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Recalling that the introductory chapter (Chapter 1) wanted to carry out similar types of analysis for the major states in India. Thus, the present chapter tries to examine the trends of a bank branch, deposit, credit, the credit–deposit ratio, sectoral shares of credit, magnitudes of banking transactions, credit concentration, etc., for the selected 15 states and Delhi as the only union territory for the period 1972–2019. The study period covers the pre-reform period from 1972 to 1992 and the post-reform period 1993–2019. The observations show that the branch, deposit and credit did not grow significantly during the post-reform period. As a result, the credit–deposit ratio did not increase significantly during the reform period. But, the magnitude of banking transactions increased in most of the states during the reform period. Regarding the sector-wise share of credit, AP, Maharashtra, UP and TN are the leading states in agricultural credit, WB, Gujarat and Maharashtra are in industrial credit and Kerala, Assam and Delhi are in the service sector. On the other hand, the study finds rising magnitudes credit concentrations of the states during the post-reform period in contrast to the declining concentration in the pre-reform period. Maharashtra is the state which holds around 25 per cent of all states’ credit throughout the entire period of 1972–2019. Hence, there are the notions of rising disparity and inequality in credit as well as incomes of the states and all India levels.

Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia must be undertaken with the view that they are not mutually exclusive competitive tradeoffs. Rather banks and markets must be viewed as complementary supportive pillars in a financial system. Additionally, legal and functional reform must be undertaken simultaneously. The paper proposes that a likely consequence of doing so will enable creating a four-pillared multi-dimensional growth paradigm in the region to help restore and promote growth.

This paper proposes that if a political system is more like to facilitate a unified government, to establish a strong executive body and to respond to the needs of the majority, financial reforms are more likely to emerge from the policymaking process and produce positive results. On the contrary, political systems that discourage those governing features are less likely to produce reforms. This chapter compares financial reform processes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand. All of them performed low level of financial reforms in the early 1980s but resulted in different situations later. In the mid-2000s, New Zealand heralded the most efficient and stable financial system; while Taiwan lagged behind and China performed the worst. Evidence showed that China’s authoritarian system may be the most superior in forming a unified government with a strong executive, but the policy priority often responds more to the interests of a small group of power elites; therefore the result of financial reform can be limited. Taiwan’s presidential system can produce greater financial reform when the ruling party controls both executive and legislative bodies, but legislative obstructions may occur under a divided government. New Zealand's Westminster system produces the most effective and efficient financial reform due to its unified government and a strong executive branch with consistent and stable supports from the New Zealand Parliament.

This paper reviews the socioeconomic reform policies employed by the China’s party-state between the early 1980s and mid-2000s. Unlike conventional frameworks viewing the reform as an economic development project designed for “national interests” or “ruling elites” personal interests’, this paper interprets the reform as a political attempt of the state made in response to the crisis of dominance over the working class. In the face of the crisis of class dominance expressed as economic and political unrests related to low growth of labor productivity, the state managers of the post-Mao era embarked on the reform as a way of restoring the state’s ability to impose work upon the workers. As is well known, the reform was “market-oriented” with the state relinquishing some of the control over economic managements, and this paper sees it as the state’s strategy of reducing political risks arising from a highly politicized form of class confrontation. By making pressures upon producers look like a purely economic matter arising from private relations, that is, by depoliticizing exploitative social relations of production, the market-oriented reform helped the party-state effectively repress workers without a serious damage to political legitimacy. From this perspective, this paper examines the reform policies in management of labor, firms, and money, and how those policies contributed to the state’s ability to discipline class relations of production in China. This paper, however, does not conclude that the reform as a depoliticization strategy of class dominance was successful and nonproblematic. It is argued that beneath the success of the reform was a growing necessity of crisis; faced with re-burgeoning workers’ struggles, growing problems of overproduction/overaccumulation, and the resultant looming banking system crisis, the party-state came to find it more and more necessary to bring the economic managements back into political ambit with the related political risks also growing.

Social scientists have long been interested in how political institutions affect economic performance. Nowhere are these effects more apparent today than in the current U.S. financial meltdown. This article offers an analysis of the meltdown by showing how government regulation among other things helped cause it. Specifically, the article shows how regulatory reforms closely associated with neoliberalism created perverse incentives that contributed significantly to the increased lending in the mortgage market and increased speculation in other financial markets even as such behavior was becoming increasingly risky. The result was the failure of mortgage firms, banks, a major insurance company, and eventually the market for short-term business loans, which triggered a general liquidity crisis thereby thrusting the entire economy into a severe recession. Implications for future research are explored. The article also offers a few policy prescriptions and an assessment of their political viability going forward.

This chapter is intended to provide the reader with information and insights on the transition or transformation from socialism to a market economy in what are generally termed the transition economies. This includes countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), sometimes referred to as the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the South East European (SEE) countries, sometimes referred to as the Balkans and the major socialist economy of Asia, China. The chapter covers the critical years of reform for most of these countries, from 1990 to 2000. Some transition economies started reforming earlier, such as China which has continued state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms to the present time. Other transition countries, primarily the SEE economies, lagged due to the conflict which raged throughout most of the region and the period of isolation which followed, particularly for Serbia. China and Serbia are sui generis for a number of reasons. They will be referenced as examples in this chapter, but they will not form part of the core statistical and data analysis.

This essay explores the critical vision of Francisco Barrera Lavalle about the Mexico’s Monetary Reform of 1905. In his critique, Barrera inserts an argument about the nature of the balance of payments in the Mexican economy: the disequilibria in Mexico’s trade balance were structurally recurrent given the characteristics of what the country exports: commodities and raw materials. Barrera believed that the authorities made the mistake of overvaluing the peso, assigning it a value higher than what silver currency was worth at the time on international markets. Barrera also dismissed the idea that monetary stability could be achieved by suspending the free coinage of silver currency. Finally, Barrera held that banks should be obligated to pay their banknotes in gold, as they were in Great Britain and in the United States, not in silver coins.

Purpose – The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted the need for reform of financial regulation in several jurisdictions across the globe, including the United Kingdom and the United States. This chapter argues that the reforms need to be comprehensive and will therefore have to cover several aspects of financial regulation.

Design/methodology/approach – The chapter critically examines some of the areas where reforms are most needed. This involves consideration of the merits and demerits of multi-functional or universal banking. It also involves consideration of the systemic and other problems that arise as a result of the increasingly international nature of banking and other financial services. Moreover, it examines the need for regulators to understand and keep pace with financial innovation. Furthermore, it involves discussion on the need to improve corporate governance and remuneration policies in banks and other financial services providers as well as the need for adequate arrangements for dealing with bank insolvencies and collapses.

Findings – Market fundamentalism and over-reliance on the alleged self-correcting powers of the market have led to excessive deregulation and liberalisation in world financial markets. Financial regulatory reforms will therefore have to be substantial and comprehensive to properly address the problems caused by excessive financial liberalisation.

Originality/value – The chapter examines significant issues that academics, regulators and policy makers should consider when devising or implementing reforms designed to prevent, or reduce the impact of, financial crises in the future.

The 17 December 2004 was a turning point in both Turkish and European history: The European Council followed the European Commission's recommendation and approved the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, which commenced on 3 October 2005. The goal of accession to the European Union (EU) has become one of the main driving forces for broadly defined legal, political, economic, and financial reforms in Turkey.²