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This paper aims to investigate the impact of market structure and market share on the performance of the Islamic banks operating in the Iranian banking system based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm.

The Iranian Islamic banking system’s market structure is evaluated by using the econometrics method to test the validity of the traditional SCP paradigm. For this purpose, the authors estimate a simple regression model that is consisted of several independent variables, such as the market share, bank size, real gross domestic product, liquidity and Herfindahl-Hirschman index as a proxy variable for concentration and one dependent variable, namely, the profit as a proxy for performance. The panel data includes a data sample of 22 Islamic banks operating from 2006 to 2019. Data are extracted from the balance sheet of Islamic banks and the time-series database of the Central Bank of Iran and World Bank.

The study’s findings indicate that both concentration and market share have a positive impact on the performance of banks in the Iranian Islamic banking system. This result is contradicted with both traditional SCP and efficient structure hypotheses; however, it confirms the existence of oligopoly or cartel in the Iranian Islamic banking system that few banks try to gain the highest share of profit and maintain their market share by colluding with each other. This result is in contradiction with other research studies about the market structure in the Iranian banking system that claimed that banks in Iran operate under monopolistic competition. In addition, it shows that the privatization of some banks in Iran does not improve and help competition in the Iranian banking system.

This paper is a pioneer empirical study analyzing the market structure, concentration and collusion based on the SCP paradigm in Iranian Islamic banking. The results of the study support the existence of collusive behavior among the Islamic bank in Iran that is not aligned with Sharia. This study clearly shows the difference between ideal Islamic banking and Islamic banking in practice in Islamic countries. This clearly indicates that only prohibiting some operations like receiving interest, gambling and bearing excessive risk is not enough. In fact, the Islamic banking system should be based on the Sharia rule in all aspects and much more modification and study have to be done to achieve an appropriate Islamic banking system. These possible modifications to overcome the issues of cartel-like market structure and collusive behavior in the Iranian Islamic banking system include making the Iranian banking system more transparent, letting foreign banks enter the Iranian banking system and minimizing the government intervention in the Iranian banking system.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the market structure and financial performance of Malaysian commercial banks over the period of 2000 to 2011 by testing the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and efficient-structure (ESH) hypotheses.

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is employed to measure the efficiency of banks, while concentration ratio is used to assess the market structure of Malaysian banks. Next, utilizing the least squares method, both variables – market structure and efficiency of banks – among other explanatory variables (market share, operating expenses, loans ratio and size of banks) are regressed upon the dependent variable, namely financial performance of banks represented by return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIMTA).

The concentration of Malaysian banking industry is at a declining trend; structurally speaking, Malaysian banks are more competitive due to less market concentration. In terms of efficiency, the DEA results reveal that Malaysian banks are operating below their capacity at 40 per cent of efficiency. Thus, Malaysian banks could reduce their utilization of inputs by 60 per cent to operate on the efficient frontier. Next, the results offer support to ESH, which implies that market concentration and banking efficiency determines the profitability performance of Malaysian commercial banks.

Past studies on Malaysian banking sector had tended to focus either on measuring the performance or assessing the market structure of banks. Thus, this study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by testing the nexus between the market structure and the performance of banks.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the Chinese banking industry. This study also investigates the role of various other factors in the risk-taking channel.

This study used panel data from 2000 to 2012, and a dynamic panel model (Difference GMM) was applied.

The empirical findings of this paper suggest that loose monetary policy rates increase bank risk-taking. Unlike previous studies, the results of this paper suggest that the bank-specific factors (size, liquidity and capitalization) do not significantly affect the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure does have a stabilizing effect on monetary policy transmission and the risk-taking channel. Higher market power weakens the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission.

Of significance to the policymakers' point of view is that loose monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, such effects can be mitigated by encouraging a proper level of market power in banking markets.

This study investigated the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission for the Chinese banking industry. Due to the unique features of the People's Bank of China (PBC, Central Bank of China) policy, this study also contributes to the literature by comparing price-based and quantity-based monetary policy tools and their effectiveness in financial stability and monetary policy transmission. Furthermore, the role of market structure is also investigated in the risk-taking channel.

The purpose of this paper is to examine from a comparative perspective, the impact of structural banking reforms on the legal frameworks for the corporate governance of credit institutions.

