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The primary aim of this study is to evaluate the impacts of institutional quality (IQ) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank risk-taking behavior, especially after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.

After considering the outlier effect, missing figure and inconsistent data, the study’s final sample contains 24,364 firm-year observations of 4,367 banks. A total of 27 countries were considered as those data are available on the “EPU index” introduced by Baker et al. (2016) for 2011–2020. To estimate the core results, the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) has been used to examine the effects of IQ and EPU on bank risk-taking behavior. Later, this study also validates the core results by using two-stage least squares (2SLS).

The authors found a positive relationship between EPU and banks' risk-taking behavior of banks', but imperatively, a significant and negative relationship exists between IQ and bank risk-taking behavior. This study also has a remarkable and distinct findings from Uddin et al. (2020) one of the vital indicators of IQ quality measurement “voice and accountability” (VACC) impacted negatively on bank risk-taking behavior. It indicates that when VACC is well established, banks tend to take the low risk under the prevailing EPU conditions and vice-versa. Moreover, the lagged dependent variable significantly impacted the bank's risk-taking negatively.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, very few studies endeavored to investigate the dominance or impact level of IQ and EPU on the area, i.e. bank risk-taking behavior which inspired us to contribute to the banking literature to address this issue in a broader aspect – the connection between EPU and bank risk-taking behavior, also a relationship between IQ and bank risk-taking behavior and finally linking them with bank risk-taking behavior.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of regulation and market competition on the risk-taking Behaviour of financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The empirical framework is based on panel fixed effects/random effects specification. For robustness purpose, this study also uses the generalized method of moments estimation technique. This study tests the hypothesis that regulatory capital requirements have a significant effect on financial stability of Islamic and conventional banks (CBs) in the MENA region. This study also investigates the moderating effect of market power and concentration on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk.

The estimation results support the view that capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has no significant impact on credit risk of Islamic banks (IBs), whereas market competition does play a significant role in shaping the risk behavior of these institutions. This study report opposite results for CBs – an increase in the minimum capital requirements is followed by an increase in a bank’s risk level, which has a negative impact on their financial stability. Furthermore, the results support the notion of a non-linear relationship between banking concentration and bank risk. The findings inform the regulatory authorities concerned with improving the financial stability of banking sector in the MENA region to set their policy differently depending on the level of concentration in the banking market.

This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reforms (in this case, capital requirements) and market competition for bank performance and risk-taking. In regard to IBs, capital requirements are less effective in requiring IBs to adjust their risk level according to the Basel III methodology. This study finds that IBs’ risk behavior is strongly associated with market competition, and therefore, the interest rates. Moreover, banks operating in markets with high banking concentration (but not necessarily, low competition), will decrease their credit risk level in response to an increase in the minimum capital requirements. As a result, these banks will be more stable compared to their conventional peers. Thus, regulators and policymakers in the MENA region should restrict the risk-taking behavior of IBs through stringent capital requirements and more intense banking supervision.

The practical implications of these findings are that the regulatory authorities concerned with improving banking sector stability in the MENA region should proceed differently, depending on the level of banking market concentration. The findings inform regulators and policymakers to set capital requirements at levels that would restrict banks from taking more risk to increase their returns. They are also important for bank managers who should avoid risky strategies in response to increased regulatory pressure (e.g. increase in the minimum required capital level of 8%), as they may lead to an increase in the level of non-performing loans, and therefore, a greater probability of bank default. A future extension of this study will focus on testing the effect of bank risk-taking and market competition on the capitalization levels of banks in the MENA countries. More specifically, this study will investigates if banks raise their capitalization levels during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The analysis of previous research indicates that there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether IBs perform differently than CBs under different competitive conditions. To fill this gap, this study examines the influence of capital regulation and market competition (both individually and interactively) on bank risk-taking behavior using a large sample of banking institutions in 18 MENA countries over 14 years (2005–2018). For the first time in this line of research, this study shows that the level of market power is positively associated with the level of a bank’ insolvency risk. In others words, IBs operating in highly competitive markets are more inclined to take a higher risk than their conventional peers. Regarding the IBs credit risk behavior, this study finds that market power has a limited impact on the relationship between CAR and risk level. This means that IBs are still applying in their operations the theoretical models based on the prohibition of interest.

