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The purpose of this paper is to identify whether personality traits can help explain the outcomes that arise in bargaining outcomes.

Experiments with subjects playing the alternating-offers bargaining game are considered. Both full information and asymmetric information treatments are considered. Subjects also complete standardized Myers-Briggs Type Indicator assessments.

Personality type measurements are shown to help explain the opening offers, rejections, and resulting wealth in the negotiations. It is shown that interactions between the personality dimensions are important and that the interaction between personality and information play a key role in bargaining outcomes.

The research utilizes laboratory experiments to generate data. This expands our understanding of individual-level behavior, but suffers from the limitation of not replicating realistic bargaining situations.

The work should serve as a guide to organizations to identify traits of effective negotiators.

Bargaining is a central economic activity. Being able to identify the root of differences in outcomes from negotiations should be able to inform institutional design issues.

Little work has been done connecting the rich literature in social psychology and management on personality to economic outcomes. The research on bargaining neglects to incorporate individual-level traits into the process. This research begins to bridge this gap and informs both bargaining theory as well as emphasizes on the importance of personality in application.

It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games among such miner(s) and players that determine such an outcome-contingent contract before the start of the original game. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another as in the original game, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner’s profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria.

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.

The Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.

The results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.

The research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

This paper seeks first to build up a game‐theoretic model of the interactions of two agents ‐ a husband and a wife ‐ in a short story about sincere selection of a strategy of self‐sacrifice, and then to find out a solution of the model. This formal model as well as informal analysis is employed to argue that the conventional virtue of everybody's choice of a strategy of sacrifice for others in a group, especially when these strategies are uncoordinated, may ultimately lead to social vice, i.e. irrational behaviour and attempts at rationalization of it by all.

Considering there is a lack of research in determining the optimal levels of government guarantee and revenue cap, the objective of this research is to determine their optimal levels to achieve a reasonable financial risk allocation between governments and private investors while avoiding overly lucrative conditions for private investors.

Expanded net present value (NPV) analysis and bargaining game theory are employed to construct the core of the determination process. The risk gap between governments and private investors is assessed via an expanded NPV analysis to see if the financial risk has been shared reasonably, based on which the range of the government guarantee is decided. A bargaining model is then created to help locate the optimal level of the government guarantee. Finally, a revenue cap, often combined with the government guarantee in public–private partnership (PPP) agreements, will be determined if overly lucrative conditions for private investors are observed or governments suffer a risk spillover.

Referring to a real PPP project in Australia, Project BA is created to validate the applicability of the proposed determination process. The outcome shows that the proposed determination process in this paper is capable of determining the optimal levels of government guarantee and revenue cap. The government preferences towards risk allocation will influence the values of the optimal levels. Governments may also consider to alleviate the control over investors' net profits to mobilise private investors into PPP projects.

There is a potential possibility that the revenue cap fails to control the financial risk for governments or the overly lucrative condition for private investors. In other words, even though the revenue cap is set at the minimal level, the financial risk for governments still beyond their tolerance range or the overly lucrative condition for private investors still occurs. Future research may focus on other financial protective schemes which help to better control the financial risks for governments and profits for private investors.

Government guarantees are frequently used as an investment incentive to reduce the probabilities of suffering loss for private investors. Nevertheless, the financial risks for governments may increase after providing guarantees and, as a result, revenue cap is required by governments to avoid placing themselves in an unprotected situation. By recognising the importance of the two contractual parameters, many scholars dig into their option values. However, there are very rare research works focussing on the method of determining the specific levels of government guarantee and revenue cap. To overcome the limitations of existing models and enrich the methodology for government guarantee and revenue cap determination, this paper contributes to the body of knowledge by developing a government guarantee and revenue cap determination process which contributes to a reasonable allocation of financial risks between governments and private investors.

Field experiments have raised important issues of interpretation of bargaining behavior. There is evidence that bargaining behavior appears to vary across groups of populations, such as nationality, ethnicity and sex. Differences have been observed with respect to initial behavior and with respect to the adjustment pattern over time. Often, such behavioral differences are referred to as cultural, although the delineation of the cultural group has been confined to one or other observable characteristic in isolation. We show that this way of characterizing cultural differences is overly simplistic: at best, it leads to unreliable claims; at worst, it leads to erroneous conclusions. We reconsider the evidence provided by previous experiments using ultimatum game rules, and undertake new experiments that expand the controls for demographics. The lesson from our demonstration is that the task of designing experiments for the field offers many challenges if one wants to define and control for cultural impacts, but that field experiments also offer potential for providing new insights into these issues.

Explores the prospects for constructing a feminist contractarian moral theory. Argues that the social contractarianism championed by John Rawls and feminized by Susan Okin is unlikely to succeed in offering feminists an alternative theory of justice which can compete with utilitarianism. However, an appropriately modified economic contractarianism, such as that championed by David Gauthier, offers more promise for producing a successful liberal feminist theory of justice. Holds that a feminist ethic of care based on an economic contractarian model must move from an exclusive concern with game‐theoretic bargaining to solve prisoners’ dilemma problems to a bargaining game which also deals with the assurance problem. Offers speculation of how such a theory could be rigorously developed.

With rising environmental concerns, recent years have witnessed a significant surge of academic and corporate interest in green supply chain coordination (GSCC). This is evident from the rise in channel coordination literature focused toward the elimination of sub-optimal in the green supply chain (GSC). This paper seeks to summarize the model-based research on coordination in GSCs with the help of a framework developed specifically for this paper. The purpose of this paper is to present an in-depth analysis of the widely used models in the area.

A review of literature is presented in this paper to examine the underlying concepts peculiar to GSCC. A classification framework is developed to present an exhaustive survey of commonly used concepts.

Around 90 percent of the papers on GSCC come from game theory (GT) application, which explicitly utilizes coordination through contracts. The review concludes prospective area of research in GSCC. The study posits that there exists a potential of creating a more rational and efficient coordination strategies to improve GSC’s operational performance, with the view of the optimum distribution of resources and better environmental management.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first state-of-the-art review of GSCC literature focused primarily on mathematical model-based literature. This review identifies various methodological and content-oriented characteristics of GSCC. The paper also opens avenues of future research.