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The recent 2008–2009 financial crisis has led international financial authorities to review the existing regulation; the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been thus induced to review the pillars of the Basel Accord (Basel II) in order to strengthen the risk coverage of capital framework (Basel 2.5 and III). These reforms will help to raise capital requirements for the trading book, which represents a major source of losses for internationally financial institutions, especially during crisis periods. In particular, the Committee has introduced a Stressed Value-at-Risk (SVaR) capital requirement, as a new methodology to evaluate market risk.

This chapter aims to shed some lights on the issues major banks have to face when calculating SVaR in the context of emerging markets, pointing out the differences in adopting an estimation model with respect to another one. Our results show a considerable increase in capital requirements especially when new rules are applied to financial markets with high-risk parameters, such as emerging markets are. The increased cost due to higher capital requirements could be a disincentive to investment in markets with higher risk profiles than the developed markets, taking also into account that diversification benefits deriving from investing in emerging economies have shown a decrease over time. The reduction of institutional investors can thus represent a brake on the process of innovation and evolution of emerging markets.

This paper, based on case-studies with five universal banks from Europe and North America, aims to investigate which types of comprehensive risk measure (CRM) models are being used in the industry, the challenges being faced in implementation and how they are being currently rectified. Undoubtedly, CRM remains the most challenging and ambiguous measure applied to the correlation trading book. The turmoil surrounding the new regulatory framework boils down to the Basel Committee implementing a range of capital charges for market risk to promote “safer” banking in times of financial crisis. This report discusses current issues faced by global banks when complying with the complex set of financial rules imposed by Basel 2.5.

The current research project is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with five universal banks to explore the strides major banks are taking to introduce CRM modelling while complying with the new regulatory requirements.

There are three measures introduced by the Basel Committee to serve as capital charges for market risk: incremental risk charge; stressed value at risk and CRM. All of these regulatory-driven measures have met with strong criticism for their cumbersome nature and extremely high capital charges. Furthermore, with banks facing imminent implementation deadlines, all challenges surrounding CRM must be rectified. This paper provides some practical insights into how banks are finalising the new methodologies to comply with Basel 2.5.

The introduction of CRM and regulatory approval of new internal market risk models under Basel 2.5 has exerted strong pressure on global banks. The issues and computational challenges surrounding the implementation of CRM methodologies are currently fiercely debated among the affected banks. With little guidance from regulators, it remains very unclear how to implement, calculate and validate CRM in practice. To this end, a need for a study that sheds some light on practices with developing and computing CRM emerged. On submitting this paper to the journal, we have received news that JP Morgan is to pay four regulators $920 million as a result of a CRM-related scandal.

The purpose of this paper is to aid understanding of the changes in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) regulatory strategies after the global financial crisis.

The author uses the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) charge reform as a test case for inquiring whether BCBS has departed from its pre-crisis facilitative regulatory strategy path. The regulatory strategy of the CVA charge is discussed.

The charge exhibits a new regulatory strategy that BCBS has adopted. It seeks to manipulate market structures by imposing risk-insensitive capital charge methodologies.

The paper offers a new heuristic to analyse regulatory initiatives and their significance. The CVA charge has not been subject to a regulatory theory-based analysis in prior literature.

This study aims to render a fundamental assessment of the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach by taking readings of the Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II and comparing them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. The IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, which implements an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, plays an important role in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency.

Realisations of the single systematic risk factor, interpreted as describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with macroeconomic indicators. Similarly, estimates of distance-to-default, reflecting the capacity of the Australian banking sector to absorb credit losses, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with financial statistics and external credit ratings. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the time when the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was most acutely felt, the authors measure the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector.

Measurements from the ASRF model find general agreement with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. This leads to a favourable assessment of the ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring. The empirical analysis used in this paper reveals that the recent crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking sector.

Given the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, the authors cannot attest to the validity of the model specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment.

Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes this paper from other empirical studies on the IRB approach and financial crisis of 2007-2009. The authors are not the first to attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but they believe that they are the first to do so using regulatory data.

The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent is the impact of Basel II adoption on bank business models in the emerging market of selected ASEAN member states.

To evaluate the impact of the Basel II regulation on banking business models, a difference-in-differences estimation approach is used. This study defines bank business models using diversification index of a modified Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.

The findings suggest that the Basel II framework only affects banks’ income diversification, while there is no evidence that it leads to funding and asset diversification. Under the Basel II accord, banks have adjusted their business models by diversifying their sources of income to avoid the obligation for keeping more capital; in contrast, a less developed financial market structure and a dependency on customer deposits are creating difficulties for banks in diversifying their funding and asset structure.

The banking sample are taken only from ASEAN countries.

The findings provide important implication on the regulatory perspective, which is the implementation of Basel II framework induces higher intensity for the use of non-interest income activities. Including in these activities are trading and derivatives. Accordingly, the financial authorities should take with care the use of trading and derivatives products in the banking industry which is already embedded in current Basel framework, the Basel III Accord.

The paper provides direct evidence on the impact of Basel II on bank business models in the emerging markets of ASEAN banking sectors.