This study examines the impact of the regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. The impact of the heterogeneous nature of the banking environment in the sampled countries is also considered.

A dynamic panel data analysis with system GMM estimators was used with a sample consisting of 120 Islamic banks from 21 countries for the period 2000-2013.

The results demonstrate that main regulation and supervision proxies have significant negative effects on risk levels of Islamic banks, which implies that further restricted regulatory and supervisory environment can lower risk levels of Islamic banks. In addition, the Islamic banks operating under the dual banking system seem to prefer to take a lower risk. Furthermore, the results identify that a stable political environment encourages Islamic banks to take higher risks in their operations.

In addition to examining the common factors, the empirical analysis in this study is extended to the investigation of the effects of several political indicators on risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks, which should be considered as an important contribution.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) prescribed in Basel III on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic and conventional commercial banks in Malaysia. It also investigates the claim that the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) managers is identically influenced by CAR.

Secondary data for all CBs operating in the Malaysian banking sector are gathered from FitchConnect database for the 2011–2017 period. Both dynamic ordinary least squares and generalised method of moments techniques are used to estimate a panel data of 43 commercial banks, namely, 17 IBs and 26 CBs.

The findings of this study lend support to the favourable influence of CAR set in Basel III accord on risk-taking behaviour of both types of banks. CBs appeared to be remarkably better off in terms of capital buffers. Evidence is established on the identicality of the risk-taking behaviour of IBs and CBs managers under CAR influence.

Even though a high CAR is observed to hamper risk-taking of banks, the findings may serve as a signal to regulators to be mindful of the implications of holding a high CAR. Similarly, managers may capitalise on the findings in terms of strategising for efficient use of the considerable capital buffers. Shareholders are also concerned about managers’ use of the considerable capital buffers.

This study is among a few studies that endeavoured to provide empirical evidence on the claim that IBs mimic the conduct of CBs in light of the influence of CAR prescribed in Basel III on risk-taking behaviour, particularly banks operating within the same banking environment.

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance, including board gender diversity and bank risk-taking behaviour in Ghana.

This research uses panel corrected standard errors estimation on 26 selected banks over an 11-year period from 2006 to 2016.

Using three proxies for bank risk-taking and two proxies for gender diversity for the purposes of checking robustness, this study finds ample evidence to support the important influence of corporate governance and board gender diversity on bank risk-taking behaviour. The findings suggest that independence, gender diversity, size and leadership consolidation can have significant effects on the risk profile of banking firms. The initial finding of the study suggests the possibility that female board gender diversity on Ghanaian banking boards follows the tokenism theory. Subsequent estimations seem to provide evidence to suggest that attaining a critical mass of female board members imposes a significant control on risk-taking behaviour by banks.

This study has important implications for gender diversity in board construction within the banking sector and the discourse on bank risk-taking in an emerging market context.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of economic freedom and six relevant subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Malaysian dual banking system. It also aims to make a comparative analysis between Islamic and conventional banks operating in this dual banking sector. Moreover, the study is an effort to enrich the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence on the argument that the risk-taking behavior of the two types of banks is indistinguishable given that they operate in the same regulatory environment.

Secondary data of all banks operating in the Malaysian banking sector are collected from FitchConnect database, in addition to the economic freedom index from Foundation Heritage for the period 2011–2017. Generalized least squares technique is employed to estimate the influence of economic freedom and the six relevant subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks.

The level of economic freedom influenced risk-taking behavior within the banking sector as a whole, conventional and Islamic banking sectors negatively during the study period (2011–2017). Risk-taking behavior of conventional and Islamic banks is similar. However, conventional banks turn to be less influenced by economic freedom level as compared to Islamic banks.

The government and regulators may benefit from the results by rethinking and setting the best economic freedom index that better serves the stability of the banking system, and lessens banks’ risk-taking inclination.

To the present time, this paper is thought to be of a significant contribution. Given the argument that Islamic and conventional banks behave in the same way. This is one of the first attempts to address this issue in light of the influence of economic freedom and six subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks operating in a dual banking system.

