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This study aims at investigating banks’ compliance with the disclosure requirements of Basel III in two emerging market economies, namely, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India. This study also examines the impact of economic factors on the extent of disclosures.

The authors compare the Basel disclosure practices between UAE and Indian listed banks and have used panel data regression models to investigate the compliance and level of reporting based on three market variables, namely, size, leverage and profitability of listed banks.

After examining Basel reporting for each of three categories of independent factors, size was found to be the predominant factor influencing the Basel disclosures, followed by profitability and degree of financial leverage. It is prudent for all the banks irrespective of size to capitalize on themselves with an intent to tide over the frequent economic crises and prevent every economic crisis from becoming a full-blown financial crisis.

The findings suggest that there is an urgent need for a high level of concerted action in the context of listed banks in the selected emerging market nations to direct more resources to ensure full compliance with Basel III. The findings inform practitioners in emerging countries of compliance and plan expanded future applications. Investors should consider the BASEL compliance level of Banks before parking their funds in the bank’s stocks. The banks having a higher degree of compliance are expected to be safer than their counterparts having lower Basel compliance.

Many previous studies have examined the implementation of Basel III in general. This study is specific in assessing the compliance with disclosure requirements as prescribed by Pillar III of the Basel norms. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research to compare market discipline in emerging markets. Existing studies have either assessed the level of compliance in one individual or similar types of markets. However, this study made a pioneering attempt to compare two different countries in the same category (emerging markets).

The purpose of this study is to show the presence of market discipline and provide an explanation for bank risk nondisclosure behavior, specifically market risk (MR), credit risk (CR), operational risk (OR) and counterparty credit risk (CCR). The response of market discipline when banks comply with Basel III capital and liquidity restrictions is also investigated in this study.

The study used the Lasso regression method to give accurate results with the lowest error when using small observational data with a large number of features.

First, theoretically, the study points to the presence of market discipline and its sensitivity to the risks disclosed by the bank, especially when applying capital regulations under Basel III. In addition, the study also shows differences between the developed and emerging countries in the sensitivity of market discipline to factors when considering banking regulations. Finally, an interesting result that the study shows is that the higher the index of economic freedom, the weaker the market discipline is, especially for emerging countries.

The study’s findings have several important implications: (1) help regulators devise policies to manage banks' risk and meet liquidity and capital requirements according to the Basel III framework. The effectiveness of market discipline is reduced, and banking regulators need to compensate by strengthening their supervisory functions. (2) Showed the reasons why banks ignore the disclosure of bank risks according to the provisions of the third pillar of the Basel III framework. Because when following the Basel III framework, depositors demand higher interest rates or increase market discipline towards riskier banks.

This study is the first attempt to assess market discipline under the new capital and liquidity regulations using the Lasso regression model as suggested by Tibshirani (1996, 2011), Hastie et al. (2009, 2015). This is also the first study to look at the impact of four different forms of risk on market discipline (as required by the Basel regulatory framework to improve disclosure).

The purpose of this paper to analyze the risk reporting practices and its determinants of commercial banks during the period of the adoption of the Basel II Accord in Portugal.

The paper conducts a content analysis of the risk and risk management sections included in the management reports and the notes of the annual reports of Portuguese commercial banks, for the years 2007, 2010 and 2013.

Findings show that theoretical frameworks underpinned in agency and legitimacy theories continue to provide valid explanations for risk reporting by Portuguese banks. More specifically, findings indicate that agency costs, public visibility and reputation are crucial drivers of risk reporting. Findings also indicate that younger banks with lower risk management skills use risk reporting either as an informational process or as a channel to manage organizational legitimacy.

The content analysis does not allow readily for in-depth qualitative inquiry. The coding instrument is subject to coder bias. Information about risk can be provided in sources other than annual reports. Additionally, not all banks disclose information on corporate governance-related variables that could also influence risk reporting.

The current research setting has never been studied hitherto. In this sense, this study seems to be of great relevance given the scarcity of literature on the subject in Portugal.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the preparation level of Indian public sector banks for the implementation of Basel III. It is mandatory for public sector banks in India to make adequate preparations to comply with the Basel III international regulations.

This study uses a modified questionnaire (Ernst & Young, 2013; AL-Tamimi et al., 2016) to examine the preparedness level of Indian public sector banks for implementing Basel III. Seven hypotheses are developed and tested.

The results show that Indian public sector banks are positively inclined toward Basel III, and the awareness level of Indian banks’ managers is adequate concerning Basel III. The banks have required resources for the proper implementation of Basel III, which is a prerequisite for its implementation. Banks know about the expected benefits that can be attained from implementing Basel III appropriately and banks are also aware of the high cost attached with Basel III. The capital adequacy ratio of public sector banks is above 11 percent, showing the banks’ readiness for Basel III.

