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While the literature studying the effect of banking crises on real output growth rates has found short-lived effects, recent work has focused on the level effects showing that banking crises can reduce output below its trend for several years. This paper aims to investigate the effect of banking crises on investment finding a prolonged negative effect.

The authors test to see whether investment declines after a banking crisis and, if it does, for how long and by how much. The paper uses data for 148 countries from 1963 to 2007. Econometrically, the authors test how banking crises episodes affect investment in future years after controlling for other potential determinants.

The authors find that the investment to GDP ratio is on average about 1.7 percent lower for about eight years following a banking crisis. These results are robust after controlling for credit availability, institutional characteristics, and a host of other factors. Furthermore, the authors find that the size and duration of this adverse effect on investment varies according to the level of financial development of a country. The largest and longer-lasting decrease in investment is found in countries in a middle region of financial development, where finance plays its most important role according to theory.

The authors contribute by finding that banking crisis can have long-term effects on investment of up to nine years. Further, the authors contribute by finding that the level of development of the country's financial markets affects the duration of this decrease in investment.

The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more recent 2008‐09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis explanation and prediction. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical review of proxies for and important determinants of banking crises‐credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and supervision.

The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy‐related variables in the literature. Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.

Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part explained by the difference in the chosen proxies used in empirical models. The usefulness of different proxies depends partly on constraints in terms of time and country coverage but also on what particular policy question is asked.

The study offers a comprehensive analysis of measurements of banking crises, credit growth, financial liberalization and banking regulations and concludes with an assessment of existing proxies and databases. Since, the review points to the choice of proxies that best fit specific research objectives, it should serve as a reference point for empirical researchers in the banking crisis area.

This paper aims to focus on the banking crises recorded in Italy in the period 1861-2016 and to propose a novel classification based upon the timing of the crisis with respect to the business cycle.

A simple and objective rule to distinguish between slowdown and inner-banking crises is introduced. The real impact of banking crises is evaluated by integrating the narrative approach with an empirical vector autoregression analysis.

First, banking crises are not always associated to economic downturns. Especially in Italy, (but this analysis can be easily extended to other countries), they have often limited their negative effects within the financial system (“inner” crises). Second, the simultaneity of macroeconomic effects (credit contraction and GDP recession) leave the causal link undetermined. Third, the empirical and narrative analyses performed testify that boom–bust mechanisms are an exception in the panorama of (Italian) banking crises; although when the economy experiences such episodes, the economic and social consequences are not only severe but also enduring.

To classify historically recognized banking crisis episodes, the authors look at credit and GDP dynamics (and their ratio) around crisis years. Relying on a single definition of crisis is avoided. The classification provides an empirical rule to determine in what way banking crises differ. The classification is mostly based on the synchronization with the business cycle and, using the documented evolution of macroeconomic aggregates, it permits to highlight the fact that a variety of interactions occur between financial and real aggregates during and around banking crises.

As to the concept of systemic banking crisis, a qualitative judgment is often adopted to select relevant episodes, thus confirming the absence of a quantitative rule in classification criteria (Chaudron and de Haan, 2014). This paper proposes a simple and objective rule to distinguish between slowdown and inner-banking crises; the former occur close to a GDP contraction, whereas the latter appear to spread their effects with no substantial evidence of output loss.

The 2008‐2009 crisis had no significant impact on the Turkish banking system (TBS), with the TBS achieving a record level of profitability in 2009. The strong position of Turkish banks against the global crisis is attributed generally to the good regulation and risk management in the TBS. The measures implemented by The Turkish Central Bank, and The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, e.g. high capital adequacy ratio, played a significant role. But, this judgment does not take into consideration the high profitability and some inefficiency of TBS in his role of financial intermediation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the TBS's performance in the face of the global crisis.

The paper compare the measures against the global crisis and the performances of banking systems by public supports to financial sector, measures taken vis‐à‐vis the crisis, ratios as deposits/loans, loans to non‐financial sector and return to assets.

The paper explains that the performance of TBS against the crisis is, to some extent, due to the high profitability and low efficiency in financial intermediation.

Financial regulation and policy particularly in emerging or underdeveloped economies should find equilibrium between the soundness and efficiency of banking system.

In full financial crisis the majority of scientific work focuses on the prudential regulation of the banking system and the problem of moral hazard. In fact, countries such as Turkey are still far from having the same problems and concerns. The paper shows that in spite of the global crisis, the TBS continued to obtain very raised profits: it can be said that the banking system soundness improved with the detriment the non‐financial sector.

This study aims to investigate the coordinated impact of regulations on the predicted probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

The study used the dynamic panel instrumental variable probit regression model of 52 African economies over the period 2006 to 2018.

