Search results

Cryptocurrency arose, and grew in popularity, following the financial crisis of 2008 built upon a promise of decentralizing money and payments. An examination of the history of money and banking in the United States demonstrates that stable money benefits from strict controls and commitments by a centralized government through chartering restrictions and a broad safety net, rather than decentralization. In addition, financial crises happen when the government allows money creation to occur outside of official channels. The US central bank is then forced into a policy of supporting a range of money-like assets in order to maintain a grip on monetary policy and some semblance of financial stability.

In addition, this chapter argues that cryptocurrency as a form of shadow money shares many of the problematic attributes of both the privately issued bank notes that created instability during the “free banking” era and the “shadow banking” activities that contributed to the 2008 crisis. In this sense, rather than being a novel and disruptive idea, cryptocurrency replicates many of the systemically destabilizing aspects of privately issued money and money-like instruments.

This chapter proposes that, rather than allowing a new, digital “free banking” era to emerge, there are better alternatives. Specifically, it argues that the Federal Reserve (Fed) should use its tools to improve public payment systems, enact robust utility-like regulations for private digital currencies and limit the likelihood of bubbles using prudential measures.

Within the last two decades, entrepreneurship education has become institutionalized in Germany. It is offered as a stand-alone program or as part of a business degree, combining academic knowledge, practical skills, and personal development to enhance the entrepreneurial success of university graduates. While entrepreneurship education has experienced similar growth worldwide, its emergence in Germany is closely tied to the country’s political and economic developments. The significance of entrepreneurship education for a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem and contemporary economic policy has been instrumental in advancing its academic recognition. This chapter provides a historical analysis of the academization of entrepreneurship in Germany. It explores the recursive and often idiosyncratic processes involving state and financial institutions, companies, and universities that have created, respecified, and mutually reinforced a subdiscipline and field of study. Academic entrepreneurship knowledge successively not only became relevant for starting a business but also for employment within the entrepreneurial infrastructure and beyond. This chapter follows a chronological order, highlighting three key stages in the academization of entrepreneurship education. First, the academic, financial, and political roots (I) of entrepreneurship up until the 1970s. Second, it explores the transformation (II) of entrepreneurship into a viable policy alternative and the challenges faced in establishing complementary research and education in higher education institutions during the 1980s. Finally, it sketches the institutionalization (III) of entrepreneurship as a central driver of government economic policy, allowing for the late bloom of entrepreneurship education and research at universities around the turn of the millennium.

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

The board structure (BS) is pivotal in modern corporate governance (CG). This study aims to investigate BS variables (BSIZE, BIND and chief executive officer [CEO] duality) and their correlation with risk-taking behavior indicators, enriching the understanding of how CG shapes financial institutions’ (FIs) decision-making in Pakistan.

By scrutinizing data from 67 financial entities listed on the Stock Exchange of Pakistan spanning from 2011 to 2022 through panel data regression techniques, the research emphasizes that BS holds a substantial influence over the risk tendencies exhibited by these firms.

Key findings suggest that board size has a positive influence, aligned with previous CG research. Smaller boards perform better and avoid excessive risk-taking, contrasting some negative relationship claims. More independent directors are recommended to curtail risk and financial disruption. Holding both CEO and chair roles reduces risk exposure, resonating with reputational and employment risk theory. It is essential to recognize that BS’s impact on risk-taking is nuanced and context-dependent.

Policymakers, scholars, practitioners and investors working in the market for financial companies might greatly benefit from the empirical findings of this study. Imposing mandates on FIs to uphold adequate capital reserves functions as a safeguard against unforeseen losses, thereby diminishing the probability of unwarranted risk-taking.

Prior studies in this domain predominantly focus on nonfinancial sectors. In addition, existing research often explores the relationship between BS and firm risk-taking solely within the banking sector, overlooking other FIs. This study contributes by using a comprehensive data set encompassing all types of FIs, thus extending the existing literature.

This paper aims to improve the debate linking the business models of banks to their riskiness by checking if diversification exerts different impacts on the probability of bank distress depending on the level of capital buffers.

The paper focuses on a sample of listed bank holding companies observed between 2007:Q3 and 2022:Q4. The authors use three subindexes of bank diversification. The authors estimate a dynamic model specification using a system generalized method of moments with robust standard errors and consistent estimators under heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within a panel. Sensitivity and robustness checks are performed.

Asset and income diversification increase the probability of distress in low-capitalized banks during normal periods (excluding periods of crises and high uncertainty). Concerning crisis periods, a marginal increase in asset diversification during the global financial crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic crisis induces a more important increase in the probability of failure of well-capitalized banks relative to low-capitalized ones. Contrary to the results obtained for the GFC period, well-capitalized banks were found to pursue more careful funding diversification in reaction to the sudden increase of uncertainty during the Russia–Ukraine war.

