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How can laboratory experiments help us understand banking crises, including the usefulness of various policy responses? After giving a concise introduction to the field of experimental economics more generally, the author attempts to provide answers. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The author discusses methodology and surveys relevant work.

History is often too complicated to be meaningfully revamped or modified in the lab, for purposes of insight-by-analogy. But as people argue about how to understand financial history, they bring ideas to the table. It is possible and useful to test the empirical relevance of these ideas in lab experiments.

The paper pioneers broad discussion of how lab experiments may shed light on banking crises.

In the transitional process of promoting market-oriented interest rate, China is confronted with an important theoretical and practical issue: how to avoid bank runs and realize the smooth operation of the financial system. The purpose of this paper is to construct a bank-run dynamic model by taking into account a market environment with the transmission of multiple rounds of noise information, a comprehensive consideration of depositors’ expectation of return on assets (or earning rate/yields of assets), the efficiency of information processing and dissemination, and the different motives for premature withdrawal.

The authors discussed the dynamic process of bank runs, furnished the ratio and number of each round of bank run, and characterized the corresponding dynamic equilibrium as well. Furthermore, the authors expanded the benchmark model by incorporating the deposit insurance system (DIS) to discuss the action mechanism of DIS overruns.

The results show that DIS implementation has two opposite effects: stabilized expectation and moral hazard, by virtue of its influence over the two types of premature withdrawal motives of depositors; the implementation effect of DIS rests with the dual-effect comparison, which is endogenous to the institutional environment.

The policy implications are as follows: while implementing DIS, it is necessary to establish and improve the corresponding institutional construction and supporting measures, to consolidate market discipline and improve the supervisory role of the bank’s internal governance mechanism, so as to reduce the potential moral hazards. The financial system reform shall be furthered and the processing and dissemination efficiency of information be elevated to prompt depositors to form stable withdrawal expectations, thereby enhancing the stabilizing effect of DIS.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs affects withdrawal decisions.

In the authors’ setup, the bank has no fundamental problems, depositors decide sequentially whether to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw, and they may observe previous decisions depending on the information structure. The authors consider two levels of difficulty of decision-making conditional on the presence of strategic dominance and strategic uncertainty. The authors hypothesize that the more difficult the decision, the longer is the response time, and the predictive power of response time depends on difficulty.

The authors find that response time is longer in information sets with strategic uncertainty compared to those without (as expected), but the authors do not find such relationship when considering strategic dominance (contrary to the hypothesis). Response time correlates negatively with optimal decisions in information sets with a dominant strategy (contrary to the expectation) and also when decisions are obvious in the absence of strategic uncertainty (in line with the hypothesis). When there is strategic uncertainty, the authors find suggestive evidence that response time predicts optimal decisions.

Being a laboratory experiment, it is questionable if depositors in real life behave similarly (external validity).

Since episodes of bank runs are characterized by strategic uncertainty, the result that under strategic uncertainty, longer response time leads to better decisions suggests that suspension of convertibility is a useful tool to curb banking panics.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study concerning the relationship between response time and the optimality of decisions in a bank-run game.

Our paper presents an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs to an open market economy. We examine domestic banks that are subject to potential runs by domestic depositors who worry that they will not be able to be repaid in full, because the domestic banks may not be able to refinance in the international financial markets. A loss in confidence in the banking system might precipitate a bank run. A bank run might be costly to safety net guarantors, for example, the central bank. Further, a bank run might lead to a breaking of the fixed exchange rate. Our model shows that adding central bank and International Monetary Fund guarantees, increasing long term debt as well as more equity financing reduces financial fragility, but consistent with economic intuition, these policy levers cannot eliminate the possibility of a bank run or a banking crisis leading to a currency crisis.

Although granted funding from government agencies, Britain’s Northern Rock (NR) Bank experienced a depositors’ bank run in 2007. The purpose of this paper is to explore bank managers’ and the Triparties’ communications, in their failed attempt to reassure depositors during the crisis.

The paper is based on content analysis of information given to depositors by bank managers and the Triparties via mass media. The theoretical concepts of rituals and masking were utilized.

Results suggest that nonfinancial reporting supersedes financial reporting. Rather than hidden losses, bank regulators’ and politicians’ discussions of emergency funding for NR was the crucial incident signaling “something going on.” Even positive statements by prominent organizational actors may have signaled serious problems that compromised NR’s “business as usual” stance.

Collective action manifested in a bank run is triggered by reasons other than numbers in financial reporting. The research results indicate a need to consider how regulatory authorities act during financial crises.

Previous studies concluded that sensegivers must be consistent in framing communication to sensemakers. Sensemaking requires that the crisis communication is also consistent in the sensemakers’ framing. Because it is difficult for sensegivers to reshape the collective sensemakers’ frame, successful crisis communication requires that sensegivers change their communication to match the sensemakers’ frame, including symbolic actions. Additionally, a bank run is characterized first by loss of trust in financial reporting; second, in nonfinancial reporting; and, finally, in the sensegiving actor: a domino effect.