The authors observe that banking crisis is persistent for few years but dissipates in the long run. The results show that board mechanism and ownership control are important in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors found a negative impact of regulatory capital and monetary policy on the predicted probability of a banking crisis while regulatory quality was not strong in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. There was also evidence to support that regulatory capital and monetary policy augment the negative impact of board mechanism and ownership control on the predicted probability of a banking crisis.

The limitation of the study is that it did not explore all measures of regulatory framework and how they impact banking crisis. However, it has an advantage of using alternative measures of regulations in a banking crisis probability model. Therefore, future studies should include other macro-prudential regulations, regulatory environments and supervision and observe how they are coordinated to reduce possible crisis in a robust methodological framework.

The research has policy implications for monetary authorities and policymakers to set coordinated regulations through internal banking mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining banking system stability goals. Countries in Africa should strengthen their quality of regulation in such a way that it can play a strong and complementary role to a robust internal control mechanisms, so as to maintain stability in the banking system. In general, regulators and policymakers should design greater coordination of external and internal regulations through a single regulatory framework and a common resolution mechanism that make the banking system more robust in curbing possible crisis.

The policy implication of the study is to build banking confidence in the society.

This study analyses the interactions of different components of internal and external regulatory framework in helping to reduce the probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

Previous academic literature indicates that the case of the banking crises recovery, in view of implemented regulations and policies, differs across times and countries. This is explained by varied institutional environments in which banking sectors operate, and in which financial crises persist. Therefore, the aim of this study is to prioritize investigation of the regulatory framework in the crisis‐response policies across European countries affected by the current financial turmoil. In order to elicit most accurate results and fill in the gap in existing literature on banking crises, the paper aims to focus on both qualitative and quantitative methodological frameworks in order to ensure that the concerns raised by practitioners are addressed and implications for the regulatory processes instrumented.

The emphasis of the current study has been laid to flag the region‐ and country‐specific vulnerabilities in regulatory framework employed for banking crisis recovery. Additional focus has been put on groups of systemic risk which evolved from the current financial crisis and ways these risks can be ameliorated. Furthermore, the current paper strives to explore the ideas of ways to ameliorate negative outcomes of the global crisis and mitigate common risks with reference to the flawed regulations. Especially, important issues have been raised by the interviewed experts who put forward their opinions on the ways of lifting the regulatory shortcomings and costs of remedies identified in the study and who provided solutions to ensuring the financial stability of European capital markets.

The study highlighted areas of regulations that require immediate attention and which failed to prevent financial markets from the current banking crisis. These findings are then summarized with constructive proposals on how to amend banking sector and financial regulations. The study also provides a cross‐European comparison of the financial crisis‐recovery policies, evaluating solutions adopted in various selected European countries. Henceforth, the empirical model tested the possibility of a tradeoff existing between remedies which involve substantial public funds and exert burden on both fiscal balances and taxpayers, and the speed and effectiveness of the recovery processes. To this point, no tradeoff has been found. Moreover, contrasting the current banking crisis to the past financial market disturbances, highlighted the magnitude of the nascent economic downturn prevailing in Europe.

Since the existing body of literature abounds in studies devoted to investigations of the causes for the current banking crisis, the research focus of this paper has been shifted away from the factors and flawed regulations that trigger banking crises. To this point, the paper has traits of pioneering work.

The purpose of this paper is to ask two questions. How does the customer's loyalty in the banking sector change (at both the structural and quantitative level) in the light of the financial and banking crises? Are any differences observed in those changes between developing and developed countries?

The paper consists of two parts: theoretical and empirical. In the theoretical part the authors discuss the nature of the banking and financial crises, the historical perspective of banking crises occurrence and main causes and consequences of those crises. The second part of the paper demonstrates statistical analysis of the obtained data from the Polish and European banking sector. The authors also present socio‐demographic characteristic of the research samples and the character of the bank‐client relations, comparative analysis of customer satisfaction index changes in the European banking sector and structural equation modes for the Polish banking sector for the years 2007‐2009.

The analyses allowed the authors to confirm the main research hypotheses: first, clients of developing European countries demonstrate generally lower satisfaction and loyalty levels than clients of banks in Western Europe. Second, the recent banking crisis has affected the level of customer satisfaction much more strongly in developing European countries than in developed ones. Third, the recent banking crisis has changed the character of the process of building customer satisfaction and loyalty in Poland by strengthening the influence of the image area.

Hardly anyone has tried to measure the influence of the banking crises at the level of customers’ satisfaction and the structure of the process of building long‐term relations between banks and their clients before.

Testing a total of five hypotheses, the paper contributes to overall comparison of the two regimes, as it scrutinises whether these improvements have helped regulate this sector. Although it appears that, for the first time, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) had a more timely effect than US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), multiple parameters must be taken into consideration. The banking system has additional rules that may affect financial statements, such as the Basel Accord which sets many policies closely related to the IFRS, such as deferred tax credits. In this way, this paper aim to enrich the results of these decisions, and illuminate aspects of amendments to IFRS and US GAAP in light of the crisis. Focussing on the financial sector, the author sought to critically evaluate their reactions, and to question some of their fundamental rules in practice. This is vital for accounting researchers and analysts, allowing for the first time to compare IFRS performance between Europe and the US, and make better investment evaluations.

