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A major theme in the literature on bank regulation is that greater reliance on market forces can mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in government sponsored deposit insurance. Specific proposals to impose greater market discipline on banks include minimum requirements on (1) uninsured subordinated debt financing (either fixed-term or with option-type features), and (2) private coinsurance on deposits. Both proposals amount to delegating the responsibility for bank regulation to various private sector claimholders. The results suggest that such delegation (with or without claims that include option-type features) may be ineffective in lowering bank risk, at least within the present regulatory and institutional framework. Alternative mechanisms exist that can mitigate the moral hazard problem; however, it may be necessary for the regulator/deposit insurer to be an integral part of the solution.

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.

Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of shareholders and stakeholders interests. Such reforms have affected the conduct of business of all corporations in the region as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the shareholders. Unlike earlier studies which focused on non-financial firms, this study analyzes the corporate governance of listed banking firms in nine Asian emerging markets. Corporate governance mechanisms that serve to monitor the banking firms can be classified into Ownership Monitoring Mechanism, Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism, Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism, and Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism. This paper suggests that there are differences in the monitoring mechanisms of banking firms and non-bank firms.

This paper extends a recent study on financial dollarization of Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003) by introducing a lending of last resort intervention contingent both on banks’ portfolio currency composition and on banks’ monitoring effort. We show that when the lender of last resort commitment to intervene is matched with some operational discretion, according to a “constructive ambiguity” approach, then the provision of emergency liquidity may be crucial to enable distressed, but well-behaved banks, to survive and finance “high quality” investment projects.

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.

Prior research suggests that given the legal environment in the U.S., smaller syndicates with fewer lead banks should represent “best practices” to promote efficient monitoring and ease of renegotiation. Such syndicates should be associated with lower loan spreads. Controlling for other influences on loan pricing, we conduct tests of this proposition drawing on data from DealScan, Compustat and Federal Reserve Call Reports for U.S. loans between 1988 and 1999. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of lead lenders is shown to have a significant positive influence on loan yield spreads.

An inverse relation between performance and managerial turnover at Japanese firms suggests that bank monitoring substitutes for other governance mechanisms (Kaplan, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). Morck and Nakamura (1999), however, report that Japanese banks protect their self-interests as creditors rather than the interests of shareholders when appointing corporate directors. We re-examine data on top management changes at Japanese firms and find results consistent with this latter notion. Specifically, management turnover is conditionally related to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations rather than profitability or stock returns. Bank monitoring is therefore not a substitute for mechanisms that directly serve shareholders’ interests.

This chapter extends Panyagometh and Roberts (2008) by taking into account differences in costs of closure among countries and the effects of subordinated debt on moral hazard problems. Our results show that a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) can be used with contingent purchase and assumption policy to further reduce probability of future bank failure if the high level of uninsured debt can improve the effectiveness of monitoring. While a MSDP might be appropriate for some developed countries with effective informational and supervisory environments and developed financial markets, such as the U.S., extending a MSDP into developing countries is questionable.

Recent studies on the use of private, non-bank, debt have given conflicting results. Instead of a fixed order of preference between various choices of debt as suggested by previous studies, this study postulates that there is a life cycle of debt choice, and as firms move through the cycle, their preferences change. For stable, mature firms, when given a choice, non-bank private debt would fall in between the two extremes of bank debt and public debt. We provide empirical as well as anecdotal evidence from the trade press to support this view. We jointly model the decision to choose a debt source as well as the amount of debt on data from a current database to focus on the “intentional” change in debt levels, rather than those due to unintentional changes. We find that there are significant interdependencies between the decision to borrow from a particular source, as well as the amount of loan, and that taxes, as well as lender reputation, degree of renegotiability and financial flexibility required by the borrower, are key factors that influence the choice of private debt source.

This chapter is devoted to the issue of ensuring financial stability in the state. The main goal of the research is to determine the role and policy of the National (Central) Bank, which was called up, together with the Government, to ensure financial stability in the Republic of Belarus. The actions of the National Bank for the implementation of monetary policy, macroprudential regulation, and supervision are reviewed. It is noted that the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank credit and financial organizations, the payment system, the sector of other financial intermediaries (leasing activities, microfinance activities, activities of forex companies) is carried out by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. The main practical actions of the Government and the National Bank aimed at maintaining and ensuring financial stability is highlighted: monitoring of financial stability (goals, tasks, objects, monitoring directions are defined); creation of the Financial Stability Board (goals, objectives, representation, personal responsibility); disclosure of information on financial stability is carried out on an ongoing basis – the publication of the analytical review “Financial Stability in the Republic of Belarus.” The research provided a summary of the state of the country's financial sector and presented the achievements of the National Bank and state institutions for ensuring financial stability. The main problems affecting financial stability are highlighted: insufficient efficiency of the activities of large enterprises of the real sector of the economy; high levels of credit risk in banks; high dollarization of bank balance sheets. The directions of development of the financial market of the Republic of Belarus, contributing to ensuring financial stability are presented.