The global financial crisis of 2008 has put greater doubt on the bank risk-management effectiveness around the world. As a part of the response to such doubt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region is formulating some feasible approaches to manage bank risk. In this regard, an understanding of the role of the region’s culture and economic freedom will provide immense input into this risk management approach. This study examines the impact of national culture and economic freedom on bank risk-taking behavior.

Data on bank risk measures, culture and economic freedom are obtained from the FitchConnect, World Bank database, Hofstede’s insights and Heritage Foundation. Generalized least squares and two step-system generalized method of moments are then used to examine the risk-taking behavior of the region.

Banks of the GCC region operating in the low power distance, high collectivism, masculine and low uncertainty avoidance cultures are susceptible to assuming more operational and insolvency risks. Furthermore, banks’ overall risk-taking inclination is positively increased once the region has considerable business and monetary freedom.

The governments and bank regulatory bodies may benefit from the study findings by developing the best economic freedom index and national culture that enriches risk management practices and curves excessive risk-taking inclination.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first attempt to address the interplay among culture, economic freedom and bank risk to ensure constructive risk-taking behavior for the GCC banking industry.

This study aims to examine the impact of activity restrictions in shaping the risk-taking behaviour of banks through the channel of competition in different economic conditions.

The authors use a dynamic panel regression method, particularly a two-step system generalised method of moments to address the risk-taking persistence of banks and endogeneity of activity restrictions and competition with banks’ risk-taking using financial freedom and property rights as instrumental variables. Activity restrictions are computed by constructing an index based on the survey results of Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013a). Competition is measured by the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic and risk-taking behaviour are measured by non-performing loan ratio and lnZ-score. In the investigation process, the authors control bank characteristics – size, efficiency, ownership and loan composition and macroeconomic factors – gross domestic product growth and inflation, and use 2,527 bank-year observations from 180 commercial banks of Association of the Southeast Asian Nations-five countries over the 1990–2014 period.

This study finds that activity restrictions exacerbate the risk-taking behaviour of the banks leading to changes in the channel of competition because of the “risk-shifting effect” of competition. The finding is robust by considering the financial crisis and alternative specifications.

This study contributes to bank literature and policy formulation regarding the effect of activity restrictions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks, which is an issue of concern amongst bank regulators, policymakers and academics, especially in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.

Understanding how the competition plays a role in the relationship between activity restrictions and the risk-taking of banks in different economic situations.

This study provides new insight into the bank literature by investigating the moderating role of competition on activity restrictions and the risk-taking behaviour of banks in a different economic environment.

Purpose – This paper examines the interaction of efficiency and bank risk taking in the Ghanaian banking industry.

Design/methodology/approach – We relate risk taking to price competitiveness, foreign ownership and cost efficiency and other control variables. Cost-inefficiency scores from a stochastic frontier model are used, and a Lerner price index is employed to proxy for market power.

Findings – Our results suggest that market power affects risk taking when conditioned on foreign ownership, but foreign bank risk-taking behaviour is not statistically different from local banks. Cost inefficiency diminishes bank soundness. We also find that industry concentration discourages greater risk taking.

Originality/value – Our study extends the views on risk taking and competition among banks in Ghana, which throws more light from an emerging economy perspective.

This study aims to investigate how ownership structure and bank regulations individually and interactively influence risk-taking behaviour of a bank.

This empirical framework is based on dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments estimation technique to analyse an unbalanced panel data set covering 144 conventional banks from 12 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.

The estimation results suggest that foreign shareholding has an inverse relationship with bank risk-taking. In addition, official supervisory power is found to have a positive association with bank risk, and this relationship is reinforced for banks with higher ownership concentration. In addition, capital stringency increases bank risk, whereas market discipline has an opposite effect, only in countries with higher activity restrictions. Finally, the interaction between ownership concentration and activity restriction has an inverse association with bank risk-taking.

Overall, the evidence suggests that the Basel II framework and the regulatory reform initiatives in the post-global financial crisis period do not seem to have reduced bank risk-taking in MENA countries.

This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reform based on the three pillars of the Basel II guidance (capital regulations, market-oriented disclosures and official supervisory power), and offers evidence in support of “political/regulatory capture hypothesis” of bank regulation. The results also provide support for “global advantage hypothesis” of bank ownership.