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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how blockchain technology – which permits the Internet-based exchange of value (digital assets) – enables supply chain finance banks to overcome the challenges they face when attempting to create win–win transactions for supply chain participants. Traditionally, buyers and suppliers linked together in a supply chain have conflicting objectives as manifested by a zero-sum payoff structure. Suppliers want their invoices to be paid quickly in order to reduce their need for working capital. In contrast, buyers want to delay payment of invoices as long as possible in order to reduce their need for working capital. In other words, suppliers want a short cash conversion cycle; buyers want a long cash conversion cycle. This conflict is eliminated by the insertion of a financial intermediary (supply chain finance bank) between the buyer and the supplier. The bank eliminates the conflict by: (1) using its balance sheet to decouple the cash conversion cycles of the buyer and supplier; and (2) providing cheaper financing to impatient suppliers and reluctant buyers (since the bank has a higher credit rating than both the supplier and the buyer).

This chapter provides a case study on a Sharīʿah-compliant home facility contract based on the Bai Bithaman Ājil (BBA) contract, generally used by Islamic banks in Malaysia. The study emphasises on the need to comply with the existing legal framework and execute relevant contracts in line with the Sharīʿah resolutions of the Sharīʿah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia without causing harm (ḍarar) to the customers or introducing uncertain elements or procedures (gharar) in the execution of the agreements. This chapter is based on doctrinal analysis of the relevant issues as well as a qualitative legal research through content analysis of relevant BBA agreements, case law as well as statutory provisions. The case study used in this chapter is completely anonymised. The study finds that the execution of BBA agreements in Malaysia leaves much to be desired. Even though the regulatory framework for Sharīʿah-compliant home financing in Malaysia is robust, there are some legal and Sharīʿah considerations which the stakeholders need to look into in order to project Malaysia as the main global hub of Islamic finance. This study demonstrates the need for proper Sharīʿah auditing of the practical execution of BBA agreements to avoid an incorporated element of gharar at the time of execution of the agreements, which might ultimately lead to unforeseen reputation risks for the bank. Though there are several studies on the Sharīʿah, financing and accounting aspects of the BBA home facility agreement, this study focusses on both Sharīʿah and legal issues, using the case study approach. The recommendations are expected to provide a good policy framework for the stakeholders in the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia.

Introduction: According to the existing research, one of the key determinants of a company’s survival and market development is its ability to get bank loans or other external sources of finance for business expansion.

Purpose: The study aims to explore the factors affecting access to finance and their effects on the development of medium- and small-sized businesses. These factors include business size and age, profitability, the length of a company’s association with a commercial bank, and banking sector characteristics.

Need for the study: It is particularly crucial for small- and medium-sized businesses since they often have trouble getting funding from banks because they don’t supply the banks with the information they need to assess their loan application prospects, however, when a company’s economic and financial situation improves, banks get access to more information about the firms, and financing is thus more readily available.

Methodology: This research is based on qualitative methods, focus on an elaborative study of the existing literature, and provide suggestions based on the same.

Findings: The findings show that small- and medium-sized businesses, like those in other European nations, have less access to finance than large businesses. It revealed that the company’s size, liquidity, profitability, and banking industry state significantly influence the availability of bank loans.

The main purpose of this chapter is to shed more light into the challenging small business (SME) task of securing adequate and appropriate funding for continued viability. Access to finance is of fundamental importance to SME survival, invariably it involves working capital needs or long-term capital projects. This chapter will mainly focus on the Greek environment and the individual characteristics of the domestic market, in particular. As in most countries, SMEs form the backbone of Greece’s economic activity, accounting for almost 95% of the total. They are the very backbone of the country’s daily business and labour force. Crucially, the Greek banking system upon which many small enterprises rely has collapsed during the years of global financial crisis, with the domestic banks literally ending up completely drained of all available liquidity.

In a country that has gone through enormous financial turmoil, and with a damaged banking system that has undergone three recapitalisation processes, domestic companies had little, if any, support from the traditional banking sources. In the summer of 2015, things became critical, when the country almost left the European Union’s (EU) common currency zone and entered a capital control regime. As a result, enterprises sought other channels of financing to overcome the obstacle. Focus in this chapter will be on the role of the stock market, the national investment funds and the EU funding.