The public sector banks need to concentrate on revising the existing policies to sharpen their risk management practices. Moreover, improving the level of education on Basel III is still required and the results also support the importance of advanced technology and trained human resources at all level as a basic requirement for the implementation of Basel III. It can be achieved by the support of government, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and other concerned agencies. The enforcement of Basel III will also create various challenges for Indian public sector banks, in terms of declining profitability, increasing capital requirements and nonperforming assets. That is why the impact of Basel III norms on Indian public sector banks cannot be undervalued.

The findings would assist the Indian public sector banks to know about their preparedness level for Basel III and what are the necessary actions to encourage Basel III implementation process. The present study would be important for regulators and decision makers in banks, as the main purpose of this study is to increase their awareness of Basel III norms. The result would also help the regulators regarding the corrective measures that should be taken by RBI in order to motivate the banks for enforcing Basel III.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants.

The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories.

Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants.

The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.

The financial crisis 2007‐2009 calls for a regulatory response. A crucial element of this task is the treatment of systemic risk. Basel III gains centre stage in this process. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate Basel III, examining its ability to reduce systemic risk.

The paper highlights the importance of reducing systemic risk to achieve the goal of overall financial stability. By first focusing on the theoretical foundations of systemic risk, this paper explores and analyzes the crucial aspects of this almost impalpable risk type. It further investigates the current regulation of systemic risk, clearly showing Basel II's inability to reduce it. Then, it evaluates the Basel Committee's efforts to address these weaknesses through Basel III by investigating its incentives and its ability to reduce obvious drawbacks of Basel II as well as systemic risk factors.

The findings show that there are still adjustments necessary. Although the development of Basel III is well advanced, providing some stabilizing incentives, there are still issues calling for closer consideration to counter all Basel II drawbacks and systemic risk factors adequately. These include: a risk‐weighted leverage ratio; a more thorough treatment of procyclicality; adjustments for the NSFR (Net Stable Funding ratio); and most importantly, the mandatory issue to internalize negative externalities from financial institutions, that is, the call for pricing systemic risk.

The paper not only examines the new Basel III framework, as a response to the Financial Crisis 2007‐2009, but also draws attention to specific areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on more thoroughly.

Basel III is a framework to protect the global banking system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a policy discussion on Basel III in Africa.

The significance of Basel III is discussed, and some ideas to consider when implementing Basel III to make it work in Africa, are provided.

Under Basel III, the African banking industry should expect better capital quality, higher capital levels, minimum liquidity requirement for banks, reduced systemic risk and differences in Basel III transitional arrangements. This paper also emphasizes that there should be enough time for the transition to Basel III in Africa; a combination of micro and macro-prudential regulations is needed; and the need to repair the balance sheets of banks, in preparation for Basel III.

The discussions in this paper will benefit policymakers, academics and other stakeholders interested in financial regulation in Africa such as the World bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The aim of this paper is to assess the nature and characteristics of regulatory risk management reporting by private and public sector banks in India.

Using a sample of 38 banks, a content analysis of their Basel II disclosure reports for the year 2012-2013 is examined.

The assessment shows that while the majority of the disclosure across banks focuses on credit risk and capital adequacy ratios, the total quantity of disclosure varies significantly across banks. Of the three broad risk categories (market, credit and operational), operational risk disclosure is the least, with minimal to no disclosure on several key aspects of operational risk, suggesting that operational risk issues are likely to emerge as an area of concern among Indian banks. Further, for the sector as a whole, the authors observe that asset size and net income are positively correlated with the quantity of regulatory disclosure and negatively correlated with the variation of this disclosure, suggesting a possible precautionary behavior on the part of larger and more profitable banks toward excessive scrutiny by the regulators and a regulatory regime in which no institution is too big to fail.

As an exploratory research article to address the characteristics of regulatory disclosure of private and public sector banks in India, it is informative, particularly for those working in the area of banking regulation and compliance. Areas for further research are suggested.

This study aims to examine the relationship among corporate risk disclosure, cost of equity capital and performance within banking institutions in a developing country setting. The authors argue that corporate risk disclosure reduces the cost of capital as investors attain better information and have confidence in the business and that less risk disclosure may generate ambiguity for potential stakeholders.

This study uses the population of all 30 listed banks on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh, for the years 2006 to 2012 and uses three-stage least-squares simultaneous equations to deal with endogeneity issues.

There is evidence that Bangladesh has voluntarily adopted the International Financial Reporting Standard 7 – Financial Instruments: Disclosures (IFRS 7) and Basel II: Market Discipline and that these standards enhance risk disclosure even where compliance is not compulsory. The cost of capital is found to be negatively associated with risk disclosure, which has an inverse relationship with bank performance.

This study provides a link between risk disclosure, cost of capital and performance. It fills a gap in the literature by providing a longitudinal study of risk disclosure in the banking sector of Bangladesh. This research also highlights the importance of appropriate risk disclosure for banks and suggests its importance in the process of fulfilling stakeholders’ demands.