Outlines the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on bank performance and investigates the relationship between exchange rate exposure and stock value for eight major Greek banks. Explains the methodological problems involved, develops a mathematical model and applies it to 1995‐1998 data for the banks. Discusses the results for each bank individually and suggests that although their stock returns are affected by exchange rate variations, other factors (e.g. asset/liability structure, management style etc.) are also important. Calls for further research on the impact of changes in exchange rates.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which conventional and Islamic bank fixed deposit rates can protect depositors against inflation in the Malaysia context.

Nominal interest rates are represented by commercial bank fixed deposit and investment bank fixed deposit rates. The authors use monthly data over the period 2000–2016. The authors apply the autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing methodology to test the existence of long-run relationship between nominal rates and inflation, and the error-correction model to test for the short-run dynamics.

The results show that the nominal interest rate and inflation are cointegrated for all the data series. The evidence indicates that all the fixed deposit rates, for both conventional and Islamic banks are effective inflation hedges in the long-run thereby supporting the Fisher hypothesis. There is no difference in the inflation hedging ability between conventional bank rates and Islamic bank rates. However, the authors find no evidence of the short-run relationship between interest rates and inflation for either bank.

Bank regulators should be concerned on the similarities in behaviour towards inflation between conventional and Islamic rates, given that the deposit rates for both banks are supposedly set based on different premises. Bank customers, they should deposit their money for the long horizon in order to protect themselves against inflation. Depositors worrying about inflation should be indifferent between conventional or Islamic as both banks provide similar inflation hedging characteristics.

The novelty of this study is in using the bank fixed deposit rates to study the Fisher effect in an emerging market and in comparing the conventional and Islamic bank rates in terms of their inflation hedging ability.

The unhealthy drive for deposit in the banking sector has pushed many banks into unethical practices, thereby resulting in high-level corruption cases in the banking sector. The purpose of this study is to investigate the short- and long-run linkages between bank net interest income and deposit liabilities interacted with corruption, to establish the influence of corruption in deposit mobilisation drive of banks in Nigeria. Also, the study analysed the causal relationship between selected bank variables and fraud.

The study used quarterly data on selected variables from 1Q 1993 to 4Q 2017 sourced from Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) annual reports and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin of various issues. Deposit Money Bank various deposit liabilities are interacted with a corruption index and used as the independent variables, while bank earnings serve as the dependent variable. Error Correction Model (ECM) and Engel Granger approach to co-integration technique were used to analyse the data.

The findings reveal that various bank deposit liabilities interacted with corruption index has a negative effect on bank profitability in the long run, though only corrupt fixed deposit is statistically significant at the 5 per cent significance level. Bank total asset, total loan and advances and fraud have a significant effect on bank profitability at 1 and 10 per cent significance level. The findings also reveal that banks profit from corrupt fixed deposit and demand deposit in the short run.

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The literature is awash with bank lending corruption and various institutional factors such as competition among banks, credit bureau and information sharing about borrowers, bank supervisory policies, loan loss provisioning, bank ownership structure and regulatory environment and anti-corruption measures. The aspect of deposit mobilisation and corruption has not been well researched in literature; this study, therefore, fills the gap in the literature by examining the extent deposit money banks contributed to corruption in Nigeria through their cutthroat deposit mobilisation drive.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between commercial bank lending and business cycle in South Africa. This paper attempts to know whether commercial bank lending in South Africa is procyclical.

The model assumed that the lending behaviour is related to the business cycle. In this study, vector error correction model (VECM) is used to capture the relationship between bank lending and business cycle to accurately elicit the macroeconomic long-run relationship between business cycle and bank lending, as some banks might slow down bank lending due to some idiosyncratic factors that are not related to the downturn in the economy. This paper uses data from South African Reserve Bank for the period of 1990-2015 using VECM to understand the extent to which business cycle fluctuation can affect credit crunch in the financial system. The Johansen cointegration approach is used to ascertain whether there is indeed a long-run co-movement between credit growth and business cycle.

Results from the VECM show that there are significant linkages among the variables, especially between credit to gross domestic product (GDP) and business cycle. The influence of business cycle is seen vividly after a period of four to five years, where business cycle explains 20 per cent of the variation in the credit to GDP. South African banks tend to change their lending behaviour during upturns and downturns. This result further confirms the assertion in theory that credit follows business cycle and can amplify credit crunch. The result shows that in the long run, fluctuations in the business cycle can influence the credit growth in South Africa.

The impulse analysis result shows that the impact of business cycle shock is very persistent and lasting. This also demonstrates that the shocks to the business cycle result have a persistent and long-lasting impact on credit. This study finds that commercial bank lending in South Africa is procyclical. It is suggested that the South African economy needs forward-looking policies that will mitigate the flow of credit to the real sector and at the same time ensure financial stability.

Most research papers rarely distinguish between the demand side and supply side of credit procyclicality. This report is presented to develop an econometric model that will examine demand side procyclicality. This study adopts more realistic and novel methods that will help in explaining the relationship between bank lending and business cycle in South Africa, especially after the global financial crisis. This report is presented with a concise and detailed analysis and interpretation.

This paper presents an integrated regulatory model to protect depositors in the event of a retail financial institution run or failure. In Australia, many of the factors included in this model are either not in existence, or if in existence have not been fully implemented. A review of regulatory arrangements for retail financial institutions in Australia is warranted in the light of these deficiencies.