The study sought to detect whether IFRS and US GAAP protected firms from abnormal sales arising from the outbreak of the crisis, whether the reclassification option under IFRS was an answer to the crisis, and whether IFRS and US GAAP succeeded in regulating shadow banking through their amendments. Therefore, it processes five hypotheses. In order to detect the effects of the crisis on accounting regimes, the analysis focused only on companies from the financial sector composed of the banking industry, insurance companies and shadow banking. The author included firms from Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK and the US, and collected information on 679 financial institutions for the period 2009–2013. The author settled on these time frames because the author aimed to capture IFRS performance surrounding the crisis effects in 2008 and the amendments that followed. In this way, the author applied quantitative methods using only numerical data over a given period.

The results suggest that the reclassification option was successful, helping firms to perform better amid the crisis, indicating that the manipulation of the crisis was appropriate. It seems therefore that US GAAP should have activated this option for US firms. However, the US may not have hurried to act because its banking sector seemed to recover more quickly than in Australia and Europe. Either way, both regimes need to consider speculative market cases that might have appeared during the crisis, as the author have detected cases of abnormal returns. Finally, concerning regulation of the shadow banking sector, the results seem to be encouraging only with regard to the latest improvements and only for all countries examined.

The project contributes to debate on the reactions of both IFRS and US GAAP during and after the economic crisis. For this, it addresses several questions to investigate the performance of the financial sector under both regimes, identifying possible additional effects and considerations. More specifically, it answers if the fair value orientation actually contributes to the financial crisis through contagion effects, while it addresses additional questions. Have these two global accounting regimes succeeded in overcoming the consequences of the crisis? Have amendments and the introduction of new standards to IFRS and US GAAP achieved regulation of shadow banking? Which of the two has performed better? As aforementioned, the analysis focused only on companies from the financial sector composed of the banking industry, insurance companies and shadow banking firms from Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK and the US, for the period 2009–2013.

Regulators such as Turner have identified excessive securitization, high leverage, extensive market trading and a bonus culture, as being major factors in bringing about the bank centred financial crisis of 2007‐2009. Whilst it is inevitable that banks adopt procyclical business strategies, not all banks took excessive risks and subsequently had to be rescued by taxpayers. The paper examines the extent to which individual bank outcomes can be attributed to systematic differences in banking knowledge concerning the primary risks and value drivers of their organisations by bank board directors and top management.

The paper reviews a wide range of theoretical, historical and empirical literatures on banking models and detailed case analyses of failing and non‐failing banks. A framework for understanding the role and application of knowledge in banking is developed which suggests how banks, despite their pro‐cyclical business strategies, are able to institutionalise learning and actively create new knowledge through time to improve bank organisation, intermediation and risk management.

The paper finds that a lack of basic knowledge of banking risks and value drivers by the boards and senior managers of the failing banks were implicated in the banking crisis. These knowledge problems concerned banks' understanding of their organisation, intermediation and risk management in an active market setting characterised by rapid economic and organisational change. Thus, the failing banks ignored or were unaware of this knowledge and hence experienced acute difficulties with learning the new knowledge needed to address the new problems thrown‐up by the financial crisis.

The analysis suggests that addressing this knowledge gap via the institutionalisation of banking knowledge ought to constitute an important element of any sustainable solution to the problems currently being experienced by the banking sector. By ensuring greater bank learning, knowledge creation, and knowledge use, governments and regulators could help reduce individual bank risk and the likelihood of future crisis.

In contrast to the claims made by some politicians and banking insiders, the analysis indicates that the banking crisis and its severity were neither unpredictable nor unavoidable since some banks, by institutionalising banking knowledge and history of past crises, successfully avoided the pitfalls experienced by the failing banks.

This paper aims to assess the topography of financial regulation, supervisory styles and performance of banking systems across the world.

The author gains insights by comparing regulatory and supervisory practices and their impact on banking system performance before and after the global crisis. The study illustrates the differences in regulation/supervision among crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. Even as capital ratios increased, bank governance and supervision regimes were strengthened, the private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

The results show that the crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks than those in emerging countries during the crisis period. BRICS countries as a distinct block have demonstrated uniqueness in their regulatory/supervisory styles that are similar neither to those in the crisis-countries nor to those in the non-crisis countries.

The originality of this study lies in its unique approach to assessing the bank regulation and supervision styles around the world and their impact on banking system profitability, as it uses a robust database. Further, this study provides not only a general assessment but also a comparative analysis of the BRICS and emerging economies. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory/supervisory systems.