This chapter, in the main, builds insight from a research-informed case study: that of Greek SMEs and their access to finance (excluding the banking sector). The time span of the analysis covers the years of the domestic financial crisis, lasting considerably more than within the other European countries. Though varying in magnitude, the crisis in Greece started sometime in 2010 and concluded in 2018, leaving deep scars on the country’s productive body. During that period, the domestic banking system underwent catalytic changes, embracing three major recapitalisation schemes and an enormous merger phase that ended up with only four remaining systemic banks. Prior to that, the 2012 Private Sector Involvement (bailout program) led the country’s rating to a default status and made financing options extremely difficult.

This chapter will also offer comparisons to other European states, to enable drawing of conclusions about the different operating parameters of doing business in the greater region; and to facilitate search for common patterns between the countries that were hit by the credit crunch and also saw their banking systems weaken. The data will be drawn exclusively from secondary sources, including national and European public and private organisations dealing with financial and investment analyses. Once gathered, data is categorised and critically evaluated to look deeper into the nature of the behaviour of SMEs and the financing channels they have found during the study sample period.

Key findings will include the reporting and the evaluation of Greek firms’ access to finance with regard to non-banking sources, such as the stock market, EU funding, investment laws and venture funds. Comparison with prior years and with other European markets will show the main challenges and obstacles firms faced, and the solutions they found during the crisis.

Limitations can be split into two categories: first, the data reported at public and private sites include by default the official sector of the economy, thus, omitting the reporting of parallel or unofficial market activity. In an economy that includes approximately 20% of unofficial GDP, such sources most probably proved catalytic in the companies’ liquidity, without being officially reported. Second, the time span of the sample is quite large, making it difficult to analyse the specific characteristics of various companies at various time points in full detail. However, the chapter’s main purpose is to offer an all-inclusive picture of how things evolved during the years of the crisis and not to focus on specific points. Describing the big picture is the priority of this chapter, with a focus on capturing the financing trends during this period of abnormality. Perhaps a further study in the future could be inspired by this current one, to break-up the period into smaller pieces and dedicate detailed analysis to each chunk. Useful conclusions will be drawn in this chapter for policy-makers, including both fiscal and monetary directors, who will get a clearer picture of how the credit crunch influenced the market, and how SMEs worked their way through these challenging times to find ways to finance their operations, development and growth. The major contribution of this chapter is it being the first to cover SMEs exclusively during all years of the financial crisis in a country like Greece that has seen its banking sector collapse. Firms were left without their traditional source of funding, the next-door bank, and managed to find alternative routes to finance to survive and keep on going.

This chapter presents research to assess the impact of the recent financial crisis on technology-based small firms (TBSFs) in the United Kingdom based on findings from an extended telephone survey with the owner-managers of 49 young and 51 more mature TBSFs, undertaken in 2010. Even before the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, it was generally acknowledged that TBSFs faced greater obstacles in accessing finance than conventional SMEs. This is because banks have difficulty assessing the viability of new technology-based business ventures due to information asymmetries, whilst risk capital providers may have difficulty providing appropriate or sufficient funds on terms acceptable to entrepreneurs. Given the recent difficulties that SMEs, in general, have faced in obtaining external finance, we would expect TBSFs to have been particularly adversely affected by the financial crisis. Our evidence showed that TBSFs exhibited a strong demand for external finance between 2007 and 2010, related to their growth ambitions and achievements. They sought finance mainly from banks but also with younger TBSFs seeking business angel finance and more mature TBSFs seeking venture capital finance. However, our evidence indicates that both debt and equity finance became harder to access for TBSFs, particularly for early-stage and more R&D-intensive firms. Where funding was offered, it was often on unacceptable terms with regards to the levels of collateral or equity required. The chapter provides evidence of a growing funding gap and concludes that the ability of TBSFs to contribute to economic recovery is hampered by ongoing problems in obtaining external finance.