Prudential supervision should concentrate on well-capitalized banks to encompass unexpected excessive risk-taking during crisis periods. Regulatory requirements should constrain fragile banks to avoid pursuing assets and income diversification strategies that increase earnings volatility.

The main originality of this paper is to consider the interaction between three different dimensions of bank diversification and capital regulation during stable and unstable periods using the marginal effect analysis. Moreover, this paper uses, initially, the GFC as the reference crisis period to study the impact of capital buffers and diversification interactions on the probability of bank distress. Then, the authors extend the observation period until 2022:Q4 to include two additional major events, namely, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.

The financial system has witnessed the substantial growth of financial technology (fintech) firms. One of the strategies that banks have adopted to cope with this emergence is to cooperate with fintech firms. This study empirically investigated whether cooperation between banks and fintech companies would improve banks’ risk-adjusted returns.

We developed a novel index of bank–fintech cooperation across various fintech sectors. A system generalized method of moments (GMM) was used to examine this relationship using a sample of Vietnamese banks from 2007 to 2019.

The findings show that the diversity of bank–fintech cooperation across seven sectors tends to enhance banks’ risk-adjusted returns. The results also highlight that this relationship may depend on the types of fintech sectors and bank ownership. More specifically, the positive association between this cooperation and banks’ risk-adjusted returns only holds in the comparison sector of fintech, whereas there is a negative relationship between them in the payments and mobile wallets sector. Furthermore, state-owned commercial banks that engage in more bank–fintech cooperation tend to generate greater earnings. If we look at listed banks, the positive effect of bank–fintech partnerships on risk-adjusted returns still holds. A similar result was also found in the case of large banks.

Our empirical evidence provides motivations for incumbent banks to implement appropriate strategies toward diversity in bank–fintech partnerships when fintech firms have engaged in various financial segments.

This study adds more evidence to the existing literature on the relationship between bank–fintech cooperation and bank performance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the religiosity of the chief executive officer (CEO) on Indonesian banks’ performance.

The research method used was a review of the annual reports of banking companies in Indonesia from 2015 to 2019 and a web-based search to determine the religiosity of the CEOs. This study comprised 88 banking companies in Indonesia that come under the supervision of the Financial Services Authority.

The results of this study show that banks led by religious CEOs had better financial performance, as measured by their ROA and ROE, than those led by not very spiritual CEOs. These results indicate the importance of religiosity in organizations, especially at the top management level, for achieving better bank performance.

This research results show that religiosity plays an essential role in the banking business sector. This research adds to the literature on CEOs’ characteristics based on their religiosity and the concomitant effect on banking performance.

This study shows how individual religious beliefs influence the corporate behavior of top management, particularly the CEOs, and why this is crucial for organizational decision-making. This study measures an individual's religiosity (i.e. a CEO) based on that individual's actions in their workplace environment.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether banks’ commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) is related to the diversification of their activities and whether CSR, as a result, affects banks’ risk profile.

Using a sample of 215 publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies between 1996 and 2016, this study applies regression analysis to examine the links between CSR and activity diversification and risk-taking. It also conducts a mediation test to determine whether CSR affects risk through its influence on banks’ activity diversification.

The results of this study show that banks engaging in positive CSR activities significantly increase the diversification of their banking activities, consistent with the theory that CSR serves as an implicit risk hedging strategy. Mediation analysis provides evidence that this translates into more stable and less risky banks.

This study contributes to the literature by suggesting that activity diversification is a channel through which CSR reduces bank risk and improves asset quality.

Using the Indonesian setting where the government formally limits the presence of busy commissioners, the authors investigate whether a board containing busy commissioners could be beneficial or detrimental for firm performance.

The authors propose an econometric model focusing on the impact of busy commissioners on the firm's profitability. The authors are also interested in investigating whether the effect is different between small and large firms and between mature and non-mature firms. A sample of 392 Indonesian listed firms from 2014 to 2020 is used in this study.

The authors find a negative association between busyness and performance and this result is robust across different estimations and econometrics strategies. The authors also document that the negative impact of busy directors diminishes particularly in young and small firms. The authors also find that the impact is more pronounced in state-owned firms.

From a firm point of view, the result suggests that the companies should be aware that appointing busy commissioners in the board structure can detriment market-based performance. The listed firms should also understand that busy commissioners are inefficient, especially if these firms are large, mature and state-owned.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study investigating the relation between busy commissioners and performance by considering age, firm size and state-owned firms as a moderator in a sample of Indonesian listed firms.