This facilitates a functional analysis of the resulting corporate governance structures, which in turn provides the basis for an analysis of conceptual concerns with regard to the independence of the separate entity.

The paper points out that structural banking reforms come with significant implications for existing corporate governance structures of credit institutions. The resulting corporate governance structures rise conceptual concerns with regard to both the effectiveness of the independence of the separate entity and the objectives of structural banking reforms generally.

The paper shows that the implementation of structural banking reforms is a complex operational issue and process for the banking groups and the regulators. The challenge will be to establish and upheld the ring fence in a way to lower the risk of intra-group contagion. There is a great need for regulatory and supervisory policies that reinforce the settled ring fence obligations.

This paper’s value lies in providing analysis of the implications of structural banking reforms for the corporate governance of credit institutions. The relevant statutory frameworks as such set only the core components of the new structure. Defining and implementing the design is left to the discretion of the regulators.

Low cost financing in establishing economical development is very important. At this point, financial intermediaries provide great contributions to economic development by eliminating asymetrical information problem between lender and borrower. It is possible to see capital market in anglo‐saxon countries and banking system in Europe and Japan mostly from historical dimension. However, long term financing is done through capital market in most developed countries at present. It is a common characteristic in countries such as Turkey, Chile and Mexico whose economies are financed by banking system. Singh and Weisse (1998), suggests that it is because of late industrialisation 1. Developing countries are generally those where there is less capital. Therefore attracting both internal and external savings into the banking system (for these countries) is very important from economical development point. At this point, powerful banks are preferred by the investors. Because the possibilty of failure is low (for these banks) 2. The most important factor that effects banks risk structure is public’s role. Because public can effect banks risk structure both at macro and micro level. Public’s influence on bank’s risk structure at macro economic level is due to general economical structure. If the general economic structure has high volatility and is away from consistency, this situation will increase the risk for banking sector. On the other hand, fiscal dominance is one of the main problems especially in developing countries. Fiscal dominance caused by lack of enough public revenue affects banking sector negatively. Thus, a goverment which can not prepare the macro economic environment where banks can function at high productivity will increase banks’ risks. In addition, banks require strict regulations and controlling as its structure is open to fraud. That these regulations are ignored or not prepared will lead to risk accumulation in the sector. It becomes a social responsibility of the state to take necessary cautions as these kinds of issues change a large cost on the society. Within this framework, the aim of our study is to examine public’s role on fragilities in banking sector. These examinations will be conducted for Turkey which experienced a collapse in banking sector in the recent period. In the first and second part of our study, public’s influence on the sector at macro and micro level will be examined. Experiences gained through Turkey example will be presented in the conclusion.

The paper uses annual and pooled data on Australian banks for the years 1994 to 1996 to test the two competing hypotheses of market structure and performance; namely, the structure‐conduct‐performance hypothesis (in concentrated markets firms derive higher profits due to collusion) and the efficiency hypothesis (firms derive higher profits because they are efficient). We test these two and other two intervening hypothesis in the context of the Australian banking market. The results reject the efficiency hypothesis and also the two intermediate hypotheses but there is a lack of strong evidence to reject the structure‐conduct‐performance hypothesis. The results are important because such an empirical investigation has not been conducted in Australia to date. The results suggest that it may be hard to defend abolishing the Four‐pillar Policy (which was a major recommendation of Wallis Report 1997) on efficiency grounds.

In 2013-2014, Bank Muscat and National Bank of Oman requested a merger and Bank Sohar and Bank Dhofar lodged a similar request. This paper aims to investigate the shape of the market structure, and it tries to answer whether approving such requests is good for the industry, economy and society.

The study examines the market structure of Oman Banking Industry, and it also presents the shape of the market structure if there had been an approval for these mergers’ requests. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and the biggest k-banks Concentration Ratio (CRk), which measure concentration changes over 17 years during the period 1998-2014, are used in this study.

The study finds that Oman’s Banking Industry is highly concentrated, which should cause concerns over these two requests of mergers or similar requests in the future. In general, the concentration ratio shows decreasing trend. The concentration ratio in the deposit market implies a concentrated market with CR2 and CR3 recording 67 and 85%, respectively, while HHI reached 2,864 points in the 1998. However, in 2014, the concentration ratio had decreased, to CR2 and CR3 recording 52 and 65% respectively, and HHI standing at 2,112 points.