Historically, the World Bank has been the largest external financier of education in the world, committing a peak amount of just over $5 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 through both its Education Sector projects and multisector projects managed by other sectors (World Bank, 2010b). The World Bank also hosts the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI). Launched in 2002, EFA FTI is a partnership of governments, civil society organizations, and multilateral agencies such as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank, which provides grant funding and technical assistance to implement the basic education components of national education strategies. By providing significant funding for education in low-income countries (LICs) through its own International Development Association (IDA) and by managing the majority of EFA FTI grant funding, the World Bank has a major impact on the direction of education development around the world.

In 2011 the Bank released a new Education Sector Strategy, Learning for All, which sets out the World Bank Education Sector's approach to education development over the coming decade. The analysis in this chapter examines the role of the EFA FTI and the growth of World Bank education operations managed outside the World Bank Education Sector, as well as their influence on Bank education lending objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. We examine trends in World Bank and EFA FTI basic education financing in sub-Saharan African countries that have joined the EFA FTI partnership to compare these two sources of financing for primary education and analyze the extent to which the World Bank is substituting its primary education lending with grants from the EFA FTI. We also assess the results frameworks of 10 multisector operations managed by noneducation sectors (Economic Management and Poverty Reduction; Urban Development; Rural Sector; Population, Health, and Nutrition; and Social Protection) to ascertain the extent to which they include education objectives and indicators. The chapter focuses its research around two questions:1.Is there evidence that financing from the EFA FTI is substituting World Bank financing for education in sub-Saharan Africa?2.Are World Bank multisector operations well designed to achieve education objectives in sub-Saharan Africa?

The research finds that the EFA FTI has almost certainly impacted the demand for IDA financing for basic education development. The comparison of IDA and EFA FTI primary education financing shows country-level substitution is occurring in a number of sub-Saharan African countries, with at least 13 out of 18 EFA FTI grant recipients in sub-Saharan Africa receiving a declining share of IDA financing for primary education since joining the EFA FTI.

Second, multisector operations now account for one-third of Bank education lending and have increased to comprise half of all new education commitments in sub-Saharan Africa. The research finds that multisector operations with education components are not as effective or accountable for education outcomes as those managed by the Education Sector, unless they are explicitly linked to national education plans. Given the disconnect between Education Sector managed education lending, and financing for education managed by other Bank sectors, it is unclear how the latter will be guided by the Bank's Education Sector Strategy, which will only apply to half of all Bank education lending for sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, there is no guarantee that both EFA FTI funding and noneducation sector managed lending will be measured against World Bank education strategy standards, and yet the Education Sector Strategy 2020 does little to address these challenges.

Climate and environment-related financial risks could significantly and negatively impact the financial sector in future, particularly its financing to those sectors adversely impacted by the climate-related risks, low-carbon policies and the transition from traditional energy sources-based economy to a more sustainable system with alternative energy sources. The participatory countries of the Paris Agreement agreed to align finance flows with a low-emission, low-carbon and climate-resilient growth, in order to facilitate achieving the long-term climate goals. The financial sector, therefore, needs to play a proactive role in aligning financial flows. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to study low-carbon finance and climate-related financial risks. This chapter examine how climate change can affect the financial sector. It discusses the concept, nature, measurement of climate risks and climate-related financial risks and associated prospects and challenges in the assessment and the measurement of these risks. It also presents the green financing initiatives and role of central banks and supervisory authorities and their monetary and financial policies in enhancing green financing and redirecting finance to low-carbon activities. In the financial sector, the insurance industry is highly vulnerable to such risks. The banking sector is yet to witness the serious impact of these risks. With the slowing of global economic growth, appropriate policies are needed to encourage banks to provide increased green finance with an adequate profitability. Studies recommend that climate-related risk has a strong potential impact on banks’ loan default rate as well as on the financial stability, there is hence a need to incorporate climate-related criteria and the systemic risk arising out of climate change into banks’ decision-making process and risk modelling and management. There is a need for developing an appropriate methodology for assessing and reducing these risks. Moreover, observers also anticipate a need for cooperation between banking regulators and banks to develop and adopt best practices in the management of environmental risks. The environment-related risks will call forth a multi-country, or regional, research office to collect and compile the required data and undertake analysis to enhance the banking sectors’ understanding of, and capacity to address, potential systemic environmental risks. What is needed is to test the feasibility of incorporating forward-looking scenarios for assessing potential impacts of providing credit to environmentally unsustainable or sustainable activities on financial stability.