Search results

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

The need for international regulation of financial markets became apparent in the mid‐1970s in response to the post‐Bretton Woods liberalisation of financial markets. The elimination of the fixed exchange rate parity with gold resulted in the privatisation of financial risk, which created pressure to eliminate controls on cross‐border capital movements and the further deregulation of financial markets. It became necessary for national regulatory authorities to promote safe and sound banking systems through the effective management of systemic risk in national markets. Similarly, the need for international standards of prudential supervision was also recognised, to prevent solvent banking institutions in one jurisdiction from losing business to less respectable institutions operating in other jurisdictions whose laws permitted cut‐rate financial services and other risky financial practices. The privatisation of financial risk also created the need for financial institutions to spread their risks over many assets and activities, which led, in turn, to a significant increase in short‐term cross‐border portfolio investment that has, in many instances, exposed capital‐importing countries to increased systemic risk due to the volatility of such investments.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

This article reviews the history of international coordination in the supervision of financial institutions noting why cooperation developed first and has been most extensive in oversight of banks relative to securities firms and insurance companies. It also poses the question of whether the extent of international coordination can be sustained or may even diminish.

The history of international coordination is used to illustrate the hypotheses that cooperation is more likely: the broader the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the wider the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the deeper the international agreement on the probable consequences of policy alternatives, the stronger the international institutional infrastructure for decision-making and the greater the domestic influence of experts who share a common understanding of a problem and its solutions.

All five of these factors that have enabled deepening and broadening of international cooperation have diminished in strength so that international cooperation is not likely to expand and may even be in retreat.

This article clarifies the factors that facilitate international cooperation and highlights the key obstacles to sustaining international cooperation.

This paper aims to highlight the new regulatory framework established by Basel III.

This paper provides a critical review of the existing literature concerning bank supervision while providing an overview of the transition from Basel I to Basel III rules and critical appraisal of the current regulatory framework. Review of the existing literature.

Basel III introduces new measures in favor of bank stability and in order to mitigate the propagation of financial shocks. But on the other hand the new regulatory framework adds an extra burden to banks’ business plans affecting credit policies and thus the real economy. Another issue that is not properly addressed is the rising of financial innovations that are able to pass by the new regulations. Overall Basel III rules are moving to the right direction but need to stay always up-to-date in order to catch up with the modern ever-evolving financial system. Pros and cons. Need for improvement.

The paper presents an up-to-date review of Basel rules with future prospects.

This study investigates Asia Pacific banks' annual report disclosures on derivatives using the Basel Committee and IOSCO joint recommendations as the derivative and risk management disclosure benchmark. Based on our constructed disclosure index, the mean score is 35%, suggesting that many of the disclosure recommendations are not being adopted by the banks in our sample. Cross‐country and regional variation exists in the disclosure practices, with the variation associated with the extent to which accounting regulations for derivative instruments are operational. Hong Kong banks have the highest mean disclosure scores while the Philippines banks have the lowest mean disclosure scores. Australasian banks generally provide more disclosures than East Asian and South East Asian banks, and banks in developed countries generally have a higher level of disclosure relative to developing countries. The transparency of derivative activities by the banks is expected to improve as Asia Pacific countries promulgate accounting regulations congruent with international accounting standards.

Amid increased size and complexity of the banking industry, operational risk has a greater potential to occur in more harmful ways than many other sources of risk. This paper seeks to provide a succinct overview of the current regulatory framework of operational risk under the New Basel Accord with a view to inform a critical debate about the influence of data collection, loss reporting, and model specification on the consistency of risk‐sensitive capital rules.

The paper's approach is to investigate the regulatory implications of varying characteristics of operational risk and different methods to identify operational risk exposure.

The findings reveal that effective operational risk measurement hinges on how the reporting of operational risk losses and the model sensitivity of quantitative methods affect the generation of consistent risk estimates.

The presented findings offer tractable recommendations for a more coherent and consistent regulation of operational risk.

This paper not only aims to trace developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord to its present form (Basel II), but also to highlight flaws inherent in the 1988 Accord and Basel II, by way of reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis.

The paper highlights the importance of risks through a reference to the crucial role played by capital adequacy. In drawing attention to the importance of such a role and tracing developments which have taken place since the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord, it explores and analyses efforts of the Basel Committee to address capital measurement problems and assesses the success of such efforts through an illustration of capital measurement problems which still persist. An evaluation is made of the Basel Committee's efforts to address weaknesses of the 1988 Basel Accord through Basel II. Greater in‐depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the Basel Committee's efforts are undertaken through reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis, which is complemented by graphs and figures.

Whilst considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes on the basis of the principal aim of these Accords and failures of capital adequacy to address problems related to risk, that more work is still required particularly in relation to hedge funds, liquidity risks, and those risks attributed to non‐bank financial institutions.

The paper not only highlights existing problems with Basel II, as revealed in the aftermath of the Northern Rock Crisis, but also draws attention to other areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on.

The 1988 Basel Accord and the proposed revisions to the Accord represent some of the most significant international regulations impacting the financial decisions of firms, in this case, financial services firms, in recent years. The revisions to the Accord incorporate operational risk into the capital, supervisory and market requirements. In our review of the issues in this area, we provide insight into the workings of an important international regulation. We also present suggestions for further research in this area that will become feasible when data on the impact of the new regulations become available after the proposed implementation in 2006.