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This chapter reassesses the economics of interest rate risk management in light of the global financial crisis by developing a derivative-based integrated treatment of interest rate and credit risk interrelation. The decade-long historical data on credit default swap spreads and interest rate swap rates are used as proxy measures for credit risk and interest rate risk, respectively. An elasticity of interest rate risk and credit risk, considered a function of the business cycle phases, maturity of instruments, economic sector, creditworthiness, and other macroeconomic parameters, is investigated for optimizing economic capital. This chapter sheds light on how financial institutions may address hedge strategies against downside risks implementing the proposed derivative-based integrated treatment of interest rate and credit risk assessment allowing for optimization of interest rate swap contracts. The developed framework of integrated interest rate and credit risk management is of special importance for emerging markets heavily dependent on foreign capital as it potentially allows emerging market banks to improve risk management practices in terms of capital adequacy and Basel III rules. Analyzing diversification versus compounding effects, it allows enhancing financial stability through jointly optimizing Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 economic capital.

In September 2009, G20 representatives called for introducing a minimum leverage ratio as an instrument of financial regulation. It is supposed to assure a certain degree of core capital for banks, independent of the controversial procedures used to assess risk. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper discusses the interaction and tensions between the leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements, using financial data of the Swiss systemically important bank United Bank of Switzerland.

It can be shown that the leverage ratio potentially undermines risk weighting such that banks feel encouraged to take greater risks.

The paper proposes an alternative instrument that is conceived as a base risk weight and functions as a backstop. It ensures a minimum core capital ratio, based on unweighted total exposure by ensuring a minimum ratio of risk-weighted to total assets for all banks. The proposed measure is easy to compute like the leverage ratio, and also like the latter, it is independent of risk weighting. Yet, its primary advantage is that it does not supersede risk-based capital adequacy targets, but rather supplements them.

This paper aims to investigate the interaction between capital requirements and pricing constraints as measures for insurance regulation.

In a theoretical model framework, the author derives the insurer’s shareholder-value-maximizing response to capital regulation, price regulation and the unregulated strategy as a benchmark; all three strategies are presented in an analytical form.

The paper demonstrates that risk-based capital requirements exhibit an efficiency advantage over price regulation and allow for lower premiums. Moreover, the analysis identifies situations in which price floors make insurance more expensive, but have no positive impact on the safety level.

The comparison between capital regulation and price floors provides policymakers with a methodology to evaluate which regulatory tool is more appropriate. Also, the article discusses that maximum discount rates for European life insurers could be ineffective when the new regulatory framework Solvency II is in place.

In all, the article obtains analytical and informative results with relevant implications for insurance regulation.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

The EU prudential regime for investment firms comprising the Directive (EU) 2019/2034 (IFD) and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 (IFR) introduces a fit-for-purpose capital framework for investment firms. The capital impact on the practice of investment management can be material depending on firms’ specific business models and risk profiles, which may require them to take strategic decisions with respect to the services they provide. Despite the importance of this issue for the practice of investment management, there exists no study among the existing studies that focuses on this issue. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

This paper reviews the calibration approaches the European Banking Authority (EBA) has used by exploring the deficiencies of the regime with respect to the calibration of categorization thresholds and coefficients that are used by the EBA to calculate regulatory capital requirements.

This paper sets out that the choice of the relevant percentile for setting the firm categorization thresholds was not based on any theoretical rule. It also discusses that the calibration of the K-factors was subjective and lacked consistency. In addition, it criticizes the sample that the EBA used for business model coverage on the grounds that it was unbalanced, resulting in certain K-factors driving the overall capital impact.

Further research is needed on the calibration of thresholds as this will remain a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the new regime. In particular, a more data-driven and transparent approach would be necessary to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the thresholds.

This paper leads to the policy implication that, despite its merits that overweigh its shortcomings, potential market competition and financial stability issues that may stem from inconsistencies and a general lack of objectivity in certain aspects of the regime should not be underestimated by the EU policy makers.

The present paper contributes to the existing knowledge primarily by reviewing the EBA’s calibration approaches with respect to the K-factor coefficients and firm categorization thresholds, concluding that lack of objectivity and precision in the relevant methodologies could distort capital allocation decisions in the practice of investment management.

The IRB capital requirements of Basel II define the minimum level of capital that the bank has to retain to cover the current risks of its portfolio. The major risk that many banks are facing is credit risk and Basel II provides an approach to calculate its capital requirement. It is well known that Pillar I Basel II approach for credit risk capital requirements does not include concentration risk. The paper aims to propose a model modifying Basel II methodology (IRB) to include name concentration risk.

The model is developed on data based on a portfolio of Greek companies that are financed by Greek commercial banks. Based on the initial portfolio, new portfolios were simulated having a range of different credit risk parameters. Subsequently, the credit VaR of various portfolios was regressed against the credit risk indicators such as Basel II capital requirements, modified Herfindahl Index and a non-linear model was developed. This model modifies the Pillar I IRB capital requirements model of Basel II to include name concentration risk.

