Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent is the impact of Basel II adoption on bank business models in the emerging market of selected ASEAN member states.

To evaluate the impact of the Basel II regulation on banking business models, a difference-in-differences estimation approach is used. This study defines bank business models using diversification index of a modified Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.

The findings suggest that the Basel II framework only affects banks’ income diversification, while there is no evidence that it leads to funding and asset diversification. Under the Basel II accord, banks have adjusted their business models by diversifying their sources of income to avoid the obligation for keeping more capital; in contrast, a less developed financial market structure and a dependency on customer deposits are creating difficulties for banks in diversifying their funding and asset structure.

The banking sample are taken only from ASEAN countries.

The findings provide important implication on the regulatory perspective, which is the implementation of Basel II framework induces higher intensity for the use of non-interest income activities. Including in these activities are trading and derivatives. Accordingly, the financial authorities should take with care the use of trading and derivatives products in the banking industry which is already embedded in current Basel framework, the Basel III Accord.

The paper provides direct evidence on the impact of Basel II on bank business models in the emerging markets of ASEAN banking sectors.

This study aims at exploring the UAE banks' Basel II preparations. It is essential for the UAE banks to make adequate preparations to ensure their compliance with international standards and practices in the field of banking.

The author developed a modified version of the Ernst & Young questionnaire to examine the UAE banks' Basel II preparations. Five hypotheses have been formulated and tested.

Based on the results of the analysis in this study, it is concluded that the UAE banks are ready for the implementation of Basel II. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the UAE banks have sufficient resources for the implementation of Basel II, which represents a prerequisite for the implementation. The readiness of the UAE banks for implementing Basel II is also supported by the common understanding of Basel II by the employees of the UAE banks and the satisfactory level of education on Basel II. The results also indicate that there is no difference between UAE national and foreign banks in their readiness for the implementation of Basel II, which gives a positive impression about the competitive advantage of the national banks. Finally, the results support the importance of training and education on Basel II as one of the requirements of the implementation.

Improving the level of education on Basel II is still needed and this can be achieved because of the availability of the required resources and the awareness of the UAE banks of the benefits, the positive impact, and the challenges of the implementation of Basel II, as indicated by the results. The results also support the importance of training and education on Basel II as one of the requirements of the implementation.

The paper is important for the decision makers of the UAE banks and the regulators as the main objective of the study is to increase their awareness of the implementation of Basel II. The results would help the UAE banks to know the level of their Basel II preparations and what are the necessary steps that should be taken in this regard. The results would also help the regulators regarding the required steps that should be taken by the UAE Central Bank in order to motivate or encourage the UAE banks in implementing Basel II properly.

This paper aims to examine the connection between information system (IS) availability and operational risk losses and the capital requirements. As most businesses today become increasingly dependent on information technology (IT) services for continuous operations, IS availability is becoming more important for most industries. However, the banking sector has particular sector-specific concerns that go beyond the direct and indirect losses resulting from unavailability. According to the first pillar of the Basel II accord, IT outages in the banking sector lead to increased capital requirements and thus create an additional regulatory cost, over and above the direct and indirect costs of an outage.

A Bayesian belief network (BBN) with nodes representing causal factors has been used for identification of the factors with the greatest influence on IS availability, thus helping in investment decisions.

Using the BBN model for making IS availability-related decisions action (e.g. bringing a causal factor up to the best practice level), organization, according to the presented mapping table, would have less operational risk events related to IS availability. This would have direct impact by decreasing losses, related to those events, as well as to decrease the capital requirements, prescribed by the Basel II accord, for covering operational risk losses.

An institution using the proposed framework can use the mapping table to see which measures for improving IS availability will have a direct impact on operational risk events, thus improving operational risk management.

The authors mapped the factors causing unavailability of IS system to the rudimentary IT risk management framework implied by the Basel II regulations and, thus, established an otherwise absent link from the IT availability management to operational risk management according to the Basel II framework.

This paper not only aims to trace developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord to its present form (Basel II), but also to highlight flaws inherent in the 1988 Accord and Basel II, by way of reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis.

The paper highlights the importance of risks through a reference to the crucial role played by capital adequacy. In drawing attention to the importance of such a role and tracing developments which have taken place since the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord, it explores and analyses efforts of the Basel Committee to address capital measurement problems and assesses the success of such efforts through an illustration of capital measurement problems which still persist. An evaluation is made of the Basel Committee's efforts to address weaknesses of the 1988 Basel Accord through Basel II. Greater in‐depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the Basel Committee's efforts are undertaken through reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis, which is complemented by graphs and figures.

Whilst considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes on the basis of the principal aim of these Accords and failures of capital adequacy to address problems related to risk, that more work is still required particularly in relation to hedge funds, liquidity risks, and those risks attributed to non‐bank financial institutions.

