Search results

This study explores how the firm’s proprietary information has an impact on the bank loan contracts. It explains the propensity of using the competitive bid option (CBO) in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid for innovative firms and how it changes based on industry competition and the degree of innovations. This research also examines how the interstate banking deregulation (Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act) in 1994 affected the private loan contracts for innovative borrowers.

The study uses various econometric analyses. First, it uses the propensity score matching analysis to see the impact of patents on pricing terms. Second, it uses the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis by implementing the litigation and non-NYSE variables. Finally, it studies the impact of the policy change of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 on the bank loan contracts.

Firms with more proprietary information pays more annual facility fees but less other fees. The patents are the primary determinants of the usage of CBO in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid. While innovative firms can have better contract conditions by the CBO, firms with more proprietary information will less likely to use the CBO option to minimize the leakage of private information and the severe monitoring from the banks. Finally, more proprietary information lowered the loan spread for firms dependent on the external capital after the interstate banking deregulation.

The findings of this research will help senior executives with responsibility for financing their innovative projects. In addition, these findings should prove helpful for the lawmakers to boost economies.

This study examines bank practices of corporate loan pricing in the Asia‐Pacific region. We find that the all‐in‐spread for loans (mostly term loans with longer maturities) in the Asia‐Pacific region are significantly smaller than those in the US. In addition, foreign banks tend to price their loans favorably in the Asia‐Pacific region, while foreign banks in the US have a higher loan spread. This finding indicates that foreign banks foster more competitive loan pricing in the Asia‐Pacific region, while foreign banks in the US seem to experience a competitive disadvantage compared to domestic lenders.

This paper aims to examine how a firm’s political party orientation (Republican or Democratic), which is measured as the composite index based on the political party leanings of top managers, affects bank loan contracts. This study also investigates how the political culture of local states has a significant impact on loan contracts.

This research uses various databases including the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, financial covenant violation indicators based on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, firm bankruptcy filings and political culture index data to examine the impact of political orientation on the cost of debt. This paper also includes the state level of gun ownership and bachelor’s degrees to investigate how local political culture affects the loan contract. To control endogenous concerns, this paper uses an instrumental variable analysis.

Firms that have Republican-oriented political identities pay lower yield spreads for the main costs of debt including all-in-spread-drawn and all-in-spread-undrawn. This pattern is consistent with other fees of bank loans. This paper finds that an increase in conservative political policies toward Republican orientations is negatively associated with the cost of debt. The main findings also show that the political culture in the state where the headquarters of the borrowing firm are located plays an important role in bank loan contracts.

The findings in this paper provide evidence that a firm’s political party orientation significantly affects the loan contract terms in both pricing and non-pricing terms. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that shows the importance of political party identification on loan contracts by separating the sample into Republican, neutral and Democratic.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the issue of bayʿ wa salaf (the combination of sale and loan contracts in a single arrangement) from the Sharīʿah perspective. Based on the Sharīʿah findings on the issue, the paper examines the existing Islamic banking products and services that use these two specific contracts to determine whether the current practice is in line with Sharīʿah.

The paper uses the qualitative method by reviewing and analyzing relevant literature and operational structures to comprehend the issues pertaining to bayʿ (sale) and salaf (loan). It then provides Sharīʿah parameters for bayʿ wa salaf before applying them in assessing some existing Islamic banking products and practices. Subsequently, the compliance status of the banking operations that use these contracts in a specific product structure can be ascertained.

The paper finds that the bayʿ wa salaf arrangement in the existing Islamic banking products and services, as elaborated in the paper, does not fall under the prohibited category. This deduction is made in accordance with the parameters derived from jurists’ discussion on the issue of bayʿ wa salaf. It also takes into consideration other factors influencing the existence of such arrangements.

This conceptual research highlights the jurists’ discussion on the issue of bayʿ wa salaf and the compliance status of the current products and services that use the contracts in a single arrangement (specifically in the case of Malaysia) without discussing other possible structures that can be applied as an alternative to the bayʿ wa salaf arrangement.

Thorough understanding of the issue can strengthen the industry’s confidence in executing operations that conform to Sharīʿah principles.

The paper provides comprehensive deliberation on the ruling of bayʿ wa salaf from various schools of thought and exhaustive elaboration on existing Islamic banking products that apply bayʿ wa salaf in their structures. This contributes in reinforcing the stakeholders’ confidence in the operations of Islamic banking and finance.

This paper aims to examine whether CEO/chair dual roles influence board monitoring-audit fees nexus. The impact of corporate governance on audit fees literature is lacking in the banking sector, which is subject to different regulations and reporting requirements to other sectors. The level and quality of external audit services are important not only to shareholders and customers but also for regulators’ reputations and public confidence.

Examining a sample of the US national commercial banks, this study fills the gap by empirically examining whether the attributes of internal corporate governance mechanisms, proxied by boards of directors and audit committee characteristics, are related to audit fees. We introduce two interaction variables to understand whether chief executive officer (CEO)/chair dual roles influence the relationships between board independence and audit fees on the one hand and between the audit committee and audit fees on the other hand.

We find that audit fees are positively associated with board independence, board size, CEO/chair dual role and audit committee financial experts. The results of the interaction variables indicate that boards with higher independence and more effective audit committees tend to demand higher audit quality, and consequently, pay higher audit fees to protect shareholders’ interests from potential power abuse by CEOs who also chair boards.

This study contributes to the literature by providing extensive understanding of the influence on audit fees of the independence of the board of directors and the effectiveness of the audit committees. The authors first examine the impact of each individual governance variable separately and then introduce two interaction variables. This study provides policymakers with insights into the existing relationships between audit fees and the banking sector governance structure.