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Legitimacy is defined as the ability to exercise authority without resorting to open coercion. It is an essential asset for firms seeking to reach and maintain profitability. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to present the case of the Canadian banking industry, which has been highly criticized during the last decade for its record profits, low level of risk taking, high fees and buoyant CEO compensation packages. More specifically, this research aims to analyze the general public's perceptions of the industry during a 50‐month period, starting with the first strong reaction to recurrent announcements of record profits. It also seeks to look at industry reactions as a response to bank bashing.

The case study in this paper was conducted in two steps. It first analyzed public perceptions by studying the content of a sample of newspaper articles on the Canadian banking industry from 1996‐2000. It then examined the industry's reactions by reviewing the documents found on the web site of the Canadian Bankers Association.

The study shows that the crisis faced by the banking industry was of limited but sustained intensity. The industry used a mixed strategy, justifying itself through its public discourse and mounting a program to inform and educate the Canadian public on the effects of economic factors in their lives. The banking industry limited its reactions to Sethi's first‐level strategy found in the literature.

The paper highlights how the general public perceive profit levels in the Canadian banking industry and how legitimacy is clearly an issue in this context.

Starting from the theoretical mechanism of profit sharing between finance and the real economy, this paper reviews and analyzes the profitability of China's banking industry and makes a horizontal comparison with the banking industry of the United States, Japan, and Germany.

Based on the panel threshold model, it is found that there is a dual-threshold asymmetric effect between banking profit and the growth of real economy. When the net profit rate of the banking industry is lower than 0.491%, the increase in banking profitability will inhibit the growth of real economy due to profit grabbing; when the rate falls within the range of 0.491–0.801%, the increase in bank profitability is conducive to the growth of real economy.

Finance and the real economy are in the most comfortable symbiotic state; when the rate is higher than 0.801%, the continued increase in bank profitability will weaken the promotion effect of finance on the real economy, but bank profitability and the growth of real economy are still in a symbiotic state of positive promotion.

The promotion effect of China's bank profitability to the growth of real economy has shifted from the suboptimal state to the optimal range as a whole, which is attributed to the strong deleveraging and strict supervision of the Chinese government after 2016, the timely and decisive “stepping on the brakes”, pulling the financial sector back from the “illusion” caused by “self-circulated” profits and preventing it from harming the real economy.

The present study assesses the commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition in a rapidly growing emerging economy, India from 2009 to 2019 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).

Lerner indices, conventional and efficiency-adjusted, quantify competition. Two SFA models are employed to calculate alternative profit efficiency (inefficiency) scores: the two-step time-decay approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) and the recently developed single-step pairwise difference estimator (PDE) by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). In the first step of the BC92 framework, profit inefficiency is calculated, and in the second step, Tobit and Fractional Regression Model (FRM) are utilized to evaluate profit inefficiency correlates. PDE concurrently solves the frontier and inefficiency equations using the maximum likelihood process.

The results suggest that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic equivalents, supporting the “home-field advantage” hypothesis in India. Further, increasing competition drives bank managers to make riskier lending and investment choices, decreasing bank profit efficiency. However, this effect varies depending on bank ownership and size.

Literature on the competition bank efficiency link is conspicuously scant, with a focus on technical and cost efficiency. Less is known regarding the influence of competition on bank profit efficiency. The article is one of the first to examine commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition. Additionally, the study work represents one of the first applications of the FRM presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and the PDE provided by Belotti and Ilardi (2018).

This paper offers a framework for understanding the financial system using Marx’s theory of value. It examines how to interpret the Marxist concepts of the rate of profit and fictitious capital when analysing the financial sector, showing how accounting terms such as ‘return on equity’ and ‘leverage’ can also be understood in this context. The analysis argues that the capitalist system’s rate of profit should be conceptualised in a way that includes finance, but that one should not mix up the accumulation of financial assets with the accumulation of advanced capital. While the costs of finance are negative for the system’s average rate of profit, the paper concludes by noting how this is not inconsistent with financial operations being very profitable for imperialist powers that can use the financial system to appropriate surplus value from elsewhere in the global economy.

The purpose of this study is to propose a model of competition between a formal lender (bank) and an informal lender (moneylender) with informational asymmetry between these two lenders. Further, the authors introduce capacity constraint on the lending capacity of the moneylender and assume that borrowers differ in risk and wealth.

The solution concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to derive the optimal strategies of the lenders.

The equilibrium strategies in most of the results depend on the difference between the expected returns from risky and safe projects where the risky project has higher expected returns. The credit market is segmented in terms of risk and wealth levels. Rationing of poor safe borrowers from the credit market is inevitable when the moneylender's capacity is sufficiently small, suggesting a low-income trap for them. Further, when moneylender has capacity constraint of some form, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome.

There is a possibility of collusion between the lenders. However, the authors do not derive all possible outcomes under capacity constraint

When the informal lender has limited capacity, competition between formal and informal lenders may not alleviate credit rationing, instead aggravate the problem. Thus, the government should devise policies to ensure credit availability to resource poor households

While the literature models strategic interaction between lenders under the assumption of zero-profit (Bertrand Paradox) condition, this study shows that zero profit is not the only outcome under such a set-up. Also, in presence of capacity constraint of the moneylender, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome for the lenders. There is an optimal contract at which the lenders differentiate in terms of repayment and collateral and earn positive profits under certain conditions.