The paper not only highlights existing problems with Basel II, as revealed in the aftermath of the Northern Rock Crisis, but also draws attention to other areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

International regulators are due to finalize the New Basel Capital Accord by the end of 2003, for implementation by banks at the end of 2006. Basel II is a response to the need for reform of the regulatory system governing the global banking industry. In this article, we review the New Basel Capital Accord and summarize some of the main implications that we expect it to have on the European banking industry. As was the case for the first Basel Accord (Basel I), we conclude that not only will the new accord have an impact on the amount of book capital that banks are required to hold, but also on the strategic landscape of the banking industry.

Recent events demonstrate that problems in the banking system pose a significant threat to the health of the global economy. Despite several shortcomings the Basel Accord thus emerges as an attempt to protect banking systems. The purpose of this study is to shed light on potential barriers to implementation of the Basel Accord in emerging countries. Several issues of wider interest to risk management and financial regulation also emerge.

The paper maps implementation of the Basel Accord against the wider regulatory context. Against this backdrop, the Basel Accord appears well‐motivated but is limited by several practical considerations. These factors, amidst other practical implications, are identified as the paper applies rigorous statistical methods to novel primary survey data from risk managers.

The Basel Accord is generally well‐received due its dual aims of improved capital administration and scientific risk management. Operational risk is a significant barrier to implementation, with a number of further issues only partially addressed (see below). Equally supported by both public and private sector banks the reasons for delay appear due to lack of technical expertise and the level of preparation. Results highlight credit risk, practical implementation issues (IT and HR), minimal capital requirements, data security and operational risk as issues of critical importance.

The originality of the contribution lies in the scientific treatment of novel primary data from risk managers tasked with implementation of the Basel Accord. Findings suggest several important practical implications discussed above.

The purpose of this paper is to apply theoretical concepts of corporate and bank boards to the Boards of Directors at Federal Reserve Banks and at US Basel II A‐IRB adopters. The Basel II Accord set to take effect in the USA in 2009 provides direction as to board oversight in Pillar 2. Since the Federal Reserve is one agency responsible for this document, the paper proposes to investigate the governance structure at US banks, presumably adopting (or opting in) the Basel II A‐IRB framework.

The board structure at Federal Reserve District Banks as of 2006 is examined. Also analyzed are the board structure, executive compensation, and ownership structure at the 22 banks identified as Basel II A‐IRB adopters. These results are then compared with current views and standards of “good governance” in the literature.

It was found that there is a fairly diverse representation on the board (in terms of female directors), a large proportion of directors are CEOs (generally of other banks), and that boards comprised a majority of outside directors. Several governance characteristics are contrary to “good governance” characteristics described in the literature. Further, banks adopting A‐IRB procedures in Basel II may need to improve governance structures to be in compliance with Pillar 2 of Basel II.

The Federal Reserve System, in an effort to increase board oversight as part of a risk management framework, should also consider its own board structure in light of current research on private‐sector boards. Both Federal Reserve District Boards and Basel II Boards should work towards exemplary corporate governance in light of their place in the US banking system.

The paper investigates the governance structures of banks.

The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004. This modification of the regulatory framework for banking institutions raises the question to what extent real estate financing will be impacted and how market participants can be adequately prepared. Aims to examine the impact of Basel II on the future pricing and availability of debt capital and on the cost of capital in real estate financing and to present possible reactions for real estate developers.

This research paper follows a deductive approach. First, the New Basel Capital Accord and the main features of commercial real estate financing are presented. On a normative level, the implications for developers are explained. Since no information regarding the behaviour of market participants in commercial real estate financing was available, the authors have ascertained the relevant questions within the framework of an empirical analysis. A total of 205 banking institutions were asked to fill out a survey pertaining to commercial real estate financing. The results of this survey are partly presented and interpreted.

The availability and the pricing of debt capital will be risk‐adjusted and will depend on the amount of regulatory equity banks will have to hold in reserve for a credit engagement. The cost of debt capital in real estate financing will rise due to systemic reasons of the New Basel Capital Accord. Banks are/will be very restrictive with regard to credit allowances. The use of the positive leverage effect will become more difficult. Structured financing, particularly the use of private equity, is the best way to fill a potential financing gap.

The paper is a timely investigation of a significant regulatory framework that is of world‐wide significance. The New Basel Capital Accord is introduced in its fundamental structure and the two relevant rating approaches are described and put into context. The paper reduces the complexity of the comprehensive and sophisticated Basel Capital Accord. Based on the facts that have been analysed, recommendations of how real estate developers can react to the changes in financing that lie ahead are given.

The new Basel Accord (known as Basel II) attempts to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements. We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates specific regulatory capital requirements and the possibility of capital forbearance and moral hazard. We estimate the cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulation regimes based on the building block approach of the 1988 Basel Accord (known as Basel I) and internal model-based (IMB) capital regulation. In contrast to the building block of Basel I, Basel II's IMB capital regulation links more closely the capital requirement to a bank's actual risk. We develop a multiperiod pricing model while incorporating the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard. The fairly-priced premium rates are computed by assuming that a bank's asset value follows a GARCH process. In contrast to previous studies based on the building block capital standard, we find that forbearance and the potential moral hazard behavior will not increase the cost of deposit insurance in the scheme of Basel II's IMB capital regulation.