As the Pillar I IRB capital requirements model of Basel II does not include concentration risk, the credit VaR calculations performed in the present work appeared to have gaps with the Basel II capital requirements. These gaps were more apparent when there was high concentration risk in the credit portfolios. The new model bridges this gap providing with a correction coefficient.

The credit VaR of a loan portfolio could be calculated from the bank easily, without the use of additional complicated algorithms and systems.

The model is constructed in such a way as to provide an approximation of credit VaR satisfactory for business loan portfolios whose risk parameters lie within the range of those in a realistic bank credit portfolio and without the application of Monte Carlo simulations.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of regulation and market competition on the risk-taking Behaviour of financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The empirical framework is based on panel fixed effects/random effects specification. For robustness purpose, this study also uses the generalized method of moments estimation technique. This study tests the hypothesis that regulatory capital requirements have a significant effect on financial stability of Islamic and conventional banks (CBs) in the MENA region. This study also investigates the moderating effect of market power and concentration on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk.

The estimation results support the view that capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has no significant impact on credit risk of Islamic banks (IBs), whereas market competition does play a significant role in shaping the risk behavior of these institutions. This study report opposite results for CBs – an increase in the minimum capital requirements is followed by an increase in a bank’s risk level, which has a negative impact on their financial stability. Furthermore, the results support the notion of a non-linear relationship between banking concentration and bank risk. The findings inform the regulatory authorities concerned with improving the financial stability of banking sector in the MENA region to set their policy differently depending on the level of concentration in the banking market.

This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reforms (in this case, capital requirements) and market competition for bank performance and risk-taking. In regard to IBs, capital requirements are less effective in requiring IBs to adjust their risk level according to the Basel III methodology. This study finds that IBs’ risk behavior is strongly associated with market competition, and therefore, the interest rates. Moreover, banks operating in markets with high banking concentration (but not necessarily, low competition), will decrease their credit risk level in response to an increase in the minimum capital requirements. As a result, these banks will be more stable compared to their conventional peers. Thus, regulators and policymakers in the MENA region should restrict the risk-taking behavior of IBs through stringent capital requirements and more intense banking supervision.

The practical implications of these findings are that the regulatory authorities concerned with improving banking sector stability in the MENA region should proceed differently, depending on the level of banking market concentration. The findings inform regulators and policymakers to set capital requirements at levels that would restrict banks from taking more risk to increase their returns. They are also important for bank managers who should avoid risky strategies in response to increased regulatory pressure (e.g. increase in the minimum required capital level of 8%), as they may lead to an increase in the level of non-performing loans, and therefore, a greater probability of bank default. A future extension of this study will focus on testing the effect of bank risk-taking and market competition on the capitalization levels of banks in the MENA countries. More specifically, this study will investigates if banks raise their capitalization levels during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The analysis of previous research indicates that there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether IBs perform differently than CBs under different competitive conditions. To fill this gap, this study examines the influence of capital regulation and market competition (both individually and interactively) on bank risk-taking behavior using a large sample of banking institutions in 18 MENA countries over 14 years (2005–2018). For the first time in this line of research, this study shows that the level of market power is positively associated with the level of a bank’ insolvency risk. In others words, IBs operating in highly competitive markets are more inclined to take a higher risk than their conventional peers. Regarding the IBs credit risk behavior, this study finds that market power has a limited impact on the relationship between CAR and risk level. This means that IBs are still applying in their operations the theoretical models based on the prohibition of interest.

The 1988 Basel Accord and the proposed revisions to the Accord represent some of the most significant international regulations impacting the financial decisions of firms, in this case, financial services firms, in recent years. The revisions to the Accord incorporate operational risk into the capital, supervisory and market requirements. In our review of the issues in this area, we provide insight into the workings of an important international regulation. We also present suggestions for further research in this area that will become feasible when data on the impact of the new regulations become available after the proposed implementation in 2006.

The systematic assessment of working capital requirement in construction projects deals with the analysis of various quantitative and qualitative factors in which information is subjective and based on uncertainty. There exists an inherent difficulty in the classical approach to evaluate the impact of qualitative factors for the assessment of working capital requirement. This paper presents a methodology to incorporate linguistic variables into workable mathematical propositions for the assessment of working capital using fuzzy set theory. This article takes into consideration the uncertainty associated with many of the project resource variables and these are reflected satisfactorily in the working capital computations. A case study illustrates the application of the fuzzy set approach. The results of the case study demonstrate the superiority of the fuzzy set approach to classical methods in the assessment of realistic working capital requirements for construction projects.

The new Basel Accord (known as Basel II) attempts to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements. We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates specific regulatory capital requirements and the possibility of capital forbearance and moral hazard. We estimate the cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulation regimes based on the building block approach of the 1988 Basel Accord (known as Basel I) and internal model-based (IMB) capital regulation. In contrast to the building block of Basel I, Basel II's IMB capital regulation links more closely the capital requirement to a bank's actual risk. We develop a multiperiod pricing model while incorporating the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard. The fairly-priced premium rates are computed by assuming that a bank's asset value follows a GARCH process. In contrast to previous studies based on the building block capital standard, we find that forbearance and the potential moral hazard behavior will not increase the cost of deposit insurance in the scheme of Basel II's IMB capital regulation.