The researcher suggests future investigation and further research in setting a benchmark index as a guideline for mergers’ requests.

Exercising monopoly power, by fewer banks, is very harmful to the economy. Charging higher interest rates on business loans escalates the cost of production of products and services which will cause inflation; therefore, monopoly power will lead to slow growth of the economy.

Regulators in Central Bank of Oman (CBO) or in any central bank should be very careful in granting mergers, especially among big banks, because it enables newly bigger banks to exercise monopoly power, thereby harming depositors who will be getting low deposit interest rates and harming borrowers by charging them high loan interest rate.

Even though, this study discussed two requests of mergers between banks in Oman; however, it has presented formal approaches to the measurement of market structure in any country. Overall, it provides the policymakers in making the final decisions on mergers between banks in the future which are not limited to these banks or to Oman’s Banking Industry.

Corporate financial communications concern public and private disclosure (Holland, 2005). This paper aims to explain how banks developed financial communications and how problems emerged in the global financial crisis. It explores policy responses.

Bank cases reveal construction and destruction of the social, knowledge and economic world of financial communications over two periods.

In the 1990s, learning about financial communications by a “dominant coalition” (Cyert, March, 1963) in bank top management was stimulated by gradual change. The management learnt how to accumulate social and cultural capital and developed “habitus” for disclosure (Bourdieu, 1986). From 2000, rapid change and secrecy factors accelerated bank internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising values, turning “habitus” in “market for information” (MFI) (Barker, 1998) into a “psychic prison” (Morgan,1986), creating riskier bank cultures (Schein, 2004) and constraining learning.

The paper introduces sociological concepts to banking research and financial disclosures to increase the understanding about financial information and bank culture and about how regulation can avoid crises. Limitations reflect the small number of banks and range of qualitative data.

Regulators will have to make visible the change processes, new contexts and knowledge and connections to bank risk and performance through improved regulator action and bank public disclosure.

“Masking” and rituals (Andon and Free, 2012) restricted bank disclosure and weakened governance and market pressures on banks. These factors mediated bank failure and survival in 2008, as “psychic prisons” “fell apart”. Bank and MFI agents experienced a “cosmology episode” (Weick, 1988). Financial communications structures failed but were reconstructed by regulators.

The paper shows how citizens require transparency and contested accountability to democratise finance capitalism. Otherwise, problems will recur.

The paper aims to investigate whether the wave of mergers observed in other European countries is suitable for the German banking industry.

This question is approached by studying the relationship between market structure and profit (the so‐called profit‐structure relationship) in the German banking industry using the model suggested by Berger. By extending his econometric model to include portfolio and capital risk and using German banks' financial data, the authors are able to test simultaneously for three competing theories of the profit‐structure relationship.

It is found that including portfolio risk significantly improves the fit of the estimated profit‐structure relationship. In addition, it is found that scale economies are present in German banking and that the so‐called structural conduct – performance hypothesis is accepted. Owing to the acceptance of this hypothesis, conclude it is that mergers are likely to boost German banks' profitability but possibly at the expense of lower consumer welfare.

The research methodology employed is unable to weigh the potential benefits of higher financial sector profitability and stability against the possible detrimental impact on consumer

The value of the paper is to provide a robust estimate of scale economies and a reliable test of the profit‐structure relationship in German banking based on recent data. It should be of particular value to bank managers, seeking to increase their institution's profitability by way of merger and to the regulator of the financial industry.

The study aims to analyze the changes in banking market structure and their impact on the bank efficiency.

This study uses a one-stage stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to compare the impact of the market structure and the GFC on the economic efficiency of the major banks in both countries.

A significant negative impact of the GFC is observed on bank efficiency. Overall, Canadian banks posted better efficiency scores than their American counterparts. Additionally, cost-efficient banks are found to be more resilient to crises and more profit-efficient in the post-GFC period. The authors found that market power had a positive impact on the cost and profit efficiency of banks. Higher levels of equity, market power and concentration helped banks be more cost-efficient.

Only large banks are selected for study although it represents the majority stake of both banking sectors.

Banking regulators should include more measures to assess the banking market structure and performance.

As per the best knowledge of the authors, it is the first study to assess the change in banking market structure and efficiency of the US and Canadian banking sectors in the post-GFC period.