This research aims to evaluate the accuracy of several Value-at-Risk (VaR) approaches for determining the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) for Islamic stock markets during the pandemic health crisis.

This research evaluates the performance of numerous VaR models for computing the MCR for market risk in compliance with the Basel II and Basel II.5 guidelines for ten Islamic indices. Five models were applied—namely the RiskMetrics, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity, denoted (GARCH), fractional integrated GARCH, denoted (FIGARCH), and SPLINE-GARCH approaches—under three innovations (normal (N), Student (St) and skewed-Student (Sk-t) and the extreme value theory (EVT).

The main findings of this empirical study reveal that (1) extreme value theory performs better for most indices during the market crisis and (2) VaR models under a normal distribution provide quite poor performance than models with fat-tailed innovations in terms of risk estimation.

Since the world is now undergoing the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, this study will not be able to assess performance of VaR models during the fourth wave of COVID-19.

The results suggest that the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) should enhance market discipline mechanisms, while central banks and national authorities should harmonize their regulatory frameworks in line with Basel/IFSB reform agenda.

Previous studies focused on evaluating market risk models using non-Islamic indexes. However, this research uses the Islamic indexes to analyze the VaR forecasting models. Besides, they tested the accuracy of VaR models based on traditional GARCH models, whereas the authors introduce the Spline GARCH developed by Engle and Rangel (2008). Finally, most studies have focus on the period of 2007–2008 financial crisis, while the authors investigate the issue of market risk quantification for several Islamic market equity during the sanitary crisis of COVID-19.

The paper aims to examine the impact of tighter banking regulation on banks’ loan loss provisioning in an emerging market context.

The authors exploit the adoption of the Basel II Accord in Vietnam as a quasi-natural experiment and use Difference-to-Difference (DiD) method to examine the impact of tighter banking regulation on Vietnamese banks’ provisioning during the period of 2010–2019.

The paper finds that affected banks (i.e. those taking part in the pilot adoption programme) manage to reduce their provisions significantly compared to their control peers in the post-adoption period. More importantly, this paper further finds that the affected banks manage their provisions primarily for incomes smoothing and signalling. This paper also finds that those banks expand their lending significantly and experience an increase in financial performance in the post-adoption period. Overall, the results provide supports for the “borrowing from the future” proposition that banks may perceive that a tighter banking regulation provides them with growth opportunities, so they have the tendency to manipulate their provisions to facilitate their current income.

This paper contributes to the established literature on the manipulation of bank provisioning as well as the impact of banking regulation, and especially Basel II on bank economic decisions. As compared to prior literature, the adoption of Basel II in Vietnam provided an ideal shock for us to conduct a DiD design to estimate the causal impact of tighter banking regulation on banks’ provisioning practices.

The purpose of this paper is to outline how banks are coping with the new regulatory challenges posed by stressed value at risk (SVaR). The Basel Committee has introduced three measures of capital charges for market risk: incremental risk charge (IRC), SVaR and comprehensive risk measure (CRM). This paper is designed to analyse the methodologies for SVaR deployed at different banks to highlight the SVaR-related challenges stemming from complying with Basel 2.5. This revised market risk framework comes into force in Europe in 2012. Among the wide range of changes is the requirement for banks to calculate SVaR at a 99 per cent confidence interval over a period of significant stress.

The current research project is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with nine universal banks and one financial services company to explore the strides major banks are taking to implement SVaR methodologies while complying with Basel 2.5.

This paper focuses on strengths and weaknesses of the SVaR approach while reviewing peer practices of implementing SVaR modelling. Interestingly, the surveyed banks have not indicated significant challenges associated with implementation of SVaR, and the reported problems boil down to dealing with the poor quality of market data and, as in cases of IRC and CRM, the lack of regulatory guidance. As far as peer practices of implementing SVaR modelling are concerned, the majority of the surveyed banks utilise historical simulations and apply both the absolute and relative measures of volatility for different risk factors.

The academic studies that explicitly analyse challenges associated with implementing the stressed version of VaR are scarce. Filling in the gap in the existing academic literature, this paper aims to shed some explanatory light on the issues major banks are facing when calculating SVaR. In doing so, this study adequately bridges theory and practice by contributing to the fierce debate on compliance with Basel 2.5.

This paper aims to propose the directions for potential reforms for the capital regulation. The focus is on the simplicity and comparability of the regulation, in addition to its risk sensitivity.

The author reviews the development of the Basel standards and identify the existing issues. On this basis, the recommendations are suggested.

The paper found that the capital regulation has become so complexed that it undermines its own efficiency in promoting the safety and soundness of the banking system. In addition, the current framework prevents a comparison of capital ratios across countries and over time. This discourages the market participants to supervise the bank’s operations. Therefore, there are still a need for the capital regulation reform.

By making the regulation simpler while ensuring the credit sensitivity, the market participants can play the most of their role and support the regulators in supervising banks.

The directions for the revised framework would be useful for the Basel Committee and central bank governors in designing an effective mechanism to supervise and discipline banks.