Bank profit warnings represent a milder form of negative news than a bank failure. Yet, they may contain signals about a bank or its rivals because the information is transmitted when the bank believes that the market is overly optimistic about its future earnings. Thus, the profit warning serves as a means by which insiders of the bank can reduce the asymmetric information between the bank’s insiders and its investors. We find that banks experience negative valuation effects in response to their profit warnings. The banks’ profit warnings result in significant negative valuation effects for its corresponding rival banks, which implies that the warning carries valuable information about banking industry conditions. However, the effects on rivals are attenuated since the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD). This implies that investors may be relying on more transparent sources of information about individual banks rather than relying on one bank’s warning as a signal about other banks. Furthermore, bank regulations may allow for more transparent communication by banks than that of nonbank firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine differences in determinants of bank profit persistence among Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.

Using system generalized method of moments and data from four SSA countries during the period 2006–2012, this study considers differences in determinants of bank profit persistence across countries.

Efficiency in cost management is a major determinant of profit persistence in all the countries. However, concentration is found to be insignificant in all the estimations, suggesting that efficiency may be a more important determinant of profit persistence than concentration. Economic freedom associates negatively with profit persistence in Ghana, but its effect is insignificant in Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa. Lending specialization translates into less profit persistence in South Africa, but greater persistence in Tanzania. Higher levels of financial development result in lower profit persistence in Kenya and Ghana, but does not matter in Tanzania and South Africa.

The level of profit persistence gives an indication of the effectiveness of competition policies, and the differences observed in their determinants in this study suggest the need for tailor-made policy responses in the different countries.

This study improves the understanding of why some banking market competition policies have not achieved the desired outcomes in some countries. It is evident that blanket rules or wholesale importation of policies from other countries may not work in different contexts.

The aim of this study is to investigate profit efficiency in the banking industries of 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries for the period 1998‐2005.

The authors employ a directional technology distance function approach to measure profit efficiency and decompose it into its technical and allocative components. They use these efficiency measures to investigate potential differences in banking performance across countries and across banks of different size and with different ownership status.

The results indicate that the highest proportion of profit inefficiency in the CEE region is attributed to allocative inefficiency, recognizing that considerable variation and different patterns in inefficiency levels across banking systems can be observed. Small and domestic private banks appear to be the most efficient. A negative relationship between efficiency and bank size, the capitalization ratio and market concentration, and a positive relationship with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development index of banking reform are also found.

Bank performance relative to best practice is measured across the CEE region. While it is found that on average technical inefficiency is relatively small and about one quarter of the banks lie on the technological frontier, the size of technical inefficiencies is likely to be exacerbated if the sample were to include Western European banks.

The effects of banking reforms are evident by recent positive trends in profit and allocative efficiencies estimated for CEE banking sectors. These trends suggest that policy makers should intensify efforts to further improve the financial services regulatory and supervisory framework while freeing any remaining explicit or implicit barriers to bank competition.

The study departs from the traditional literature of efficiency. It uses a directional distance function approach to model multi input – multi output banking technology and to investigate profit efficiency in CEE countries.

In this paper, the authors investigate whether the systemic local banking crises (LBCs) and global financial crisis (GFC) impact the association between bank profit efficiency and earnings quality in developing economies.

Using panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991–2019 for 169 banks drawn from five East African countries, the authors perform difference-in-difference multivariate analyses using the generalised method of moments (GMM) system estimator on a sample consisting of 2,261 bank-year observations.

The results, which are robust for endogeneity and other checks, show that banks with higher profit efficiency consistently report higher quality earnings. The authors further establish that whereas systemic LBCs contribute negatively to bank earnings quality, the GFC tends to have a positive impact. These results are upheld when the joint impacts of both systemic LBCs, GFC and profit efficiency on earnings quality are considered. The positive influence of profit efficiency and GFC on earnings quality is pronounced under income-decreasing earnings management. The impacts of profit efficiency, LBCs and GFC on earnings quality appear to be non-monotonic and vary across the sampled countries.

The study's findings are based on banks in five developing countries within a regional economic bloc. Additional studies could focus on other economic blocs for enhanced generalisability of the findings. In addition, some of the variables examined are studied at bank-level, while other variables are at country-level. Finally, the study establishes an association between the variables of interest, and this does not necessarily imply causation.

The results provide useful insights to bank regulatory and supervisory agencies on the need to exercise increased risk-based scrutiny over bank loan loss provisioning and minimum loan loss reserve requirements. From an audit perspective, auditors need to be cautious and apply an enhanced risk-based audit especially when auditing banks during and after a financial, banking or systemic crisis. Credit rating agencies need to pay closer attention to the LLPs of distressed banks. Finally, bank investors and customers should be cautious when using bank financial statements, since bank managers of poorly performing banks might engage in aggressive earnings management.

The study is perhaps the first to examine the joint effects of systemic LBCs on the association between bank profit efficiency and the quality of earnings in a larger dataset of banks in a developing regional economic bloc. The authors also employ the GMM system estimator in the modelling, which helps address some weaknesses in prior studies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the quality of financial reporting by banks in China, and the profit hiding behavior of banks in particular.

Reported profit is compared with actual profit using multiple regression analysis. The identification strategy allows the authors to quantify the degree of profit hiding in banking institutions.

Profit hiding exists in the whole banking sector in China regardless of the ownership structure of individual banks, though joint-stock banks have higher degree of profit hiding. Banks that are more financially constrained hide more profit than those less constrained ones. The competition in the banking industry competition impacts the extent of profit hiding, with higher competition being associated with lower degree of profit hiding.

This paper documents the prevailing behavior of profit hiding in Chinese banks. It raises issues regarding the conventional methods of measuring bank efficiencies using accounting information reported by banking institutions.

This paper empirically examines the profit hiding behavior of banks in a transitional country.