to an international sample of 586 banks from 21 European countries in the period between 2000 and 2012. To give robustness to the results, different variables have been used to test the role played by market discipline and regulation as well as an alternative methodology known as duration/survival analysis.

It can be found that market discipline is a good indicator in signalling banking distress, that is, market discipline has penalized more banks with a higher likelihood of being in distress. Nonetheless, as broadly acknowledged, market discipline was not sufficient per se to avoid banking distress in Europe. With regard to regulation, this paper evidences that the adoption of other regulatory measures beyond the simple transposition of changes occurred in the EU Directives such as borrower-based measures and limits on pre-emptive exposures’ concentration, have contributed toward reducing the probability of distress of EU banks, showing that the introduction of this kind of measures was necessary and relevant. In addition, in this paper, it can be found that the NPL ratio, size, capital (including the well-known regulatory capital ratio, as well as the novel leverage ratio which discards the risk weights present in the former one) and liquidity are good indicators of banking distress which lead us to conclude that the new regulatory framework known as Basel III is on the right path to mitigate the probability that a new banking crisis similar to the last one takes place again.

The first limitation regards the period of time chosen, that is, from 2000 to 2012, empirically neglecting, to some extent the important regulatory changes occurred after the aforementioned period. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the Data and Methodology section, the period ends in 2012 because it is difficult to flag a reasonable number of banks’ bailouts afterwards, to properly run the type of model used in this paper. The second limitation is the fact that the possible changes in the risk management and risk assessment by institutions and in the behaviour of investors, acknowledge as weak and inappropriate before the on-set of the global financial crisis, albeit very relevant, are not in the scope of this paper.

Despite the welcomed changes performed by regulators so far, some aspects are not complete yet and new areas deserve more empirical work and attention by the regulators and supervisors. Some of them stem directly from the results obtained from this paper such as the enhancement and a close monitoring of the current Pillar 3 framework the increase of the adoption of more targeted tools, in a more preemptive way, to counter the build-up of risks and the implementation of the leverage ratio.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the identification of leading indicators signalling emerging risks to the banking system has become a major priority to central banks and supervisory authorities. As a consequence, several studies have formulated the aim of analysing predictive characteristics of a set of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP Growth, Credit-to-GDP, Inflation, M2-to-GDP, among others. Other studies take a different perspective and complement the analysis with bank-specific risk indicators. Nonetheless the aforementioned studies do not consider the relationship between regulation and market discipline and banking distress. This is the gap the authors wanted to fill, and this assessment is the main contribution of this paper.

Basel III is a framework to protect the global banking system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a policy discussion on Basel III in Africa.

The significance of Basel III is discussed, and some ideas to consider when implementing Basel III to make it work in Africa, are provided.

Under Basel III, the African banking industry should expect better capital quality, higher capital levels, minimum liquidity requirement for banks, reduced systemic risk and differences in Basel III transitional arrangements. This paper also emphasizes that there should be enough time for the transition to Basel III in Africa; a combination of micro and macro-prudential regulations is needed; and the need to repair the balance sheets of banks, in preparation for Basel III.

The discussions in this paper will benefit policymakers, academics and other stakeholders interested in financial regulation in Africa such as the World bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The increased capital requirements and the implementation of new liquidity standards under Basel III sparked various concerns among researchers, academics and other stakeholders. The question is whether Basel III regulation is ideal, that is, adequate to deal with a crisis, such as the 2007–2009 global financial crisis? The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, perform a stress testing exercise on the US banking sector, while examining liquidity and solvency risk indicators jointly under the Basel III regulatory framework. Second, allow the study to cover the post-crisis period, while referring to key Basel III regulatory requirements. And third, focus on the resilience of domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs), which are supposed to support the US financial system in times of stress and therefore whose failure causes the entire financial system to fail.

The authors used a sample of the 24 largest US banks observed over the period Q1-2015 to Q1-2021 and a scenario-based vector autoregressive conditional forecasting approach.

The authors found that the model successfully produces accurate forecasts and simulates the responses of the solvency and liquidity indicators to different real and historical macroeconomic shocks. The authors also found that the US banking sector is resilient and can withstand both historical and hypothetical macroeconomic shocks because of its compliance with the Basel III capital and liquidity regulations, which consist of encouraging banks to hold high-quality liquid assets and stable funding resources and to strengthen their capital, which absorbs the losses incurred in a crisis.

The authors developed a framework for testing the resilience of the US banking sector under macroeconomic shocks, while examining liquidity and solvency risk indicators jointly under Basel III regulatory framework, a point not yet well studied elsewhere, and most studies on this subject are based on precrisis data. The authors also focused on the resilience of D-SIBs, whose failure causes the failure of the entire financial system, which previous studies have failed to examine.

The purpose of this study is to show the presence of market discipline and provide an explanation for bank risk nondisclosure behavior, specifically market risk (MR), credit risk (CR), operational risk (OR) and counterparty credit risk (CCR). The response of market discipline when banks comply with Basel III capital and liquidity restrictions is also investigated in this study.

The study used the Lasso regression method to give accurate results with the lowest error when using small observational data with a large number of features.

First, theoretically, the study points to the presence of market discipline and its sensitivity to the risks disclosed by the bank, especially when applying capital regulations under Basel III. In addition, the study also shows differences between the developed and emerging countries in the sensitivity of market discipline to factors when considering banking regulations. Finally, an interesting result that the study shows is that the higher the index of economic freedom, the weaker the market discipline is, especially for emerging countries.

The study’s findings have several important implications: (1) help regulators devise policies to manage banks' risk and meet liquidity and capital requirements according to the Basel III framework. The effectiveness of market discipline is reduced, and banking regulators need to compensate by strengthening their supervisory functions. (2) Showed the reasons why banks ignore the disclosure of bank risks according to the provisions of the third pillar of the Basel III framework. Because when following the Basel III framework, depositors demand higher interest rates or increase market discipline towards riskier banks.

This study is the first attempt to assess market discipline under the new capital and liquidity regulations using the Lasso regression model as suggested by Tibshirani (1996, 2011), Hastie et al. (2009, 2015). This is also the first study to look at the impact of four different forms of risk on market discipline (as required by the Basel regulatory framework to improve disclosure).